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1P REFAC E
Most research initiatives on Roma migration focus on Roma migrating 
from non-EU to EU or EU-to-EU countries. In our project we aim to 
look at another sub-component of the migration process: transatlantic, 
Canadian migration. The migration and asylum seeking of Central Eastern 
European Roma to Canada started in the 1990s when several thousands of 
Roma moved to Canada. The dynamic face of discrimination and the racist 
climate in their home countries, as well as the Canadian state’s shifting 
immigration and refugee policies and the bilateral diplomatic relations 
between Canada and the CEE countries were all factors in the emigration 
of Roma and the eventual return back to their home countries. Most Roma 
immigrants were from the Czech Republic and Hungary though some 
came from Slovakia as well. 
The collection of papers presented here is the outcome of a pilot 
project that aimed to look at various aspects of Roma migration to Canada. 
Judit Tóth’s paper discusses Roma migration from a legal standpoint, 
enumerating and analyzing the various European and international laws and 
regulations that aim to protect the Roma but, evidently, fail to satisfactorily 
do so. Antonela Arhin gives insight into how Roma migration is perceived 
in Canada while also attempting to suggest a context for understanding 
the shift in Canada’s refugee policy which ultimately put an end, at least 
temporarily, to Roma migration from CEE countries. The following four 
papers are country case studies based on exploratory fieldwork conducted by 
Jan Grill (the Czech case), Alena Chudžíková and Elena Gallová Kriglerová 
(the Slovak case), Zsuzsanna Vidra and Tünde Virág (the Hungarian case). 
The last chapter is Judit Durst’s piece on migrant experiences in Canada. 
2The aim of our pilot project was to present a multidimensional picture 
of Roma migratory trends to Canada as well as to juxtapose this against 
the home country experiences, given that there have been important out-
migration waves from all three countries at different periods of time and 
at different volumes. As for the case studies, they are based on exploratory 
research in three sending and in one receiving community. Additionally, 
the pilot project attempted to present new perspectives on how ‘Roma 
migration’ might be conceptualized. It is also our hope that, given the 
comparative nature of the project as well as the specific focus on Canadian 
migratory trends, some of the insight gained from this pilot study will 
inspire the development of future projects.  
Legal and political perspectives
In her paper, Judit Tóth considers the legal aspects of Roma migration. 
She illustrates how constant attempts by various international organizations 
and bodies (like the UN and the EU and national governments) to regulate 
the status and situation of Europe’s estimated 10-12 million Roma citizens, 
often producing unsatisfactory results, actually fuel migration itself. The 
fact that instruments of Roma integration/inclusion/legal protection have 
been inapt is mainly attributed to the absence of political will on the part 
of CEE countries’ national governments, who fear alienating too many (the 
majority of) their constituents. She rather convincingly argues that Roma 
have long been categorized as ‘irregular’ – be it as citizens of the EU or 
their nation state, as migrants or minorities. Tóth analyzes the ‘five pillars 
of regulation’, which are anti-discrimination legislation, right to asylum 
and international protection, free movement of persons, EU work policy, 
affirmative action and minority rights. These aim to ‘regularize’ the situation 
of Roma as much from a legal point of view as from a social integration one. 
Indeed, the author argues, there is evidence enough that none of these tools 
are working properly. Despite national and international efforts to improve 
the situation of the Roma from both legal and social aspects, no significant 
advances have been made in the last few decades. The fault lies with both 
3the implementation of the related measures or, as Tóth asserts, the fact that 
the tools themselves are inadequate and inept to change the situation. Thus, 
she concludes, these system failures significantly contribute to the ongoing 
push towards Roma migration. 
Antonela Arhin presents Roma migration from CEE countries from the 
Canadian perspective. She briefly introduces Canada’s immigration regime, 
pointing out that – although it has been, through the course of time, a very 
open and welcoming system – it has had periods of exclusion. Although the 
spirit of immigration and the resulting multicultural society are embedded 
in the very sense of Canadian nationhood, the reverse in asylum policy in 
2012 (Bill C-31) was not unprecedented. The Bill was passed as a reaction 
to the prior massive influx of Roma refugees and was intended to stop 
‘bogus’ and ‘unfounded’ refugee claims. According to the new regulation, 
countries with democratically elected parliaments, independent judiciaries, 
and civil society organizations are deemed as ‘safe’ and refugee claims from 
the citizens of these states would be deemed illegitimate. Providing us with 
unique insight, Arhin also discusses how some civil and political actors in 
Canada perceive the new refugee law. 
Research in the field – country case studies
Whilst the first two studies investigated the legal and the political 
components of the push and pull of Roma migration, the rest of the papers 
are based on qualitative, empirical studies that were conducted in three 
CEE countries – the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia – as well 
as in Canada. The three country case studies were designed to consider 
Roma migration from a micro perspective using the same methodology 
and the same conceptual framework. Researchers in the three countries did 
fieldwork in villages and towns in which there had been a significant out-
migration of Roma, presently or in the past. The selected communities all 
had a significant proportion of Roma inhabitants and had similar dynamics 
of social inclusion and exclusion. They interviewed families and individuals 
who had emigrated and then returned as well as individuals whose families, 
4relatives, or acquaintances were still in Canada. The project covered a small 
scope – about 5-10 family interviews per country – and did not attempt to 
give profound insight on, or a full-fledged understanding of the migration 
process of Roma families as a whole. Rather, it sought to raise new questions 
and formulate a more coherent conceptual framework in which to facilitate 
future inquires into the ‘Roma migration theme’. The three case studies on 
the home countries are supplemented by a fourth fieldwork study made on 
the receiving end, in Toronto, Canada, a place where many of the migrants 
have settled and live. These empirical snapshots constitute our pilot project. 
We see all this as a starting point, a first step towards further inquiry and an 
inspiring attempt at developing a new conceptual framework for the study 
of Roma migration.
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1 .  I N T R O D U C T I O N 
T H E O R I Z I N G  R O M A  M I G R AT I O N  TO  C A N A D A
Zsuzsanna Vidra
Central European University, Center for Policy Studies,Hungary
The original conceptual framework in which the phenomenon of Roma 
migration has been traditionally analyzed is based on the currently adopted, 
scholarly definition of this process; considered a combination of refugee and 
either labor or economic migration (Klimova and Pickup 2003). Given the 
fact that Roma migration from the Central Eastern European countries, 
following the democratic transition, took the form of asylum seeking (into 
other EU countries and into Canada), the occurrence of these specific 
migratory movements became a political battlefield notably between states 
and human rights activists. CEE state governments saw Roma asylum 
seeking as an impediment on their EU accession and the start of trouble 
in terms of their peaceful bilateral relationship with Canada. The main 
public and political argument in the 1990s and early 2000s (before the 
EU accession) was that emigrating Roma were ‘bogus’ refugees and should 
simply be considered economic immigrants attempting to take advantage of 
the welfare systems in their host countries1. 
1 Table 1. shows the trends of Roma migration – both asylum seekers and labor/economic 
migration – before and after EU accession. In the pre-accession period, emigration into 
EU countries primarily took the form of asylum seeking and with, basically, only negative 
results. In contrast, the asylum seekers in Canada had a better chance of receiving a positive 
verdict. After accession, economic migration to the EU replaced asylum seeking, although 
it is estimated that the volume of this type of migration from these three countries has been 
rather limited.
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Table 1. Roma migration trends, before and after EU accession, from 
the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary 2 3
EU2 Canada 
Pre-accession 
Cz Mass migration3 (asylum) Mass migration (asylum) till 1997 (visa in 1997) 
Sk Mass migration (asylum) Non significant  
H Non significant Mass migration (asylum) till 2002 (visa in 2001)
Post-accession 
Cz Non significant labor migration Mass migration (asylum) between  2007-2009 (new visa in 2009) 
Sk More significant labor migration Started in 2009 
H Non significant labor migration Mass migration (asylum) from 2009 (visa lifted in 2008) 
Source: compiled by the author of the paper based on the country case studies 
Research focus and theoretical framework
It was essential for civil rights activists and Roma organizations to construct 
a counter argument to the ‘economic migrant’ conjectu-re by emphasizing 
that, indeed, ethnic discrimination continued to be the major impetus 
for migration. Yet, in terms of scholarly discourse – from an analytical 
point of view – making an artificial distinction between migrations fuelled 
by ethnic discrimination or social deprivation was nonsensical. Any 
meaningful analysis would have to take into account these motivations 
as inseparable. Indeed, most studies conducted on Roma migration found 
 
2 The asylum seeking of Roma in Western European, EU member states before accession 
had been a continuous process, nonetheless, except for few exceptions, all Roma claims had 
been turned down.
3 “Mass migration” is a relative term: “only” a couple of thousands of people emigrated, but 
the process had important political consequences.
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 that individual reasons given for migration encompass both dimensions, as 
they are hard to separate and, even if you focus on one or the other, actually 
there are traces of both in the migrants’ accounts (Vašečka and Vašečka 
2003, Kováts et al. 2002).
Even we took for granted that Roma migration should be understood 
and posited as being motivated by various factors that include both 
discrimination and social deprivation in the course of our project. However, 
we decided to engage in creating a conceptualization that focuses on the 
migration process as a whole, rather than pinpointing the motivations 
behind Roma migration. Thus, we hope to have found a somewhat different 
and new way of understanding Roma migration. Our pilot research was 
conducted with the purpose of exploring the families’ entire migratory 
process: their motivations for leaving, how they find the resources to 
migrate, life in the destination country, and, in some cases, the process of 
returning. Besides recording some real life accounts from the migrants (or 
the narratives from family members who stayed), it was also possible to get 
insight into how migrant networks formed and how they worked. 
In fact, the empirical materials we gathered from these three 
countries, although limited in scope and volume, provided us with enough 
information to begin developing a conceptual framework that accounts for 
migration systems and migration diffusion. We need to emphasize that our 
exploratory studies have only allowed us to raise hypotheses and collect sets 
of questions, rather than come to any conclusions or propose answers. 
In order to understand how migration processes start and develop 
in general, we set out on the search for theoretical models dealing with 
the process. De Haas’ (2010) has an influential theoretical work on the 
dynamics of migration process and when applying his approach we 
attempted to clarify some aspects of Roma migration by looking at the 
formation and self-sustainability of migration networks and their diffusion. 
We posed the questions like: What initiates migration to Canada? How 
does it perpetuate itself? What kinds of network effects are at play? Besides 
the macro effects of Canadian refugee policies, what determines migration 
a success or a failure? (Table 2.) 
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Table 2. Examples of endogenous and meso-level contextual feedback 
mechanisms (de Haas 2010)
Type Level
Domain
Social Economic Cultural
Endogenous
Immediate 
(migrant 
group)
Migrant 
networks, 
’migration 
industry’
Remittance-
financed 
migration
Transfers of 
migration-
related ideas and 
information
Contextual 
Origin 
community 
Social 
stratification, 
relative 
deprivation
Income 
distribution, 
productivity 
and 
employment
Social 
remittances, 
culture of 
migration
Destination 
community
Patterns of 
clustering, 
integration/
assimilation 
Demand for 
migrant labor 
generated 
by clusters 
of migrant 
businesses
Transnational 
identities, 
demand for 
marriage patterns 
On the migrant group level, the social feedback mechanism entails the 
migrant network itself and the migration industry (de Haas 2010) including 
all actors who form part of the migration process (e.g. travel agents, lawyers, 
bankers, labor recruiters, brokers, interpreters, and housing agents as 
well as human smugglers and traffickers). In the economic domain, the 
remittances financing migration are considered to be the main facilitators of 
the process whereas what plays an important role in the cultural domain is 
the information and ideas essential for new migrants. As for the contextual 
feedback mechanisms, for the origin community we can talk about the 
social consequences of migration as generating social differences (since 
migrants become wealthier, this results in a relative deprivation for those 
who stay behind). This is also related to the economic domain, whereby 
– as a result of remittances – a change in the income distribution within 
the origin community could, along with communities’ general relative 
deprivation, raise the desire to migrate. Social remittances (Lewitt 1998) 
do play a role of inspiring migration. In the destination community, it is 
9I N T R O D U C T I O N .  T H E O R I Z I N G  R O M A  M I G R A T I O N  T O  C A N A D A
always an essential question if migrants will settle in clusters that end up 
with a special social arrangement. At the same time, it is also a question - 
an important one in the migration process - if migrants have the desire or 
the opportunity to integrate or assimilate in their host country. Generally 
speaking, assimilated migrants have less incentive to assist new migrants 
from their origin community. Additionally, migrant clustering maybe the 
main reason for increased migrant labor demand, since migrant businesses 
also emerge in these communities. Finally, it is also yet to be seen how 
transnational identities develop because it may be a factor in the increase 
of culturally determined migrant moves (such as more marriages between 
migrants and members of their origin community). 
While this model is used to explain the dynamics of the migration 
process, at least certain aspects of it, De Haas argues that the model 
remains incomplete because, if all elements are unchanged, then migration 
would go on “ad infinitum” and the “whole community should end up 
at the destination” (de Haas 2010: 1599). To account for this weakness, 
the concept of migration diffusion as well as of weak and strong ties and 
negative social capital is introduced to explain why migrant networks 
decline and why migratory trends change in regards to destinations over 
periods of times.  
Using diffusion theory we can identify the ‘pioneers’ or ‘innovators’ 
-  those who migrate first from a community. Given the high risks and 
costs of migration, these individuals are usually from relatively well-to-do 
households. They are then followed by the early majority and then by the 
laggards. The networks evolve, ensuring that the risks and costs become 
bearable even for those who come from much less affluent households. 
Migration continues until a certain saturation point is reached; that is, 
when all households intending to migrate have done so. Alternately, the 
migration pattern may change as a result of competition for jobs in the 
destination community. 
Further to the point that the migration process may come to an end 
because there are no more who wish to migrate from a community, that 
all have gone who could or wanted to, it should also be clarified why it 
10
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does not spread across all segments of society or to the wider community. 
Here, De Haas insists on applying the notion of weak and strong ties, as 
developed by Granovetter (1973), as well as the concept of negative social 
capital, as developed by Portes (1998). Normally, strong ties represent a 
positive influence. However, in the migration process, they might be 
counter-productive at some point. It is argued that migration information 
is spread through the weak ties in a community, whereas strong ties play a 
crucial role in the actual migration process, especially amongst lower status 
migrants. On the same token, social capital can be paralyzing because it 
can also be exclusionary. When strong ties only help immediate family 
members for example, the migration process may be halted or altered as no 
other members of the community, except those who have strong ties (are 
related) to the pioneers, can leave.
Roma migration to Canada
Our endeavor entails an attempt to apply these models of migrant networks, 
migration diffusion, and the role of strong and weak ties to the Roma 
migration to Canada relying on the interview data collected and presented 
in the specific country case studies provided here. By undertaking this 
exercise we hope to come to a more refined understanding of the Roma 
migration process while keeping in mind the explorative nature of the 
project. Thus, we will propose some hypotheses that could be worthy of 
further investigations and testing. The below table (Table 3.) summarizes 
the findings of the case studies.
11
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Table 3. Endogeneous and meso-level contextual feedback mechanisms 
applied to Roma migration to Canada 
T
y
p
e 
Level
Domain
Social Economic Cultural
E
n
d
o
g
e
n
e
o
u
s
Immediate 
(Migrant 
group)
Some family 
members/
acquaintances already 
in Canada, 
Including money-
lenders, 
lawyers, interpreters, 
social workers, health-
care workers, human 
rights activists 
Family/relative 
remittance-
financed 
migration; 
Selling all their 
properties, taking 
loans 
Via internet, 
Village/
community 
chit-chat 
transferring 
migration-
related 
information
C
o
n
t
e
x
t
u
a
l 
Origin 
community 
Relative deprivation 
is at play (earlier 
migrants bought new 
homes, renovated old 
homes, etc.) 
Minor impact on 
income 
distribution 
(investing in 
housing or finance 
remigration) 
Evolving 
culture of 
migration 
social 
remittances: 
“we were 
treated as 
human beings”
Destination 
community
Strong ethnic 
clustering 
(accommodation)
Lack of social 
capital: not being 
able to integrate (not 
learning English, not 
having the skills to 
manage life; strong 
dependence on 
migrant network) 
Existing migrant 
business: 
garbage picking 
(‘garbicsolás’ in 
Hungarian)
working on 
construction sites, 
factory jobs
Crucial: success of 
migration depends 
on one getting into 
an ethnic business
Transnational 
identities are 
strong
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Looking first at the immediate migrant group, we observe similar 
trends in all three countries. Migration to Canada, while being in different 
phases for each of the three countries (e.g. the visa requirements for Czech 
citizens (2009) have resulted in a complete drop in applicants from the 
country, or the effects of the new refugee reform introduced by Canada as 
of 2012), shows very similar network characteristics. Migrant networks are 
usually formed with family members or, to some extent, with acquaintances 
already in Canada. Migrants get monetary help from their relatives overseas 
– remittance financed migration – so they can buy the expensive airplane 
ticket. They are usually expected to pay this back once they arrive and 
begin to receive social welfare there. Oftentimes, it is the family in the 
home country that helps to finance the migrant’s journey. The network 
almost always covers the initial costs, however, we have also seen examples 
of new migrants selling all their property or taking loans in order to have the 
money required for the move. Risk taking of this kind could be accounted 
for by a heightened sense of confidence in the success of the endeavor and 
the belief that the network will be sufficiently effective to help them once 
they are in Canada. This is a phenomenon characteristic of some, but not 
all, migrants (e.g. regarding the Hungarian cases, this was more or less the 
case). Just as the ‘rose tinted picture’ (see Gallová Kriglerová-Chudžíkováin 
this volume) of the opportunities Canada has to offer, often based on a 
selective portrayal of Canada and the migration experience (leading to 
misinformation), as revealed in Slovak and Hungarian interviews, could 
also be associated with the network effect. 
Migrant networks go together with what is called ‘migrant industries’ 
(de Haas 2010). In the Canadian migratory process, it was discovered 
that, in fact, a very effective migration industry has developed in all three 
countries. For example, in the origin community, migrants are helped by 
entrepreneurs specialized in booking airplane tickets and driving families to 
the airport (Slovakia). In the destination community, there is a wide array of 
official (or semi-official) helpers who attend to the refugees (social workers, 
teachers, interpreters, lawyers, health care workers, human rights activists, 
etc.). Cultural domain networks are sustained by intensive communication 
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between family members via the Internet and migration-related information 
is spread via Skype and Facebook contacts to immediate group members and 
then through the village gossip channels to non-immediate group members. 
On the origin community level, apparently the most important 
conditions that increased migration came from all the three domains, that is 
to say that migration was impelled by social, economic, and cultural factors. 
Socially, living in a segregated community (as most of our interviewees did) 
was in fact an important condition that determined the desire to migrate. 
Roma in all three countries emphasized how negatively they experienced 
the deteriorating interethnic relations. For example, interviewees in 
Slovakia often compared their current situation with their socialist past, 
a time when they had a higher social status and more acceptance in the 
community. In the Czech Republic, a recent violent incident led to the 
escalation of interethnic tension. Moreover, the fact that they were confined 
to live in ‘settlements’ (suburbs, often with the most basic of amenities) 
without any hope of local improvements or the opportunity to move to the 
non-segregated parts of the town, constituted further incentive to migrate 
(Hungary and Slovakia). The rise and spread of violence as well as political 
racism and fear from racist attacks were also among the socially motivated 
reasons for migration. In economic terms, deprivation was an overwhelming 
experience everywhere, even if to different degrees. In Slovakia, it was felt 
that migrants and their descendents were mainly the “winners of socialism” 
(that is to say the relatively well-to-do members of the Roma community)4. 
Culturally, the most eminent motivation for migration seemed to be their 
stigmatized ethnicity, the consequences of which Roma had to face on 
a daily bases (employment and educational discrimination, verbal and 
physical racial violence, etc.). In Slovakia, Roma interviewees referenced 
negative attitudes on the part of the majority society as an important 
incentive to wanting to leave. One could interpret this as “escaping the 
(interiorized) stigma,” incidentally further burdened by the majority society 
blaming them for migrating and accusing them of misusing the welfare 
system in the destination country, thus, creating a bad image of the home 
4 For the sociological analysis of well-to-do migrants, see the section on migration diffusion. 
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country. Although the general approach of the majority is similar in all 
three countries – labeling Roma migration as a disloyal, treacherous deed 
that the home country is negatively stigmatized by – it was the Slovak 
Roma in particular who discussed migration with a sense of guilt and felt 
the need to further justify, through various arguments (right to move, etc.), 
why one would leave. 
The original conditions in the sending community change as a result 
of migration and this, as is claimed by the model, influences what turns 
the process take. Looking at the Canadian migration process, it is clear 
that relative deprivation gradually become a factor that spurred further 
migration. In Hungary, there had been migration in the early 2000s 
and those who came back invested in their houses, a visible sign of the 
success of the migration for the whole community. Similarly, in Slovakia, 
improving housing conditions was one of the major goals all migrants 
wished to achieve and those who had already gone were sending money 
back so that their half-built houses could be finished in front of the 
eyes of the whole community. Meanwhile, the actual economic impact 
of migration (for instance, on income distribution), could be assessed 
as minimal for several reasons. First of all, remittances or the savings of 
returnees are mainly invested, as we have seen, in renovating one’s house 
or buying a new one. This, in itself, does not result in any change in social 
stratification or income inequalities with regards to the original conditions. 
Improvement of one’s housing conditions will not change one’s social 
status with regards to the majority: this can only change if one moves 
from the segregated settlement to the center (or mixed areas). However, 
this does not happen, at least it did not happen in the Hungarian and 
the Slovak cases we observed. However, the betterment of their housing 
conditions can lead to a somewhat better social status within one’s own 
community, as in the Slovak example. Also, savings are sometimes used, 
as in the Czech case, for financing remigration, although that does not in 
itself result in upward social mobility. It can be concluded that migration, 
even if it is a success in economic terms, does not result in change in 
social status: those who had been better-off are usually more successful in 
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their migration than those who come from somewhat worse situation, and 
the balance seems to be the same even after a considerable migration has 
happened in a community.
Concerning the cultural domain, we observe some elements of the 
‘culture of migration’ (Massey et al. 1993) evolving in all the three cases. We 
define ‘culture of migration’ as “migration‐affected cultural change [that] 
can further strengthen migration aspirations along established pathways in 
communities and societies that can become obsessed with migration” (de 
Haas 2010: 1595). “Social remittances are likely to reinforce these processes 
and can even lead to a shift in preferences or a ‘culture of migration’, in which 
increasing prestige is attached to migration” (de Haas 2010: 1608). In general, 
the context of Slovak Roma’s migration experiences is relatively important 
given their history: Slovak Roma migration to the Czech Republic in the 
aftermath of displacement of ethnic Germans and additional migrations 
throughout socialism. One may argue that the previous migratory experience 
of some Roma showed the rest of the community that migration abroad is a 
viable option for improving one’s dire living conditions, to some extent they 
may have drawn on past experiences for this conclusion. Slovak Roma have 
migrated to the Czech Republic, other EU countries (before accession), and 
to the UK (after accession). Although Roma in Hungary and in the Czech 
Republic have less of a migratory past, the migration experienced in the 
observed Roma communities suggests an emerging culture of migration. In 
both these communities, some families had been to Canada or the UK. This 
can lead us to formulate a question: is repetitive migration an illustration of 
the emergence of the ‘culture of migration’?
One of the widely shared common experiences in the three countries 
that we might denote as an important social remittance is the cultural 
encounter with Canadian multiculturalism and tolerance. All interviewees 
expressed their amazement that they were “treated as human beings” 
and felt “safe and respected” without being stigmatized or discriminated 
because of their ethnicity. This experience seemed to have a great impact 
for everybody interviewed and may be assessed as an upcoming significant 
element in the culture of migration, a future core incentive for moving. 
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In order to account for feedback mechanisms, it is necessary to 
also study the destination community. Migrant ethnic clustering within 
destination communities is a well-know phenomenon. Depending on the 
type of migration, migrants tend to live and work together, thus, creating 
new communities. Ethnic clustering could be best observed amongst 
the Hungarian Roma migrants, given their number and the size of the 
community. Due to the social housing situation and network dependency, 
many new migrants end up in the same blocks of flats or in close vicinity to 
one another. Given their low status and the lack of the necessary cultural 
capitals, many of the low status, late adopters, or laggards, have little or no 
chance to integrate. Although attending language courses is obligatory, most 
adults find it very hard to go back to school and they do not learn English 
at all. This strengthens their dependence on networks and is one reason why 
ethnic clustering is, in fact, important - especially for low status migrants. 
There are several factors that determine whether migration will be a 
success or a failure. For most migrants, integration is simply not possible. 
This is not merely due to their instable legal status – whether they can stay or 
not – it also depends on whether or not their networks help them get access 
to some ethnic business (garbage or scrap metal collection, construction 
work, factory jobs, etc.). State welfare can provide enough financial support 
for sustaining a family, however, it is impossible to building any savings. 
Migration is only successful if one can return with some savings. This 
is well illustrated in the Slovak case where those returnees from Canada 
who came back with nothing were seen as failures by the community and 
blamed for not working hard enough. External or network effects have not 
been considered in these narratives. 
To understand the dynamics, or changing of migration patterns and 
migration diffusion, weak and strong ties as well as the negative effects of 
social capital need to be taken into account. As we mentioned, migration 
diffusion starts with pioneers or innovators leaving a community. They 
are followed by late adopters, coming from less well-to-do households. In 
general, Roma migration is characterized by this pattern. An IOM 2000 
study on Roma migration from Slovakia (Vasecka 2003) indicates that 
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migrants tended to be Roma with an above-average education and social 
status (the ‘winners of socialism’). A similar trend was likewise observed 
in Hungary (Kováts et all. 2002); Roma involved in the earlier phases 
of migration were usually from merchant or musician backgrounds and 
some segments of these migrant populations tended to be more educated. 
Considering the Canadian migration diffusion, it was found that people 
from relatively wealthier households migrated first. In addition, among the 
early migrants we find more individual or small group migration, whereas 
among the late adopters there are usually more families migrating together, 
a pattern noted in all three countries. 
Concerning risks and costs, pioneers have the greatest advantages and 
disadvantages. However, compared to other forms of migration, the risks 
are relatively low, since social welfare will cover immediate costs. So, it 
seems that pioneers in Canada had a better chance of succeeding than late 
adopters did. From all accounts, it can be deduced that job opportunities 
on the low-skill labor market are scarce and this creates a greater reliance 
on strong networks. As previously mentioned, these networks do exist and 
do provide income resources for some people. Oftentimes, it is  the pioneers 
who become the ‘bridgeheads’ (de Haas 2010) of these migrant networks 
and they can even be the generators of some of the new migration by sending 
money back or providing loans to aspiring migrants. These networks seem 
to be rather small and weak and tend to saturate quickly. Thus, ‘bridgeheads’ 
quickly become ‘gatekeepers,’ sometimes causing further hindrances for 
new migrants that may slow down their migration process. However, the 
process does not appear to diminish and die off. Since these networks are 
based on strong (usually family) ties and are exclusionary towards others 
(even people from the same community), there could be many of these 
networks functioning side by side. In fact, as extended families continue to 
migrate and they join in on the networks of close ties, still more migration 
could happen. 
All this said, however, it is also very easy to be without a network. One 
may find themselves going to Canada as a result of the weak tie effect – as 
stated earlier, information tends to flow through weak ties – but end up in 
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a situation where, once they arrive, they have no strong ties to help them 
get established. These migrants often become what we might call failed 
migrants: those who get in a situation temporarily or are worse in the long 
run than they were in their original situation.  Failed returnees in all three 
countries face very similarly difficult situations. Sometimes they had sold 
their house, so, they have nothing to return to. They move in with relatives, 
or move to new localities; sometimes they come back more indebted than 
they were before. Further, if they did not deregistered from the local welfare 
system before leaving, they may have to face the legal consequences. In all 
three countries, the hostility of the community elite (e.g. mayor) can make 
reintegration difficult. All in all, some of the returnees suffer from multiple 
disadvantages at the end of their migration journey. 
Conclusions
Using a multidimensional approach, this explorative project aimed to raise 
new questions about the Canadian migration process for Roma from the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary. Our premise was that ‘Canadian 
Roma migration’ should be understood as a process motivated by a mixed 
set of factors and, from an analytical point of view, it should be studied as 
neither refugee nor labor migration but as a compound of both. Based on this 
premise, the project set out to apply a conceptual framework that accounts 
for the entire migration process and aims to gain further insight into how 
it starts, how it develops, and what role networks play in the whole process.
By applying de Haas’ migration system model, we were able to show 
that this migration displays similar, but sometimes differing, trends and 
patterns than other migrations. In regards to the similar trends, we observed 
that the ways in which this migration developed was very much like a 
‘classic’ labor migration process: transnational networks were formed and 
functioned over space and time, remittances were sent (thus, generating more 
migration), migrant clusters were established in the destination country, 
etc. On the other hand, there were important differences that are worth 
pointing out. Most importantly, the way migration started was influenced 
both by the existence and influence of the migrant networks and by the 
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fact that welfare was provided for refugees in Canada. This meant that 
a wider social stratum – including lower status, underprivileged migrants 
who could not have been able to undertake other forms of migration – had 
the opportunity to participate in the process. 
As a general pattern, we could distinguish the pioneers from the 
laggards. In all three cases, pioneers were migrants who were from wealthier 
families and many had earlier migration experiences; they were the ones 
who would leave, come back, and some would try to leave again. The latter 
were often the failed migrants, those whose return left them in a more 
desperate situation than they had been in before leaving. 
All in all, it can be argued that the relatively low costs and low risks 
of migrating to Canada spurred old, and motivated new migrants alike 
to leave their home country. The effects of this are yet to be seen. We 
remain, now, with a host of unanswered questions: will some of the failed 
migrants become recurrent migrants, due to their positive experiences 
(despite unsuccessful endeavors, some still managed cultural or social 
accumulation)? Will migrants returning from Canada again set out for 
other destinations (given their accumulated social, economic, and cultural 
capital)? Will the impact of migration on the origin communities have a 
lasting effect in terms of establishing migration patterns? 
It is our hope that the research and analysis presented here brings to 
light a fresh approach to the subject of Roma migration, inspiring a new 
generation of work to develop around the framework with which we worked. 
We look forward to future researchers both building on our growing list of 
questions and finding answers to some of the above-stated ones.
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The Roma and their cross-border migration has become a major 
embarrassment for the European Union’s legislative bodies, who considered 
Roma asylum claims to be phony, a fraud. This uncomfortable situation has 
been draped with the label ‘irregularity.’ So it is, that those transnational 
members of the Roma community’s some 10-12 million total population 
would become the symbol of ‘irregularity’ in Europe, at least in three senses 
of the word (Tóth 2010a):
•	 Irregular (union) citizens because they are segregated, unemployed, 
less educated than the mainstream population and they are 
frequently undocumented (without birth certificates, identity 
papers, passports, or a nationality); 
•	 Irregular migrants because, due to transitional measures resulting 
from EU enlargement (2004/2007-2011/2014), they are moving 
both within and across borders, neither as tourists nor formal 
laborers (job-seekers), while at the same time submitting asylum 
applications in Europe and/or Canada;
•	 Irregular minorities because they have no compact community. 
Rather, Roma live in religious, linguistic, cultural, and social 
diversity throughout Europe, sometimes as recognized minorities 
with special rights or as equally-treated individuals, but without 
a kin-state or the recognition of minority status in many of the 
EU’s member states.
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 What are the main pillars of the legal system that might be leaned on 
to deal with the complex case of Roma migration? The answer depends on 
which stratum of regulation takes the lead. For instance, take the concept of 
‘human rights’; shall we apply universal (international), regional (European 
standards, Union acquis), bilateral, or national legal legislation to define 
our terms? Taking into account the transnational nature of the community 
at hand and, specifically, the related international migratory movements, I 
primarily refer to domestic regulations while exceptionally giving examples 
of migration theory ‘push factors’. This said, I would like to emphasize that 
that Roma people’s living conditions and the type of prejudices they face 
differ in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary, while their improper 
political treatment and rather reluctant legal protection are very similar 
throughout all these new, fragile democracies.   
Combating multiple/racial discrimination 
United Nations human rights treaties prohibit discrimination. This includes 
documents such as the International Covenant on Civil and political Rights 
(ICCpR), the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (ICERD), the Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the Convention Against 
Torture (CAT), and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) as 
well as the (rather recently created) 2006 human rights treaty the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities. The right not to be discriminated against is 
guaranteed by Article 14 of the European Convention of Human Rights 
(ECHR) which states that equal treatment shall be provided in the 
“enjoyment of the rights set down in the given Convention.”
Protocol No. 12 (2000) to the ECHR, not yet ratified by all EU 
Member States, expands on the scope of the prohibition of discrimination 
by guaranteeing “equal treatment in the enjoyment of any right,” including 
those rights provided under national law. According to the Explanatory 
Report to the Protocol, it was created in order to strengthen protection 
against discrimination, which in itself is considered to be a core element to 
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insuring that human rights are protected. The Protocol actually emerged 
out of debates over how to strengthen sex and racial equality, in particular. 
This provision prohibits discrimination: 
•	 in the enjoyment of any right specifically granted to an individual 
under national law;
•	 in the enjoyment of a right which may be inferred from a clear 
obligation of a public authority under national law, that is, where 
a public authority is under an obligation under national law to 
behave in a particular manner;
•	 by a public authority in the exercise of discretionary power (for 
example, granting of subsidies);
•	 by any other act or omission by a public authority (for example, 
the behavior of law-enforcement officers when overseeing a 
demonstration).
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, passed in 2000, contains a list 
of human rights inspired by the rights contained in the constitutions of 
the Member States, the ECHR, and universal human rights treaties (such 
as the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child). When the Treaty of 
Lisbon entered into force in 2009, it altered the status of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights making it a legally binding document. As a result, 
EU institutions are bound to comply with it. The EU Member States are 
also bound to comply with the Charter, but only when implementing EU 
law. Article 21 of the Charter contains a prohibition on discrimination on 
various grounds. In 2000, two directives were adopted: the Employment 
Equality Directive, prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis 
of sexual orientation, religious belief, age and disability and the Racial 
Equality Directive, prohibiting employment discrimination (including 
access to the welfare system, social security, and goods and services) on the 
basis of race or ethnicity. Under the ambit of the EU, this was a significant 
expansion on the scope of non-discrimination law. 
The Roma community faces prejudice and discrimination across 
various segments of their everyday lives. Therefore, in regards to 
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upholding human rights and protection from racist discrimination, legal 
practitioners now uphold that ‘multiple grounds of discrimination’ apply 
in Roma asylum cases. The theory of ‘multiple discrimination’ considers 
the aggregated impacts of social disadvantages and overlapping social roles 
(e.g. gender discrimination against Roma women, unequal treatment of 
disabled rural inhabitants seeking employment). There seems to be no legal 
recourse within a legal dispute that takes into account the multi-facetted 
social roles of a discriminated person. Relevant handbooks offer to weigh 
fairly the belonging, affiliation, and membership of victims - differentiating 
discrimination from persecution - as relevant cumulative elements5 or 
selecting, out of protected statuses, the most relevant grounds to apply.6 
Still, putting to use the standard definition and terms used to assess multiple 
discrimination has been encouraged, but not has been accepted.7 The 
European Court of Human Rights summarizes the complex appearance 
of racial discrimination as follows: “Ethnicity and race are related and 
overlapping concepts. Whereas the notion of race is rooted in the idea of 
the biological classification of human beings into subspecies according to 
morphological features such as skin color or facial characteristics, ethnicity 
has its origin in the idea of societal groups marked by common nationality, 
tribal affiliation, religious faith, shared language, or cultural and traditional 
origins and backgrounds.”8 In brief, in explaining the concept of race and 
ethnicity, according to this opinion, the language, religion, nationality and 
culture may be in dissociable from race. 
Due to this shortcoming in regards to Roma cases, we should apply 
the already established anti-discrimination law legislation, along with 
applying the definition of direct and indirect discrimination, harassment, 
5 Handbook on procedures and criteria for determining refugee status under the 1951 
Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees. Geneva, September 
1979, p.55.
6 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights - European Court of Human Rights 
- Council of Europe: Handbook on European non-discrimination law, 2011, Wien – 
Strasbourg. 
7 Equinet, ‘Dynamic Interpretation: European Anti-Discrimination Law in practice’, volumes 
I-Iv, available at: www.equineteurope.org/equinetpublications.html  (loaded 31 May 2012)
8 Timishev v. Russia (No. 55762/00 and 55974/00), 13 December 2005, para. 55
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segregation, retorsion and instruction to discriminate in order to determine 
discriminative behavior on the most relevant ground. 
Essentially, those individuals in similar situations should receive 
similar treatment and not be treated less favorably simply because of 
a particular ‘protected’ characteristic that they possess. This is known 
as ‘direct’ discrimination. Direct discrimination, as framed under the 
European Convention of Human Rights (1950), is subject to a general 
objective justification defense; however, under EU law, defenses against 
direct discrimination are somewhat limited. The non-discrimination law 
stipulates that those individuals who are in different situations should 
receive different treatment to the extent that this is necessary to allow them 
to enjoy particular opportunities to the same degree as others. Thus, those 
same ‘protected grounds’ should be taken into account when carrying out 
particular practices or creating particular rules. This is known as ‘indirect 
discrimination’. All forms of indirect discrimination are subject to a 
qualification known as objective justification, irrespective of whether the 
claim is based on the European Convention of Human Rights or EU law. 
The courts have provided a broad interpretation on the reach of 
‘protected ground’. It includes ‘discrimination by association’, whereby the 
victim of the discrimination is not themselves the person with the protected 
characteristic. It can also involve the ground in question being interpreted 
in an abstract manner. This makes it imperative that practitioners embark 
on detailed analysis of the reasoning behind the less favorable treatment, 
looking for evidence that the protected ground is causative of such 
treatment, whether directly or indirectly. 
For instance, note the example on indirect discrimination from 
the European Court of Human Rights case law wherein a series of tests 
were used to establish the intelligence and suitability of pupils in order 
to determine whether or not they should be moved out of mainstream 
education and into special schools. These special schools were designed for 
children with intellectual disabilities and other learning difficulties. The 
same test was applied to all pupils who were being considered for placement 
in special schools. However, in practice, the test had been designed in such 
a way that students with a strong aptitude regarding Czech mainstream 
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cultural knowledge would pass and with the inherent consequence that 
Roma students were more likely to perform badly. Indeed, they did; 
between 50 and 90 percent of Roma children were educated outside the 
mainstream education system, many placed in programs for children with 
intellectual and other learning difficulties. The European Court of Human 
Rights determined that this was a case of indirect discrimination.9
The part of EU non-discrimination law prohibiting ‘harassment’ and 
‘instruction to discriminate’ are relatively new developments that were 
introduced to allow for more comprehensive protection. For instance, 
in a case before the Hungarian Equal Treatment Authority, a complaint 
was made about teachers who told Roma students that their misbehavior 
at school had been notified to the ‘Hungarian Guard’, a (now illegal) 
nationalist organization known for committing acts of extreme violence 
against Roma. It was found that the teachers had implicitly endorsed the 
racist views of the guard and created a climate of fear and intimidation that 
amounted to harassment.10
Although the non-discrimination directives do not oblige Member 
States to use criminal law to address acts of discrimination, a Framework 
Decision of the European Council11 does oblige all EU Member States to 
provide for criminal sanctions in relation to incitement to violence or hatred 
based on race, color, descent, religion or belief, national or ethnic origin, 
as well as dissemination of racist or xenophobic material and condonation, 
denial, or trivialization of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against 
humanity directed against any group. Member States are also obliged 
to consider racist or xenophobic intent as an aggravating circumstance; 
however, it has not been systematically transposed into national legislation 
(e.g. in Hungary). (Tóth 2010b)
9 D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic (No. 57325/00), 13 November 2007, para. 79
10 Decision no. 654/2009, 20 December 2009, Equal Treatment Authority (ETA)
11 Council Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA of 28 November 2008 on combating certain 
forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law, OJ L 328, 
6.12.2008, p. 55.
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Summing up, the results of anti-discrimination dictates in Europe 
partly depend on case law from the European Court of Human Rights, 
the European Court of Justice, and the equal treatment of these at local, 
regional, or national levels. In the absence of judges properly trained in 
(multiple) discrimination, statistics on ethical and systematic monitoring 
in administration, and justice in new democracies, latency regarding racial 
discrimination remains high. Table 4. outlines the 33 cases that have 
protected discriminated Roma within the last 60 years at the European 
Court of Human Rights. 
Table 4. Cases at European Court of Human Rights, based on 
violation of Art 14 of ECHR 
 
The 60th anniversary of ECHR – Art.14 •	 Cases v. UK, France, Bulgaria 
(1996-2009)
8 cases: Obligation of Roma/travelers 
to leave land they had stationed their 
caravans due to authorities’ plans to 
remove a Roma settlement
•	 D.H. and others v. Czech Republic 
(13 Nov 2007) and similar cases v. 
Croatia, Hungary
3 cases: Segregation in schools (e.g. 
placement of Roma children into 
‘special’ schools) 
•	 Nachova v. Bulgaria (6 July 
2005) and similar cases v. Greece, 
Croatia, Romania, Slovakia
8 cases: Racially biased police actions 
(e.g. police shooting of Roma and 
investigations following)
•	 Moldovan and other v. Romania 
(12 July 2005) and similar cases v. 
Romania
5 cases: Attacks on Roma villages and 
destruction of property (e.g. living 
conditions of Roma villagers following 
police involvement in the killing of 
members of their community and the 
destruction of their homes)
•	 Munoz Diaz v. Spain (8 Dec 2009)
•	 Seidic and Finci v. Bosnia-
Herzegovina (22 Dec 2009)
Validity of Roma marriage, refusal to 
recognize validity of a Roma marriage 
for purposes of disclaiming entitlement 
of a widow’s pension
•	 V.C. v. Slovakia (8 November 
2011) and similar vs. Czech Rep.
Barring of Roma from running for 
election
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5 cases: Alleged forced or coerced 
sterilization of Roma women
•	 Paraskeva Todorova v. Bulgaria (25 
March 2010)
2 other cases: relating to freedom of 
expression, involving a suspended 
sentence
•	 Aksu v. Turkey (2010)
Cases from the recent past may further illustrate the fragile situation 
of Roma in the CEE region, in light of case law from the European Court 
of Human Rights. 
CASE OF BORBÁLA KISS v. HUNGARY (No.59214/11) 26 June 2012
The Court concludes that the Roma applicant has been subjected 
to degrading treatment by the police brutality and that no adequate 
investigation has been carried out into her allegations. There has, 
accordingly, been a breach substantially and procedurally of Article 3 of 
the Convention, but Art 14 was not violated. 
CASE OF EREMIÁŠOVÁ AND PECHOVÁ v. THE CZECH 
REPUBLIC (No.23944/04) 16 February 2012
The Court has found a violation of the substantive limb of Article 2, 
and also that the subsequent investigation was neither adequate nor 
independent. The applicants must have suffered gravely as a result of the 
serious (police brutality) violations, found in the present case, of the most 
fundamental human rights enshrined in the Convention. The Court 
notes that the case concerns the death of the first applicant’s partner, the 
father of her child, and the second applicant’s Roma son.
CASE OF KOKY AND OTHERS v. SLOVAKIA (No.13624/03) 
12  June 2012
A non-Romani waitress, I.S., refused to serve a drink to a person of 
Roma ethnic origin and a group of at least twelve people went into the 
Roma settlement in the village where the applicants lived. Some of them 
were wearing balaclavas and they were armed with baseball bats and iron 
bars. The incident is a violation of Article 3 of the Convention under 
its procedural head. The Court finds that the investigation into the
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incident at the applicants’ settlement cannot be considered as having 
been effective. The Court considers that these elements, coupled with 
the sensitive nature of the situation related to Roma in Slovakia at the 
relevant time (see, for example, Mižigárová v. Slovakia, no. 74832/01, 
§§ 57-63, 14 December 2010 and V.C. v. Slovakia, no. 18968/07, §§ 
78-84 and 146-9, 8 November 2011), are sufficient for it to conclude 
that the authorities have not done all that could have been reasonably 
expected of them to investigate the incident, to establish the identity of 
those responsible and, as the case may be, to draw consequences.
CASE OF N.B. v. SLOVAKIA (No. 29518/10) 12 June 2012
On 25 April 2001, during the delivery of her second child, the Roma 
applicant was sterilized. The Court has previously found that the 
practice of sterilization of women without their prior informed consent 
affected vulnerable individuals from various ethnic groups. In view 
of the documents available, it cannot be established that the doctors 
involved acted in bad faith, that the applicant’s sterilization was a part of 
an organized policy, or that the hospital staff’s conduct was intentionally 
racially motivated. At the same time, the Court finds no reason for 
departing from its earlier finding that shortcomings in legislation 
and practice relating to sterilizations were liable to particularly affect 
members of the Roma community (see V.C. v. Slovakia, cited above, 
§§ 177-178; and also paragraphs 96-97 above). In that connection, the 
Court has found that the respondent State failed to comply with its 
positive obligation under Article 8 of the Convention to secure to the 
applicant a sufficient measure of protection enabling her, as a member of 
the vulnerable Roma community, to effectively enjoy her right to respect 
for her private and family life in the context of her sterilization.
The Lisbon Treaty contains a provision mandating the EU to join the 
European Convention of Human Rights as a party in its own right. Protocol 
14 to the ECHR then amends this to allow this to happen. It is not yet clear 
what effect this will have in practice and, in particular, what the future 
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relationship between the European Court of Justice and the European 
Court of Human Rights will be, as the EU accession negotiations may take 
several years. However, it will - at the very least - allow individuals to bring 
the EU directly before the European Court of Human Rights for failure 
to observe the ECHR. It remains to be seen how the ‘racial protection’ of 
Roma will be affected by this accession into the Union. 
The breadth of the grounds for ‘racial and ethnic origin’ appears to 
differ slightly between the EU and the ECHR in that the Racial Equal-
ity Directive expressly excludes ‘nationality’ from the concept of race or 
ethnicity. While the ECHR lists ‘nationality or national origin’ as a sepa-
rate ground, case-law has shown that nationality can be understood as a 
constitutive element of ethnicity. This is not because discrimination on the 
grounds of nationality is permitted in EU law, but because the way that EU 
law has evolved means that discrimination on the grounds of nationality 
is regulated in the context of the law relating to free movement of persons. 
Apart from expressly excluding the grounds of discrimination against a na-
tionality, the Racial Equality Directive does not itself contain a definition 
of ‘racial or ethnic origin’.12
The European Court of Human Rights does not require proof that 
the perpetrator is motivated by prejudice, thus, there is no need to prove 
the perpetrator has ‘racist’ or ‘sexist’ views in order to prove racial or sexual 
discrimination. In general, laws cannot regulate individuals’ attitudes, 
since they are entirely internal. Rather, it can only regulate actions 
through which such attitudes may manifest themselves. Moreover, it is 
not necessary to show that the rule or practice in question is intended to 
result in differential treatment. That is to say, even if a public authority 
or an individual can point to a well-intentioned or good-faith practice, if 
the ‘effect of that practice is to disadvantage a particular group, this will 
amount to discrimination’. In relation to a case on race discrimination, 
the European Court of Justice found that there was no need to prove that 
there is actually an identifiable victim. Presumably this finding has equal 
12 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights - European Court of Human Rights 
- Council of Europe: Handbook on European non-discrimination law, 2011, Wien – 
Strasbourg.
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application for other grounds of discrimination, in similar circumstances. 
While EU law has no requirement for an identifiable victim, this is not the 
case at the European Court of Human Rights, where such a claim would 
not meet the criteria for admissibility (Art. 34 of the ECHR). It seems that 
it may be possible to prove that a protected group is disproportionately 
affected even where no statistical data is available, but the available sources 
are reliable and support this analysis.
The case D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic provides one 
example of this. This case is based on the complaints by Roma applicants 
that their children were excluded from the mainstream educational system 
and placed in ‘special’ schools, intended for those with learning difficulties, 
on the basis of their Roma ethnicity. The placement of Roma children into 
‘special’ schools was based on the use of tests designed to test intellectual 
capacity. Despite this apparently ‘neutral’ practice, the nature of the tests 
made it inherently more difficult for Roma children to achieve a satisfactory 
result and enter the mainstream educational system. The European Court 
of Human Rights found this to be proven by reference to statistical evidence 
indicating the particularly high proportion of pupils of Roma origin placed 
into ‘special’ schools. The data submitted by the applicants, including their 
particular geographical region, suggested that 50 to 56 percent of special-
school pupils were Roma, while they only represented around 2 percent of 
the total population. Data taken from inter-governmental sources suggested 
between 50 percent and 90 percent of Roma students attended special 
schools in the country as a whole. The European Court of Human Rights 
found that, while the data was not exact, it did reveal that the number 
of Roma children affected was ‘disproportionately high’ relative to their 
composition of the population as a whole.
There are a number of other instruments that offer guidance as to 
how racial and ethnic origin should be understood. Neither ‘color’ nor 
affiliation with a national minority are listed expressly in the Racial 
Equality Directive, however, they are listed as separate grounds under the 
ECHR. These terms may be able to be dissociated from the definition of 
race and/or ethnicity and, thus, will be considered here. The EU Council’s 
Framework Decision on combating racism and xenophobia under the 
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criminal law defines racism and xenophobia with reference to violence 
or hatred directed against groups in reference to ‘race, color, religion, 
descent, or national or ethnic origin’. The Commission Against Racism 
and Intolerance (Council of Europe) has also adopted a broad approach 
to defining ‘racial discrimination’, which includes the grounds of “race, 
color, language, religion, and nationality or national or ethnic origin”.13 
Similarly, Article 1 of the UN Convention on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination (1966) defines racial discrimination also in reference to 
the grounds of “race, color, descent, or national or ethnic origin”. The 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, responsible for 
interpreting and monitoring compliance with the treaty has further stated 
that, unless justification exists to the contrary, determination as to whether 
an individual is a member of a particular racial or ethnic group, “shall … 
be based upon self-identification by the individual concerned.” This prevents 
the State from excluding protection of any ethnic group that it does not, or 
has not yet, recognized.14
The Racial Equality Directive does not, however, define housing 
discrimination as domain of multiple discrimination. However, it is 
suggested that this should be interpreted in the light of international human 
rights law, in particular the right to respect for one’s home under Article 7 
of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and Article 8 of the ECHR and 
the right to adequate housing contained in Article 11 of the International 
Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights. The European Court 
of Human Rights has construed the right to a home widely, including 
mobile homes such as caravans or trailers, even in situations where they are 
located illegally. According to the UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, adequate housing must satisfy a range of requirements. In 
particular it should “be of sufficient quality to ensure protection from the 
elements; reflect the cultural requirements of inhabitants (and so includes 
13 ECRI General Policy Recommendation no. 7 on national Legislation to Combat Racism 
and Racial Discrimination, CRI (2003)8, adopted 13 December 2002, paras. 1(b) and (c)
14 CERD, General Recommendation III concerning the interpretation and application of 
Article 1, paragraphs 1 and 4 of the Convention
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vehicles, caravans, encampments and other non-permanent structures); be 
connected to public utilities and sanitation services; and be connected to 
public services and allow access to work opportunities through an adequate 
infrastructure.” It should also include adequate protection against forced 
or summary eviction, and be affordable. This understanding of housing 
also appears in the approach taken by the EU Agency for Fundamental 
Rights (FRA).15 
Adopting this approach, access to housing would include not just 
ensuring that there is equality of treatment on the part of public or private 
landlords and estate agents in deciding whether to let or sell properties to 
particular individuals. It would also include the right to equal treatment 
in the way that housing is allocated (such as allocation of low-quality or 
remote housing to particular ethnic groups), maintained (requiring upkeep 
of properties inhabited by particular groups) and rented (providing security 
of tenure, controlled rental rates, and/or reasonable deposits for those 
belonging to particular groups).
Right to asylum and international protection
The legal regulation also provides “international protection for persecuted 
or systematically discriminated or tortured migrants” on various grounds. 
The exodus of Roma from the CEE region to Canada may illustrate the 
ineffectiveness of the sending countries anti-discrimination provisions. 
However the European Union guarantees – with a wide margin of 
appreciation – the asylum of third country nationals (Art 18 of the 
European Charter of Fundamental Rights). It is exceptional if a (potential) 
union citizen is eligible for international protection status, simply due to 
the measures the Council would have to take should a given member state 
violate union-shared values. This exclusive principle was passed in the 
Aznar Protocol (1999) in order to make it impossible for member states 
to take in separatists or extremists from another member state as refugees. 
15 The State of Roma and Traveller Housing in the European Union: Steps Towards Equality. 
Summary Report (Vienna, FRA, March 2010).
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Added to the Amsterdam Treaty, Protocol No. 24, on asylum for nationals 
of Member States of the EU, institutionalized this exclusion into the acquis 
communautaire. This ‘safe country of origin’ principle was extended to the 
nationals in candidate states. Neither the 1951 Geneva Convention on the 
status of refugees nor the ECHR (Art 3) or the UN Convention Against 
Torture allows exceptions for persons in need of protection on the grounds 
of nationality. This limitation on the assessment of Roma applicants has 
externalized this issue of Roma disintegration from Europe to overseas 
since the beginning of the enlargement process. (Tóth 2011)  This effort 
is supported by the set of readmission agreements (to send back irregular 
migrants to the country of origin) that have been signed with an increasing 
number of source countries. In additional, these agreements discourage in-
depth evaluation of applications and/or prohibition of expulsion or return 
in transit and destination states. 
The inflow of Roma asylum seekers was unexpected for Canadian 
authorities. However, this movement, along with its contradictions, managed 
to upgrade the reluctant reform in refugee procedural and substantive 
regulation in Canada. Meanwhile, the social conditions for Roma citizens 
in the sending (their home) countries - that might readmit them after the 
(final) refusal - have not further developed. Table 5. demonstrates how 
the reintroduced visa requirements against Czech travelers can reduce 
applications and, in parallel, maintain the recognition of Roma applicants. 
Furthermore, taking into account the great deal of pending cases that were 
submitted in the prior period, data indicates that Canada was certainly not 
the only destination for asylum seekers from these three member states in 
2010.
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As is well known, the size of a diaspora and its cohesion contributes 
to migratory movements. Canada’s largest Roma community is understood 
to be located in Hamilton, Ontario and is estimated at between 1,500 
and 3,000 people. The vast majority of these Roma came to Canada as 
refugees from Hungary, Slovakia, and Czech Republic and gained extensive 
support from social workers and supportive community members to find 
jobs, affordable housing, and to learn English. As the number of refugee 
applicants from Czech Republic increased dramatically in 2008 and 2009, 
the Canadian government decided to impose visa restrictions on the Czech 
Republic and, according to Citizenship and Immigration Canada, they are 
considering doing the same for Hungary because it was also amongst the 
first sources of refugee claimants.
The Canadian government has also argued that, as member states of 
the EU, the Roma citizens of Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia 
are free to live in any of the other 26 EU countries and, thus, cannot be 
considered legitimate asylum claimants. Furthermore, Minister Jason 
Kenney, the Canadian Minister of Immigration and Multiculturalism at 
the time, said in June 2009 that they have been “monitoring very closely 
the rising number of asylum claimants from the Czech Republic, [but] we 
find it hard to believe that [it] is an island of persecution.”16
Being a hardened skeptic of the merits of claims put forth by members 
of the stateless ethnic group, Kenney visited the Roma Community Centre 
in Toronto in November 2011 where he met with claimants that testified to 
persecution by ultra-right-wing nationalists and neo-Nazi groups in their 
home countries and across Europe. In 2009, he had called Czech Roma 
claims “bogus” and in 2010 told the House of Commons that some Roma 
asylum-seekers are “coached to come to Canada, making a false asylum 
claim and then registering for provincial welfare benefits.” He asserted that 
most of the 2,298 claims filed in 2010 were “not bonafide” and migration by 
Hungarian Roma is “very peculiar,” “bizarre,” and “very well-organized.” 
16 Why Canada should care about the Hungarian  Roma February 10, 2010 
On-line: http://canadasworld.wordpress.com/2010/02/10/why-canada-should-care-about-
the-hungarian-roma/
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Kenney went as far as to say that “asylum isn’t about whether you like 
the country you live in, it’s not about whether life is easy there or not, it’s 
not even about whether you might occasionally face discrimination”…“If 
people are interested in Canada because they want to pursue a quality health 
care system, or economic opportunities, or they don’t like their country of 
origin, then I would invite them to apply through our immigration system 
like everyone else.” The number of Hungarian claims increased almost 100-
fold after the country’s visa requirement was lifted in 2008, with claims 
jumping from 34 in 2007 to 2,298 in 2010. The Canadian government 
has grappled to get a handle on Roma claims since the issue flared with 
a boom with Czech Republic claimants in 2009, when the government 
imposed a visa requirement on Czech citizens after 95 Roma landed at 
Pearson International Airport one June night. The number of Czech 
claimants has since dropped dramatically. Richard Kurland, a Vancouver-
based immigration lawyer and policy analyst, echoed the minister’s 
skepticism. He chalked the flood of Hungarian Roma claims to “sheer 
abuse.” He believed many Hungarian Roma asylum-seekers have “done a 
calculation on how much they can milk from the Canadian and provincial 
governments.” (Carlson 2011) 
Refugee reform reached a new stage with Bill C-31, intended as a 
solution to what the Canadian government sees as a threefold ‘threat’ to 
Canada and its immigration and refugee system. Firstly, the refugee process 
can be very slow. It can take a number of years to determine whether or not 
a person is a legitimate refugee. Secondly, there are the so-called ‘smuggler’ 
boats. The Ocean Lady and the Sun Sea are two such crafts, carrying Sri 
Lankan Tamil refugees to Canada in 2009 and 2010, respectively. The 
government calls these asylum seekers ‘irregular arrivals’ and Bill C-31 has 
a number of provisions that penalize these groups. Asylum seekers who 
arrive ‘irregularly’ will be held in detention. Lastly, the third threat is Roma 
movement, an amassing of independent asylum seekers who buy plane 
tickets to Canada and declare on arrival their refugee status to authorities. 
This last group is the source of what the government considers to be the 
‘third threat to the system.’ That is where the idea of ‘safe country of origin’ 
comes in. Bill C-31 provides that asylum seekers from countries the Ministry 
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designates as ‘safe’ will get short shrift indeed - 15 days to make their case 
in writing and 45 days in total. After this they will, if the authority (IRB) 
does not accept them, be immediately returned home. Based on abundant 
empirical data and massive and detailed reports by bodies such as Amnesty, 
the Council of Europe, the United States State Department and Human 
Rights Watch, it is impossible to imagine that any panel would be able to 
classify Hungary in 2012 as ‘safe.’ The cruel fact is that Hungary is not safe 
for the Roma.
According to European nation-state’s version of the story, the Roma 
are not victims at all. They are people who refuse to work, who were the 
‘spoiled children of Communism,’ and whose ‘culture’ is based on indolence 
and criminality. Canadian officials accept this antiquated, profoundly 
racist story and have legitimized it to the Canadian government who, in 
response, reintroduced the visa requirement for Czech visitors in 2009. 
However, the visa fix did not settle matters with the EU. It only muddied 
the waters for the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) 
Canada was trying to negotiate with the EU. A number of EU countries 
said they would never make such an agreement with Canada as long as it 
imposed visas on any EU member states. Indeed, the government was in a 
pickle; especially considering that Roma were now coming to Canada not 
only from the Czech Republic but also from Slovakia and a considerable 
number from Hungary, as well. (Nerenberg 2012)
Free movement of persons, workers
European Union integration is based on economic freedom (free 
circulation of products, services, capital, etc.), including the free movement 
of workers. Although the latter has been a guarantee that has gradually 
developed over a period of 45 years, the establishment of union citizenship 
in the Maastrich Treaty (1992) extends the personal scope to workers, 
entrepreneurs, students, inactive persons, and family members. This almost 
linear development is challenged by the temporary limitations on workers 
coming from ten new member states without economic gains. (Lukács 
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2011) In these circumstances, the interpretation of the free movement 
of union citizens - namely that they are eligible for entry and residence 
in another member state unless they cause an “unreasonable burden to 
the social system of the place of residence” - is hardly popular with 
public opinion. Furthermore, the irregular economic activities commonly 
associated with lower strata Roma such as begging, prostitution, dumpster 
diving, scraps and refuse collection, material recycling, and hawking, 
have brought to question whether these poor, mobile, segregated union 
citizens should be the subjects of expulsion or tolerance. EU law prohibits 
‘removal of residing union citizen’ based on pure economic grounds 
or mechanic authoritarian decisions or discrimination. On the other 
side, Roma who are third country nationals can be easily expelled for 
‘public order’ reasons, in particular based on the readmission agreements. 
However, the authorities simply cannot differentiate amongst Roma as 
irregular migrants or else wise. 
However, EU law protections are more limited in scope. The 
prohibition of discrimination against nationality in EU law applies to 
the context of free movement of persons and is only accorded to citizens 
of EU Member States. In addition, the non-discrimination directives 
contain various exclusions of application for third-country nationals 
(individuals who are citizens of a State that is not a member of the EU). 
The non-discrimination directives expressly exclude their applications 
as nationality discrimination, as regulated under the free movement 
directive.17Accordingly, only citizens of EU Member States have right of 
entry and residence in other EU Member States. After a period of five 
years of lawful residence in another EU Member State, an EU citizen is 
entitled to permanent residence, giving them equivalent rights to those 
in the category of ‘worker’. This, however, does not mean that non-
discrimination directives do not protect nationals of other Member States.
Both the Racial Equality Directive and the Employment Equality 
Directive state that they do not provide any right to equal treatment for 
17 Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to 
move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, OJ L 158, 30.4.2004, p 77.
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third-country nationals in relation to conditions of entry and residence. 
However, third-country nationals will enjoy a right to equal treatment 
in broadly the same areas covered by the non-discrimination directives, 
allowing them to qualify as ‘long-term residents’ under the Third-country 
Nationals Directive (which requires, among other conditions, five years’ 
lawful residence). In addition, the Family Unification Directive allows for 
third-country nationals that lawfully reside in a Member State to be joined 
by family members in certain conditions.18
In brief, EU law on free movement grants limited rights to third-
country nationals. Nevertheless, the ECHR does stipulate that it is the duty 
of all member states within the Council of Europe to guarantee the rights 
provided in the ECHR to all individuals within their jurisdiction, including 
non-nationals. The European Court of Human Rights has maintained a 
balance between State’s right to control what benefits it may offer to those 
enjoying the legal bond of nationality against the need to prevent states from 
discriminating against those who have formed substantial, factual bonds 
with the State. The Court has applied great scrutiny in matters relating 
to social security, if individuals can show a strong ‘factual tie’ to a state. 
In this way, the ECHR administers stronger protection for third-country 
nationals than the EU law in terms of entry and residence. In connection 
to this, the European Court of Human Rights has primarily intervened in 
complaints relating to deportation of individuals where they face inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment or torture in the destination state 
(under Article 3), or have formed strong family ties in the host state, which 
will be broken if the individual is forced to leave (under  Article 8).19
The free movement – entry and residence without prior permission 
from the authorities in the destination state – is not universal but, in theory, 
it is a prerogative for union (EEA) citizens and family members, internally 
and externally. In this way, the common visa policy determines EU 
18 Directive 2003/109/EC concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-
term residents, OJ L 16, 23.01.2004, p. 44.; Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family 
reunification, OJ L 251, 3.10.2003, p. 12.
19 For example, ECtHR, Chahal v. UK (No. 22414/93), 15 November 1996. Abdulaziz, 
Cabales and Balkandali v. UK (Nos. 9214/80, 9473/81 and 9474/81), 28 May 1985.
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foreign affairs, also in regards to the solidarity closure of visa restrictions. 
In the relationship between Canada and EU, the Roma ‘situation’ was, 
if truth be told, significant neither in terms of threatening the solidarity 
principle against Canadian nationals (requiring visas to enter the EU) 
nor to hindering the free trade agreement under negotiation between the 
EU and Canada. In short, the visa war was a burlesque, not a drama. 
(Tóth  2010c) 
European policy or a separate Roma Strategy? 
Numerous surveys and reports made by the European Union Agency 
for Fundamental Rights (FRA) prove that legislative instruments and 
regulations cannot make an impact on Roma integration into the 
mainstream society. The deeply-rooted segregation of Roma requires active 
measures, institutional intervention, expert analysis, and financial backing 
to reduce the gap in new democracies between Roma and the mainstream 
in terms of employment, housing, health care, schooling and democratic 
thinking. The social cohesion and regional development of employment 
policies in the EU are supported by funds (ESF, ERDF, EAFRD) to 
the tune of EUR 17.5 billion in the period of 2007-2013. These can be 
implemented to include social inclusion programs that also favor Roma 
inclusion. However, effective and sustainable programs cannot be evaluated 
properly if there is no statistical data, governmental coordination (both 
horizontally and vertically) with municipal governments, and a system of 
monitoring that assures the involvement of civil society. We have to add 
here that security and justice programs combating organized crime (i.e. the 
Stockholm Programme 2009-2013) are also supported by the EU budget 
(covering human trafficking, protection of victims as witness in racial 
violation, etc.).   
In absence of a holistic pursuit of European policies and governmental 
coordination at the national level, the success of the Europe 2020 program 
is doubtful. Additionally, it establishes its anti-poverty policy without 
stipulating specific methods for monitoring. In parallel, the segregation of 
Roma continues, as testimonies and available surveys demonstrate. Roma 
44
J U D I T  T Ó T H
ghettoes and spatial segregation in settlements have been documented in 
these states. The construction of walls around Roma neighborhoods, the 
denial of (address) registration for Roma households at municipal offices, 
and the municipal obstruction of Roma families seeking to purchase 
homes in ‘clean’ villages demonstrate some of the specific legal conflicts. 
Between 2008-2010, the Slovakian press covered instances of ghettoization 
– the construction of walls around Roma neighborhoods and settlements 
in Ostovany, Michalovce, and Sedovce. The authorities cited the moves 
as intended to improve property protection, theft prevent, environmental 
pollution, noise, and further that the walls would be used for sport 
activities. However, the common feature of these construction projects is 
that these walls were built without exhaustive communication taking place 
first between the municipality, inhabitants, self-governments, and Roma 
communities at the local level on the issues that led them to build the walls 
in the first place20. 
From the legal perspective, affirmative (or supporting) actions are a 
universal concept. In the UN context, these are labeled as ‘special measures’, 
while EU law refers to them as ‘specific measures’ or ‘positive action’. 
By taking special measures, governments are able to ensure ‘substantive 
equality’, that is, equal enjoyment of opportunities and access to benefits 
available to the general society, rather than a mere ‘formal equality’. In 
such instances that governments, employers, and service providers fail to 
consider the appropriateness of taking special measures, they increase the 
risk that their rules and practices may amount to indirect discrimination. 
The European Court of Human Rights has stated that, “the right not to 
be discriminated against in the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed under 
the ECHR is also violated when States fail to treat differently persons 
whose situations are significantly different.”21 Similarly, the EU non-
discrimination directives expressly foresee the possibility of affirmative 
action stating, “with a view to ensuring full equality in practice, the 
20 Opinion issued by the Slovak National Centre for Human Rights, 22 January 2010 
http://www.snslp.sk 
21 Pretty v. UK (No. 2346/02), 29 April 2002, para. 88.
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principle of equal treatment shall not prevent any Member State from 
maintaining or adopting specific measures to prevent or compensate 
for disadvantages linked to [a protected ground].”22 The permissibility 
of making positive measures in favor of disadvantaged groups is further 
reinforced by guidelines offered by several of the bodies responsible for 
interpreting and monitoring UN human rights treaties. These bodies have 
stressed that such measures should be temporary in nature, not extending 
in time or scope beyond what is necessary to address the inequality in 
question.23
Although many experts have claimed that the segregation of Roma 
is not ethnic in character and that implementing effective social and 
employment policy is the best mid-term panacea, for Roma as well, the 
dilemma remains whether a specific Roma strategy is required or whether 
the integration of Roma into mainstream society shall be treated inside 
various existing sector’s frameworks. At one point, a separate ‘Roma 
toolkit’ was proposed at the EU level. Looking beyond the shortages in 
governmental capacity, affirmative action to date has simply not been based 
on either social acceptance or a supportive attitude on the part of municipal 
authorities. Thus, I am afraid, the concept of national Roma strategy shall 
remain a theory found only in the books.  
On March 8, 2011, the Roma Framework Strategy came before the 
European Parliament. It was generally agreed that a focus on improving 
the Roma’s economic situation would raise the GDP and result in better 
social cohesion. Creating a map of ‘territories in crisis’ would help direct the 
destination of money towards projects financed partly from the European 
funds, taking into consideration the ethnic, social, and economic features 
of a region as well as the demand and supply at regional and national 
22 Racial Equality Directive, Article 5; Employment Equality Directive, Article 7; gender 
goods and Services Directive, Article 6; and also with a slightly different formulation: 
gender Equality Directive (Recast), Article 3.
23 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment no. 18: non-Discrimination’ UN Doc. 
A/45/40(vol. I.) (SUpp), 10 November 1989; UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination, General Recommendation no. 30 on Discrimination against non-Citizens, 
UN Doc. HRI/gEn/1/Rev.7/Add.1, 4 May 2005.
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level programs. The overseeing body would be the European Commission. 
This strategy was accepted with 576 in favor, 32 against, and 60 abstained 
(March 9, 2011). The national field of priorities and administrative capacity 
in terms of programming and monitoring would remain the responsibility 
of the member states. Perhaps the move towards separate Roma actions 
stemmed from the Decade of Roma Inclusion (2005-2015), launched by 
12 countries, targeting joint cooperation with Roma civil societies across 
Europe in four priority areas: education, employment, healthcare, and 
housing and on three interrelated issues: poverty, discrimination, and 
gender equality. Each of the 12 countries created their own action plan, 
based on the existing governmental policies and strategies.24 
In summary, the forthcoming European goals regarding anti-poverty 
and Roma inclusion policies are treated separately (as demonstrated here on 
Tables 6. and 7.).
24 For instance, the Slovak program can be read in the Report on the Observance of Human 
Rights including the observance of the principle of equal treatment in the Slovak Republic 
for the year 2009, Slovak National Centre for Human Rights, Bratislava, 2010.
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Table 6. Aims of Europe 2020 in EU27 and in member states with 
significant Roma populations
EU 27 headline targets 
for the Europe 2020 
program
Employment 
rate (%)
School 
Drop-Out 
rate (%)
Tertiary 
Education 
(%)
Reduction 
of 
population 
at risk of 
poverty 
and social 
exclusion
% Roma 
population / 
Total Roma 
population 
(estim.)
75% of the 
population 
between
20-64 years old
10% 40 % 20 million
Bulgaria 10.3%
750,000 76% 11% 36% 250,000
Slovakia 9.2%500,000 72% 6% 40% 170,000
Romania 8.3%1,850,000 70% 11.3% 26.7% 580,000
Hungary 7.1%700,000 75% 10% 30% 450,000
Greece 2.5%265,000 70% 9.7% 32% 450,000
Czech 
Republic
1.9%
200,000 75% 5.5% 32% 30,000
Spain 1.6%725,000 74% 15% 44% 1,500,000
Total EU 
in average
1.73%
6,172,800
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Table 7. Comparison of goals in Europe 2020 to the past Roma Strategy
Europe 2020 targets EU Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies up to 2020
Employment of 75% of working age 
population (20-64 year-olds) Reduction 
of school drop-out rates to below 10%
Completion of third-level education  
for at least 40% of adults  
(30 years old and up) 
Reduction in poverty and social 
exclusion: Reducing the number of 
people in, or at risk of poverty and 
social exclusion, by least 20 million. 
Reduction of the employment gap 
between Roma and the majority 
population
Completion of (a minimum of) primary 
school for all Roma children 
Reduction of the disparity in health 
statistics between Roma and the 
majority population 
Elimination of the gap between Roma’s 
access to housing and public utilities 
and that of the majority population
EUR 26.5 billion in EU funding 
(Structural, Agricultural, Regional 
Development, etc.)
Optional minority rights
Minorities may enjoy specific rights that preserve own identity, as a 
community or individuals with the same regional origin, language, 
traditions, religion, and/or ethnic roots. Although the European Charter 
of Fundamental Rights respects diversity and minorities, there is no EU 
level ethnic/minority policy. Regional rules such as the European Charter 
for Regional and Minority Languages (1992) and the Council of Europe 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (1995) 
protect minority rights but their ratification within the member states is 
not high. In this way, constitutional rules on specific rights and institutions, 
as well as domestic practice, are decisive in minority rights. For instance, 
Slovakia established the Council of the Government for National Minorities 
and Ethnic Groups and, in 1993, Hungary passed the Act on Minorities’ 
Rights, setting up a self-governmental system for statute (13) minorities 
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in 2011. However, if we are aiming at effective diversity, the existence 
of minority actions and commitments ought to be accompanied by the 
majority society’s acceptance of minorities and the active involvement of an 
influential minority elite who govern the infrastructure of community life. 
(Tóth 2012) 
Conclusions
The academic research on migration to Canada (as well as to France and 
the UK in 1996-2001), conducted in both Hungary and Canada in the 
last few years, disproves the simplistic suggestion that (Hungarian) Roma 
migration is either merely a response to economic misery in Hungary and 
better opportunities elsewhere or a product of de facto (if not de jure) 
persecution. Simplistic imagery dominates much of popular thought on 
migration, which is clearly seen in the rhetoric of political parties, along 
with human rights protection and racial exclusion attitudes exhibited in the 
parliament, as was well documented in 2000-2001. (Kováts 2002)  
he media espoused the ‘wave from poverty to wealth’ without critical 
analysis of either the internal or external ramifications of Roma migration. 
As it has been proven, even significant disparages in economic returns 
(measured in wages) are not sufficient to induce migration in most people. 
For Roma, the overwhelming factor in their mobility was that their home 
country was a less and less desirable place to live. Furthermore, in actuality, 
migration as a ‘strategy for survival’ is only truly available for persons in a 
certain social and economic position. The heterogeneous nature of Roma 
communities and the levels of abject poverty mean that the most deeply 
segregated groups have remained untouched by this pattern. 
In Hungary, the ‘ethnicisation’ of poverty and the Roma issue at large 
have been most prominent political features in the past couple of decades 
and is more characteristic of Hungarian civil culture than any other 
CEE country. Since 1990, every government has followed this pattern of 
‘ethnicization’, yet without capping off the slippery slope towards ever-greater 
amounts of migration. Roma migration is not an ethnic phenomenon, 
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but rather a socio-economic and political one and it can be treated as a 
part of the inevitable transformation of labor markets, in relation to the 
liberalization of world trade. 
Furthermore, Roma migration may give rise to revision of sending 
countries’ inclusion policies, inspiring a separate Roma strategy and reform 
within destination states’ asylum legal systems, through the externalization 
of the European visa and other security measures. Roma migration may 
also create a focus on how to make the protection against racial/multiple 
discrimination more effective in future. However, if things do go this 
direction - if the response does include creation of a separate Roma strategy 
for substantive equality, the introduction of visa restrictions, and stricter 
asylum regulations in destination states - then all this would definitively 
relegate migrating, as well as returning, Roma to the role of Europe’s 
‘scapegoats’.
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Introduction
Although prominently exposed in the media over the last decade, Romani 
migration to Canada is not a recent phenomenon. Early Romani migration 
to Canada took off in the last decade of the 19th century when Vlach Roma 
from Eastern Europe and the Balkans migrated en mass to the United 
States, Central and South America, and Canada (Lee 2000). In the second 
decade of the 20th century, Roma migrated to Canada from Britain as 
British-Romani Travellers and were identified as British immigrants by the 
Canadian immigration authorities. The third largest group composed of 
Hungarian Roma arriving in Canada as political refugees who were fleeing 
the 1956 Soviet invasion (Lee 2008). 
It was not until 1997 that the mainstream media and the general 
public became aware of their arrival to Canada. After the birth of new 
democracies in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary, Roma 
were no longer able to claim refugee status. They began arriving in Canada 
as victims of ethnic persecution, a category unfamiliar to Canada at the 
time. In 1996, a group of some 150 Czech-Romani refugees arrived in 
Vancouver after first landing in Montreal and being told by Canadian 
54
A N T O N E L A  A R H I N
Immigration officials that they were not welcome in Canada. Though 
this incident flew under the media’s radar, in contrast, Czech TV Nova 
aired a well-viewed documentary Na Vlastni Oči (With Your Own Eyes) 
in August 1997 portraying the lives of a few Czech Roma refugee claimants 
and presenting the situation in a rather optimistic light.25  As a direct result, 
some 1,500 Czech Roma sought refuge in Canada. Two months later, by 
October of that year, Canada had already countered this with a visa regime 
specifically for Czech nationals (this was finally lifted in 2007 and re-
imposed in 2009). According to one source, from August to November of 
1997, 14 major Canadian media outlets ran no less than 91 stories on this 
matter (Ferguson 2009). The media frenzy generated images of a ‘Gypsy 
invasion’ using a number of value-loaded terms; their arrival was described 
as an “influx,” a “flood,” “tide,” and Roma refugees were accused of being a 
“burden,” “straining,” “draining,” to the system and the taxpayers; “severely 
taxing,” “swamping,” the Canadian economy or “taking advantage of” 
emergency housing, welfare, and other social services.” The above source 
also claims that 600 of the 1,500 Czech Roma have since returned home and 
96% of reviewed refugee claims have been deemed legitimate and granted. 
In late 1998, for the first time in its history, the Canadian Immigration 
and Refugee Board (IRB) decided to establish a lead case, involving two 
families, which would serve as the precedent for all other Hungarian 
Roma refugee cases. The question at hand was whether or not, while 
the applicants may indeed face discrimination if sent back to Hungary, 
the affliction they would face in their home country would amount to 
persecution. The rationale for producing the lead cases was published 
by the IRB in a March 1999 “Lead Case Backgrounder”.26 On March 
25 This short TV report portrayed Romani emigres in Canada living comfortably with support 
from the state, sheltered from racial discrimination and violence. This was in stark contract 
with current events in the Czech Republic. One of the reports stated that 5,000 Romani 
from the city of Ostrava were ready to migrate to Canada. Mayors in some Czech towns 
even offered to facilitate the move and finance flights. In 1997, 1,285 people from the 
Czech Republic arrived in Canada and claimed refugee status, in comparison to 189 Czechs 
who applied the previous year. Both governments criticized the TV report.
26 IRB «Lead Cases Backgrounder», March 1999. See Geza v. Canada (Min. of Citizenship 
and Immigration) 2006 FCA 124.
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27, 2006 the Federal Court of Appeal of Canada overturned the IRB 
Lead Case decision of January 21, 1999 because, inter alia, “a reasonable 
person… would think that the hearing panel was biased and was not 
acting independently when it rejected the appellants’ claims for refugee 
status”.27 In 2008, the Canadian Citizenship and Immigration Minister 
(now the Minister of Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism), 
Jason Kenney, publicly stated they were ‘bogus’ refugees coming from 
democratic countries in Europe. In 2009, Canada re-imposed visas on 
Czech applicants, due to a significant rise in migration in 2008. In 2010, 
the Balanced Refugee Reform Bill C-11 was passed in order to address 
the large backlog of claims and the long waiting times for hearings. In the 
same year, Canada was presented with its first case of trafficking in persons 
for labor exploitation. It involved Roma families and it was the largest 
human trafficking case in Canada to date. In 2012, Protecting Canada’s 
Immigration System Act Bill C-31 was passed. It included a number of 
important changes and provisions to the system, mainly regarding the 
Interim Federal Health Program.
Roma Refugee Statistics
Canada is a signatory to all major United Nations human rights treaties 
that seek to protect refugees and victims of torture, including the Refugee 
Convention, the International Covenant   on   Civil   and   Political   Rights, 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
and the Convention against Torture. Canada has been accepting refuges 
since the end of World War II and has gone through three major refugee 
movements between 1945 and 1970, in response to humanitarian crises: 
(1) accepting displaced persons in the years immediately following WWII 
(2) Hungarian refugees between 1956 and 1957, and (3) Czech refugees 
in 1968.28 In the past decade, Canada has become one of the top three 
27 Federal Court of Appeal of Canada, Dockets A-419-04 and A-420-04, Heard at Toronto, 
Ontario, on November 22, 2005, Judgment delivered at Ottawa, Ontario, on March 27, 
2006.
28 See http://www.migrationinformation.org/feature/display.cfm?ID=853
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refugee resettlement countries in the world. The United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees estimates that, as of January 2012, there are 
206,735 refugees and asylum-seekers present in Canada.29 Currently, 
Canada has one of the highest per capita immigration rates in the world, 
driven by economic policy and family reunification (Dolin and Young 
2004). Canada also resettles over one in ten of the world’s refugees (Public 
Safety Canada 2010). Approximately 41% of Canadians are first or second 
generation immigrants.30
According to a comprehensive overview of IRB decisions over the 
past 20 years, compiled by the Human Rights Research and Education 
Centre at the University of Ottawa, refugee acceptance rates have largely 
remained consistent at 40-45% for most years (Human Rights Research and 
Education Centre 2012). The same source makes the following conclusions:
•	 In regards to acceptance rates, the current rate of 38% in 2011 
and 2010 is the lowest in the IRB’s history, while over the previous 
years it remained at 40-45%.
•	 Refugee flows to Canada, through to the year 2001, remained at 
around 25,000 new claims per year. This year saw its largest flow 
of refugees – nearly 44,000 claimants. From this point on, refugee 
flows have been fluctuating, amounting to some 34,000 new 
claims in 2009 then dropping to just over 22,000 new claims in 
2010. The number of new claims reached almost 25,000 in 2011. 
There is an assumption that the fluctuation was caused by visa 
restrictions being imposed on Mexico and the Czech Republic, 
which resulted in over 9,000 claimants from Mexico in 2009 and 
just over 700 in 2011. 
•	 According to the statistics on the top ten refugee source countries, 
there is no parallel between the number of claims made and the 
acceptance rates. To illustrate, some countries that have had a high 
29 See UNHCR’s 2012 Fact Sheet on Canada at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/
page?page=49e491336
30 Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) (2009). Canada – Permanent residents 
by gender and category, 1984 to 2008. Facts and figures 2008 – Immigration overview: 
Permanent and temporary residents. Available at: http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/
statistics/facts2008/permanent/01.asp.
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number of claimants over the last 23 years, such as Hungary, have 
had low acceptance rates while others, such as Sri Lanka, have 
traditionally had high acceptance rates. For example, Sri Lanka 
has been a top source country in 10 years during the analyzed 
period from 1989 to 2011, and has consistently been among the 
top 10 during that time frame. Its aggregate average acceptance 
rate amounts to 79%. Hungary, in contrast, has been among the 
top 10 source countries eight times in the period from 1989 to 
2011, a top refugee source country three times, with an aggregate 
average of 13% over the considered years.
Expanding further on these assertions and analyzing IRB status 
determinations from 1997 to 2011, it is possible to infer that Canada’s 
national acceptance rates have been well above those of applicants from 
Hungary and the Czech Republic. The last two years offer some interesting 
points for analysis. Although being the top refugee source country, Hungary 
has had the lowest acceptance rates (i.e. 2% in the year 2010 and 8% in 
2011), while the remaining nine countries have had an aggregate average 
of 48% in 2010 and 44% in 2011 (Chart 1.). It is not possible to make the 
same claim about the Czech Republic, which appeared amongst the top 
10 source countries in the last two years (it had acceptance rates of 43% in 
2008 and 10% in 2009). 
Chart 1. Acceptance rates in % for Hungary and the Czech Republic, 
1997-2011
Source: Author’s calculations based on IRB status determinations (1997-2011)
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Concurrently, while analyzing the number of rejected applications, 
we note that Hungary had 72 rejected applications in 2010 and 738 in 
2011 (Chart 2.). In 2010, Hungary had both the lowest number of rejected 
applications as well as the lowest accepted rate amongst the top 10 source 
countries. The remaining nine top source countries had an aggregate average 
of 882 rejections with Mexico leading with 3,437 rejected claims for the 
analyzed year. In 2011, the aggregate average of the nine leading source 
countries amounted to 828, while Hungary had 738 rejected refugee claims. 
Mexico again had the highest number of rejections, totaling 4,184. In 2009, 
likewise, refugee applicants from Hungary had the lowest rejection rate. 
In terms of pending cases, Hungary was in the top three countries 
with 3,534 pending cases in 2010, along with Mexico and Haiti. Last year, 
Hungary came in first as a country with a highest number of pending cases 
(5,975), followed by Mexico and China.
Chart 2. IRB status determinations for refugee claimants from 
Hungary, 1997-2011
Source: Author’s calculation based on IRB status determinations (1997-2011)
59
R O M A  I N  C A N A D A :  M I G R A T O R Y  T R E N D S ,  I S S U E S  A N D  P E R C E P T I O N S
In comparison to refugee claimants from Hungary, information and 
data on those arriving from the Czech Republic has resurfaced on Canada’s 
refugee statistics for 2008 and 2009, as a visa requirement was in force from 
1997 to October 2007. The visa regime was re-imposed in July 2009 after 
which data on Czech claimants disappears from national refugee statistics. 
In 2008, refugee claims lodged by Czech citizens totaled five out of referred 
859 claims (Chart 3.), thus making it the country with the lowest number 
of rejected refugee applications that year. In 2009, Czech refugee claimants 
had the lowest rejection rate along with those arriving from Hungary, 76 
and 5 respectively
Chart 3. IRB status determinations for refugee claimants from the 
Czech Republic, 1997-2011
Source: Author’s calculations based on IRB status determinations (1997-2011)
While analyzing the set of data presented via IRB refugee status 
determinations in terms of the number of referred cases, it is possible to 
corroborate that Hungary has been in the top ten source countries eight 
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times from 1997 to 2011, and has ranked three times as the top sending 
country. The Czech Republic, on the other hand, has been among the top 
ten source countries three times during the same time frame (Chart 3.). 
Chart 4. Top source countries’ rankings for Hungary and the Czech 
Republic, 1997-2011
Source: Author’s calculations based on IRB status determinations (1997-2011)
Bill C-31: Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act
Bill C-31, also known as the Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act, 
was introduced in Parliament on February 16, 2012 and received royal 
assent on June 29, 2012. Many refugees, legal experts, non-governmental 
organizations as well as government officials raised serious concerns as 
to some of its new elements. The most contentious amendments are the 
following:
1. Changes to the Interim Federal Health Program (IFHP), which 
provides temporary health benefits to refugees until they qualify for 
provincial and territorial coverage. 
Historically, the benefits included basic medical care as well as 
supplemental benefits such as pharmaceutical, vision and dental care, 
ambulance services, and devices to assist with mobility, at a level similar 
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to that provided by provinces to people on social assistance. Irrespective 
of whether they arrived in Canada as part of a government resettlement 
program, had official sponsors, if they sought asylum, or were awaiting 
deportation, everyone received basic medical care. This also applied to 
rejected refugee claimants awaiting deportation. In fiscal year 2010/11, the 
IFHP cost the government $84.6 million (i.e. 0.04 % of the nation’s health 
bill), serving 128,000 refugees. It cost each Canadian about $3 per year. 
On June 30, 2012, the reformed IFHP ended the coverage of supplemental 
health care benefits to all refugee claimants except those selected and 
resettled from abroad by the government (government assisted refugees or 
GARs) and those privately-sponsored refugees who receive federal financial 
assistance. The refugee claimants, and other groups falling under the ambit 
of the IFHP (such as resettled refugees, refugees whose claims have been 
accepted, rejected refugee claimants whose cases are under judicial review, 
victims of human trafficking, or people detained at Canadian borders), 
shall be provided with medications and vaccines “only if needed to prevent 
or treat a disease that is a risk to public health or a condition of public 
safety concern.”31  These changes, according to Minister Jason Kenney, will 
discourage people who may be considering filing an unfounded refugee 
claim in Canada.32
31 See Interim Federal Health Program: Summary of Benefits. Available at: www.cic.gc.ca/
english/refugees/outside/summary-ifhp.asp
32 ‘Urgent’ services are defined as “those provided in response to a medical emergency - an 
injury or illness that poses an immediate threat to a person’s life, limb, or a function. The 
services and products shall not be more than what is required to respond to the medical 
emergency.” ‘Essential’ services are defined as ones provided to a refugee claimant or 
protected person:
•	 “who is presenting for assessment and follow-up of a specific illness, symptom, 
complaint or injury; 
•	 for prenatal, labor and delivery, and postpartum care (including routine prenatal 
care and maternal care for up to 28 days after the delivery); 
•	 or for the prevention, diagnosis, or treatment of a disease posing a risk to public 
health or of a condition of public safety concern.” 
       Services which are deemed as neither urgent nor essential include those:
•	 “provided solely for the purpose of screening or prevention of a disease or injury 
except for screening or prevention of diseases posing a risk to public health or of 
conditions of public safety concern;
62
A N T O N E L A  A R H I N
2. Provision for ‘Designated Countries of Origin’, identified at the 
minister’s discretion, by which certain countries would be deemed 
democratic, peaceful, and safe if they have a democratically elected 
Parliament, independent judiciary and civil society organizations, 
and therefore highly unlikely to produce any refugees. 
Having a ‘Designated Countries of Origin’ (DCO) list raises concern 
that the lack of an oversight mechanism would render the entire process 
to political rather than human rights considerations. According to Bill 
C-31, only countries with a combined rejection/withdrawal/abandonment 
rate of 75% or higher, or a withdrawal/abandonment rate of 60% or 
higher will qualify as a safe country. The government deems that these 
countries do not normally produce refugees, do respect human rights, and 
offer state protection. On the other hand, the DCO lists raised concern 
with a number of organizations including Amnesty International.33 
Overall, over 70 countries would automatically make the safe list based 
on 2011 statistics alone. It is planned that claimants from designated 
‘safe’ countries would have their cases fast-tracked and would have no 
right to appeal a negative decision to the new Refugee Appeal Board. 
The government’s aim is to deport illegitimate claimants within 45 days 
instead of the current 1,000 days. 
•	 for elective purposes or primarily provided to improve quality of life with respect to 
a condition that causes minimal dysfunction and that is unlikely to deteriorate to a 
medical emergency within 12 months or the current period of eligibility, if shorter; 
•	 for cosmetic purposes or convenience of the beneficiary;
•	 for fertility and sterilization purposes;
•	 for the purpose of rehabilitation, including the cost of rehabilitation hospitals and 
facilities;
•	 primarily related to research or experimentation;
•	 not paid for by provincial or territorial health benefit programs;
•	 equired by or paid by third parties such as insurance companies, business 
establishments (e.g. automobile insurance), or government agencies, but excluding 
immigration medical examinations; and 
•	 for long term care and home care.”
33 Amnesty International’s Alex Neve expressed his concern about a number of countries that 
meet the statistical ‘safe’ threshold and that there was no objective way to come up with a 
DCO list.
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3. Tight timelines for preparing refugee hearings and for processing 
refugee claims. 
A new claimant now has 15 days from arrival to file a written claim 
(i.e. to find a competent lawyer or, in most cases, get legal aid approval), 
have their lawyer arrange for an interpreter (a necessity in many cases), 
have the lawyer understand the case, and have the lawyer draft and deliver 
a well-written account of the refugee claim. There is serious concern that 
refugees will not have sufficient time to prepare, provide documents, and 
apply in a timely fashion. 
4. Mandatory detention without sufficient independent review for 
‘Irregular Arrivals’ (i.e. groups of two or more), identified at the 
government’s discretion.
The amendment stipulates review of detention within 14 days and 
then after six months – instead of after one year as originally proposed – 
and children will still be detained, despite the fact that detention is not 
‘mandatory’ for those 16 and under.
5. Barriers to Appeal: Irregular Arrivals will not have access to the 
Refugee Appeal Division, irrespective of circumstances in their 
country of origin. Bill C-31 will also allow only 15 working days 
to file an appeal for an unsuccessful claim to the Refugee Appeal 
Division.
Citizenship and Immigration Canada expects to save about $100 
million over the next five years by implementing these changes (CIC 2012a).
Reactions and Perceptions
The new Bill C-31 mobilized numerous reactions at governmental and 
non-governmental levels causing a media upheaval, especially in relation 
to Roma refugee claimants. The most prominent figure on behalf of the 
Canadian government has been Minister of Citizenship, Immigration 
and Multiculturalism, Minister Kenney, who is determined to deter 
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‘bogus’ refugees by introducing the above-mentioned changes to Bill C-31 
(Chopping health coverage 2012). 
In one of his public statements, mostly referring to Roma migrants 
from Hungary and the Czech Republic, Minister Kenney argues that the 
new legislation will stop the abuse of Canada’s immigration system and will 
“help stop foreign criminals, human smugglers, and those with unfounded 
refugee claims from abusing Canada’s generous immigration system and 
receiving taxpayer funded health and social benefits” (CIC 2012b). This 
was not the first time he has made allegations that refugee claims made by 
Roma were illegitimate. In 2009, when Canada was facing a large influx 
of Roma refugees, Minister Kenney stated, “It’s hard to believe that the 
Czech Republic is an island of persecution in Europe” (O’Neill 2009). 
In July of the same year, when Canada implemented a visa requirement 
for residents of the Czech Republic and Mexico in order to stem the tide 
of refugee claims, he commented that claimants from those countries 
represent “economic migrants who want to jump the queue” (Clark 2009). 
In addition, in March 2010, questioning the veracity of Hungarian Roma 
refugee claims, Minister Kenney referred to them as ‘bogus,’ citing how 
the majority of applicants withdrew or abandoned their applications before 
receiving judgment from the IRB (Ruf 2012).
Throughout his public statements, Minister Kenney has maintained 
that the government has tried, but thus far failed, to stem the tide of Roma 
coming into Canada and abusing its refugee system (Boesveld 2012). The 
IRB receives approximately 400 claims from Hungary every month and the 
vast majority of claimants are believed to be Roma. About 40% of refugee 
claimants from Hungary are from the city of Miskolc, about two and a half 
hours east of Budapest. The Canadian government began circulation of 
information brochures within Hungarian villages on why seeking asylum 
was not an effective way immigrate to Canada.34 These campaigns proved 
to be ineffective as Minister Kenney remained convinced that the flood 
34 Canada’s ambassador to Hungary, Tamara Guttman, visited Miskolc and a city to the north, 
Eger, to find out why 1,600 Hungarians, many from these cities, applied for refugee status 
in Canada in the first half of 2011.
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of asylum-seekers was “highly organized” and not at all spontaneous. 
(However, even quite recently, Minister Kenney travelled to the village of 
Alsózsolca and the city of Miskolc to meet with members of the Roma 
community in order to listen to their concerns, and discuss irregular 
migration with them.35 ) In July 2011, he said that between January 17 
and December 31, 2011, 8,819 Mexicans racked up nearly $7 million in 
health care costs under the IFHP, and some 6,749 Hungarians cost the 
state over $4.4 million, and another 4,583 Columbians racked up over $2.6 
million in costs (Cohen 2012a). Moreover, 3,790 Americans received over 
$1.4 million in free health care and Jamaican claimants round out the top 
five with 809 health care users receiving over $808,000 worth of health 
services, according to Postmedia News.36 Minister Kenney utilized this 
data to further assert that Mexican, Hungarian, Columbian, and American 
refugee claimants used Canadian health care services more than any other 
asylum claimants, thus, supporting the argument that there were abuses 
being made to the Canadian system.
The views of the Roma Community Centre in Toronto and its 
executive director, Gina Csanyi-Robah, are diametrically opposite to 
Minister Kenney’s opinions and perceptions. The Roma Community 
Centre is a volunteer-based organization that opened in 1997, a non-profit 
organization since 1998. They claim that Roma in Canada are the victims 
of a public defamation campaign led by Minister Kenney who continues 
to use unfair and stereotypical claims to attack Roma refugees. He has 
denounced Roma asylum claims as “bogus” and says Roma have arrived 
to Canada as a result of “human trafficking, resulting from organized 
crime”.37 Csanyi-Robah asserts that ‘gypsy’ stereotypes persist in Canada 
and are propagated by the Canadian media who label Roma as thieves, 
criminals, and undeserving refugee claimants. The Roma Community 
35 See the news release: Minister Jason Kenney Meets with Roma Leaders in Hungary 
[News release]. Available on-line at: http://www.cic.gc.ca/englisH/department/media/
releases/2012/2012-10-09.asp
36 See the cited article on-line at: http://www.activelypassive.com/category/dailynews/page/8/
37 See the Roma Community Centre’s Report for CERD on the state of Roma in Canada: 
Ilegitimizing Roma Refugees in Canada.
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Centre’s report for CERD on the state of Roma in Canada underscores that 
one of the problems is that many Roma families were denied refugee status 
because they were not able to ‘prove’ their Romani ethnicity. The report 
also directly addresses some of the issues pointed out by Minister Kenney 
in an attempt at detailing some of the explanations of why legitimate 
refugee claims are withdrawn. They state that one of the reasons is that 
Roma have very little prior knowledge of the Canadian refugee system 
and it proves to be too complex for them to navigate. Secondly, due to 
racial discrimination in Hungary, Roma have limited access to police 
and medical reports, the documents that could evidence their persecution 
and substantiate their refugee claims, once in Canada. Thirdly, there are 
a few lawyers that speak Hungarian or who have provided appropriate 
legal representation. Furthermore, translations are sometimes inaccurate. 
Finally, Roma refugee claimants can grow weary of the entire process and 
the long stagnant periods waiting for results: as a consequence, they may 
withdraw or abandon their refugee claims.  
Not only the Roma community, but also the Jewish community 
reacted queasily to the Senate passing Bill C-31. The implication was that 
Canada was denying a place of refuge and vital health services to men, 
women, and children longing for the safety and security that Canadians 
cherish (Rosenweig 2012). Further, as the same media source spells out, 
“Bill C-31 implicitly determines that if a Jew persecuted in Hungary, as is 
happening today, or a Roma who has been attacked and is the victim of 
what Amnesty International calls (regarding Hungary) ‘violent and hate 
crimes’ will still be nearly impossible for them to stay in Canada.” 
Numerous reactions also arose from other parties, including 
medical practitioners and refugee advocates who specifically denounced 
the introduction of more impediments to health care for refugees.38 
Among others, the Canadian Association of  Optometrists, the Canadian 
Association of Social Workers, the Canadian Dental Association, the 
38 Amnesty International expressed concern over changes to the IFHP as being discriminatory 
and potentially resulting in violations of the right to health of refugees in Canada, in 
contravention of Canada’s international human rights obligations.
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Canadian Medical Association, and the Canadian Nurses Association all 
showed their support and called on the government to revoke the reforms 
(Montgomery 2012). 
Ontario Health Minister Deb Matthews put her support behind 
the national campaign against Ottawa’s planned cuts to health services 
for refugees indicating that – should the cuts be approved – the federal 
costs would simply be passed on to the provincial health care system 
(Keung 2012). In her letter of protest, Matthews highlights a downtown 
Toronto hospital where it cost them an estimated $1.3 million in annual 
costs to care for refugees. Should the new changes be implemented, 
she affirms, the hospital will simply not be able to claim most of that 
amount back. 
Minister of Parliament (MP) Peggy Nash also took to the floor to 
emphasize that negative prejudice associated with asylum claims from 
European Roma does exist.39 She used as an example Parkdale-High Park, 
a district that is home to coexisting communities from many different 
countries, including a large Roma community. She mentioned that 
community’s concerns about how the bill would concentrate power in 
the hands of the minister and allow them the ability to treat refugees 
differently. 
Although portrayed as a fiscally prudent move by the Conservatives, 
Davenport MP Andrew Cash argued that taxpayers would be paying 
more in the long run and that the government was praying on the 
most vulnerable in the Canadian society (Rainford 2012). Cash’s source 
also quoted FCJ Refugee Centre’s Director in Toronto, Loly Rico, 
as stating that Minister Kenney was breaking one of the most basic 
human rights: the right to access to health care. Dr. Meb Rashid of 
the Crossroads Clinic, Women’s College Hospital believes that it is 
inhumane to deny refugees access to the health care they need as 
they begin their new lives in Canada. Meanwhile, Chief Physician for 
Family and Community Medicine at St. Michael’s Hospital, Dr. Philip 
39 See Debates of May 17th, 2012, House of Commons Hansard #126 of the 41st Parliament, 1st 
Session. Available at: http://openparliament.ca/debates/2012/5/17/jason-kenney-6/
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Berger, calls the cuts “the meanest and most vicious attack” on refugees 
thus far (Chopping Health Coverage 2012). President of the College 
of Family Physicians of Canada, Dr. Sandy Buchman, head of an 
organization that represents over 26,000 family physicians nation-wide, 
pointed out that, contrary to some allegations, Roma refugees were not 
coming to Canada for the health care and that many doctors testified 
that [refugees] would come with ready diagnoses and prescriptions 
(Rosensweig 2012). 
Along with these positive outcomes, in terms of growing support 
for Roma refugee claimants, the media seems to continue to embrace 
negative stereotyping. For instance, Ezra Levant is a conservative media 
pundit who recently was featured in a video segment equating Roma 
with theft and begging and saying that their “culture is synonymous with 
swindlers” (Berger and Rehaag 2012). (The Roma Community Centre 
responded to this segment by lodging a complaint with the police.)
According to the President of the Canadian Council of Refugees 
(CCR), Wanda Yamamoto, the new system is vulnerable to political 
influence and the government’s new law emphasizes speed and 
categorizations over fairness and individual protection. The CCR (2012) 
has stated that there are over 38,000 refugee claimants still awaiting a 
decision under the old system and they suggest that the government 
implement an ‘Earned Regularization Program’, which would allow them 
to remain in Canada on the basis of the successful integration; length 
of time spent in Canada; experiences of rape or torture; experience of 
domestic violence; statelessness; other human rights considerations; or 
sponsorship by a third-party.
Citizenship and Immigration Committee, May 3, 2012
May 3, 2012 was an historic day for the Roma community in Canada: 
Gina Csanyi-Robah, executive director of the Roma Community Centre, 
was the first Romani person to address the Canadian federal government. 
During the 10 days of testimony being heard in Ottawa regarding the 
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new refugee reform legislation, Bill C-31, she addressed the Citizenship 
and Immigration Committee. In her speech, she asked the committee not 
to create a DCO list, which would preclude Roma originating from EU 
countries to seek safety in Canada. She stated her belief that the great 
deal of withdrawn refugee claims reflected an incredibly unwelcoming 
climate for Roma people in Canada, not any illegitimacy of the claims 
being made.40
Maureen Silcoff, a refugee lawyer in private practice since 1988 
and a representative of the Roma Community Centre, also addressed 
the committee.41  A member of the IRB for five years, she currently 
represents many Roma refugees. In her statement, she focused on Roma 
refugees from Hungary, elucidating some of the barriers affecting their 
relocation to another EU country: For instance, EU citizens cannot make 
asylum claims to other EU countries (Roma from Hungary could not, for 
example, file a refugee claim in Italy). Also, there are limitations on the 
right to relocate within the EU (i.e. an EU citizen may stay in a country 
for up to three months and then must either find employment or show 
that they have sufficient funds to support themselves). She noted that it 
was extremely difficult for Roma to find jobs, due to prejudice against 
them, and that France has sent a clear message on their policy when 
they deported Roma en masse in the summer of 2010. She also objected 
to the DCO’s position, stating that the government uses statistics of 
rejected, withdrawn, and abandoned asylum cases to determine whether 
a country is deemed ‘safe’ instead of its human rights record. She noted 
the high number of refused Hungarian Roma cases and that, of the cases 
that came before the refugee board in 2011, less than one in five were 
accepted as legitimate. Referring to the labeling of Roma as criminals, 
40  See Gina Csanyi-Robah’s Statement to the Citizenship and Immigration Committee on May 
3rd, 2012, Evidence of meeting #39 for Citizenship and Immigration in the 41st Parliament, 
1st Session. Available at: http://openparliament.ca/committees/immigration/41-1/39/gina-
csanyi-robah-11/only
41 See Maureen Silcoff’s Statement at Citizenship and Immigration Committee on May 3rd, 
2012, Evidence of meeting #39 for Citizenship and Immigration in the 41st Parliament, 1st 
Session. Available at: http://openparliament.ca/committees/immigration/41-1/39/maureen-
silcoff-2/only
70
A N T O N E L A  A R H I N
she underscored that this was a “tiny drop in the bucket.” She also cites a 
decline in democratic values in Hungary as a growing concern in terms of 
the rise of fascism and racism in the region. At the close of her statement, 
she posed a number of questions, suggesting that the DCO list was made, 
in fact, to discourage Roma claims very possibly connected with political 
motivations relating to Canada’s free trade negotiations with Europe. She 
suggests going back through the criteria in Bill C-11, and having a panel 
of human rights experts be the ones to determine the criteria of whether 
a country was safe. 
During the hearing, St. Catharines’ MP Rick Dykstra stated that, prior 
to the 2008 visa regime imposed on Hungary, the Canadian government 
received some 20-30 asylum seekers per year, while in 2009 this skyrocketed 
to 2,500 and in 2010 to 2,300 applicants. He went on to explain that the 
problems came when 95% to 98% of those individuals arrived to Canada 
for a period of up to 10 to 12 months and, just prior to their IRB hearings, 
they disappeared, simply did not show up for their hearings, or authorities 
found they had returned to Hungary. Such a situation, he said, leads one 
think that a number of those individuals did not come to Canada to seek 
refugee status at all. Csanyi-Robah’s response describes the period during 
the late 1990s and early 2000s when large waves of Roma refugees arrived 
as a result of lifting the visa restriction. The subsequent decision on the lead 
case, which attempted to stop the flow, was eventually overturned and the 
visa regime was re-imposed from 2006 to 2009. Roma came flooding into 
the country looking for safety, she explained. While many did not appear 
to their IRB hearings, she says, one should also note that there was a 91% 
withdrawal rate of refugee applications in 2010 and, of those that made 
it through the process to the end, there was a mere 26% acceptance rate. 
Here, she asserts, the main fault lye in the complex refugee system, too 
overwhelming for Roma to navigate with their limited skills, experience, 
and resources. 
As for the high rate of abandonment and withdrawal of Roma claims, 
Silcoff stated that in 2011 about 4,500 people initiated claims, of these about 
800 were withdrawn, around 250 were abandoned, 160 were accepted, 
and 738 were refused. Half of the claims initiated remain pending. The 
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percentage of withdrawn claims compared to the number of claims pending 
is not very high. In either case, one cannot know for sure there would be 
a refusal rate of 98% or even an abandonment or withdrawal rate of 98%. 
However, one can, in fact, state that a mere one in five cases in which 
people actually appear before board members were approved. In terms of 
withdrawals, it was noted that Roma often lack the level of education and 
experience required to successfully navigate a complex legal system and 
many ended up with unscrupulous lawyers and consultants who did not 
properly advocate for them. 
MP Dykstra reiterated that the issue was not whether there is fair and 
equitable treatment in Hungary, but whether there is a need to change the 
immigration policies to allow permanent residents to come here under a 
different scheme. In his words, “achieving permanent residency for a better 
life is not done through seeking refugee status here in the country; it’s done 
by seeking permanent residency.” 
For Csanyi-Robah this is mainly a question of human rights and 
persecution, about the state protecting its citizens, and not about seeking 
a better place to live. There is no lineup for refugees, she says. She declared 
that the Roma are not a community of collective criminals and that no 
one should base their opinion on one single case in Hamilton, involving 
20 Roma people, while there were easily 9,000 refugee applications in the 
last few years. (According to unofficial estimates, there are about 80,000 
Roma in Canada.) She further expressed that this situation gave her cause 
to concern that the same negative rhetoric visible in European societies 
would soon spill over to Canada. 
The 2010 Hamilton Human Trafficking Case for Labor Exploitation  
“Canada has passed new immigration laws to crack down on 
the heinous crime of human smuggling. Human smuggling is a 
serious criminal offence that endangers human lives and benefits 
criminal organizations. We have made it easier to prosecute 
human smugglers and have imposed minimum sentences and 
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fines for those convicted. People who arrive in Canada via a 
designated irregular arrival (e.g., human smuggling event) will 
be detained so that authorities can determine their identities 
and whether they pose any danger to the Canadian public.”42
The CIC’s web page is intended to provide information for refugees 
on how to claim refugee protection from inside Canada and how to resettle 
from abroad. The announcement provided above (no longer available 
online) was once posted to serve as an introduction, and an explanation, 
to the most recent changes in Bill C-31. It appeared on June 29, 2012 after 
the Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act received royal assent. 
Concomitantly, a press release appeared on the Media Centre’s website 
informing the public of the implications of Bill C-31 (CIC 2012b). It 
focused on the heinous crime of human smuggling and indicated that the 
new measures would facilitate the prosecution of human smugglers and 
impose stiffer penalties. Minister Kenney affirmed, “These new measures 
send a clear message to human smugglers that Canada’s generosity will 
not be abused, that we will enforce our immigration laws against human 
smugglers.” Within this framework, the Minister of Public Safety will be 
in charge of designating irregular arrivals of groups of people, who will be 
then detained. 
Human smuggling and trafficking in persons are egregious human 
rights violations. As a global phenomenon, they are the subject of 
increasing concern to border officials and law enforcement agencies. The 
main international legal instrument used in the fight against transnational 
organized crime is the United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime (United Nations 1998) supplemented by two protocols: 
the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, 
and the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
Especially Women and Children. According to the first protocol, human 
smuggling implies “the procurement, in order to obtain directly or indirectly, 
42 An announcement by the Citizenship and Immigration Canada that appeared on http://
www.cic.gc.ca/english/refugees/index.asp
73
R O M A  I N  C A N A D A :  M I G R A T O R Y  T R E N D S ,  I S S U E S  A N D  P E R C E P T I O N S
a financial or other material benefit of the illegal entry of a person into a 
State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident” 
(United Nations 200a). Trafficking in persons, often referred to as modern 
day slavery, is defined as the act of “recruitment, transportation, transfer, 
harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or 
other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse 
of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of 
payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over 
another person, for the purpose of exploitation” (United Nations 200b). 
Exploitation includes, at a minimum:
•	 exploitation in the form of prostitution or other forms of sexual 
exploitation,
•	 forced labor or services,
•	 slavery or practices similar to slavery,
•	 servitude,
•	 or the removal of organs.
Canada became party to these three international instruments in 
2002 and is, therefore, bound by the obligations that each one carries. In 
addition to provisions in the Criminal Code of Canada, the Immigration 
and Refugee Protection Act contains specific reference to the additional 
offences of human smuggling and trafficking in persons. Section 117 
prohibits human smuggling, while section 118 prohibits trafficking in 
persons (IRPA 2001). 
Although pertaining to different conditions, it is important to bear in 
mind that, at times, human smuggling incorporates trafficking in persons – 
as these two phenomena have known to be used interchangeably, especially 
in the Canadian context (Table 8.).
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Table 8. Differences between trafficking in persons and human 
smuggling
Trafficking in persons Human smuggling
Type of crime Crime against the person Crime against the state
Objective
Protection of human rights 
and the responsibility of the 
state to provide adequate 
protection to its citizens
Protection of state 
sovereignty
Basis of crime
Organized recruitment/
transportation and continued 
exploitation for profit
Organized transportation of 
the person for profit
Border crossing Transnational and national Always inter/transnational
Consent Irrelevant Relevant
Length of 
relationship
Continued in order for the 
trafficker to maximize the 
exploitation
Finished once the migrant 
has crossed the border and 
paid the fee
Movement
Trafficking victims have 
restricted movement or are 
in complete isolation without 
documents
Migrants move freely and are 
able to leave their job
Source of profit Exploitation
Transportation or facilitating 
the entry into the destination 
country
Terms of payment
Trafficking victims often 
pays the minimal amount 
before leaving or not: later 
on he/she is in debt which 
perpetuates itself and turns 
into debt bondage
Migrants often pay the 
fee before leaving or after 
arriving in the destination 
country
Recruitment Trafficking victim is approached
Migrants often contact 
smugglers
If apprehended Repatriated or given residency status Repatriated
Source: Arhin (2011)
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Considering again the CIC’s stance, Minister Kenney’s rhetoric overall 
on ‘bogus’ refugee claimants, and the subsequent Bill C-31 amendments, 
clearly there was a popular correlation made between the influx of asylum 
seekers and the serious criminal activities that had occurred in Canada 
in recent years. Prior to the passing of those amendments, Canada has 
witnessed the largest case of trafficking in persons to date and the first one 
ever to involve labor exploitation. The Domotor family, and their extended 
family, brought 19 Hungarian Roma from Papa, Hungary to Hamilton, 
Canada to work as unpaid labor for their construction business in Southern 
Ontario. The case alleged that, in October of 2010, the Domotor family 
recruited and trafficked victims for the purpose of forced labor and took 
advantage of Canada’s refugee and welfare systems by committing fraud 
(Soroptimist 2012). Victims were instructed to claim refugee status and 
apply for welfare, which the Domotor family then collected. They were 
locked in the basements of homes in Hamilton and Ancaster where they 
lived in deplorable conditions. Their passports were taken away and, 
with no knowledge of English, they were forced to work seven days per 
week without pay. Known as ‘Project Opapa’, this case has seen eight 
convictions for conspiracy to traffic in persons and more were found guilty 
for participating in a criminal organization (Morrow 2012). The 2010 
Hamilton human trafficking case carried first-ever convictions for forced 
labor as well as for international human trafficking. 
This case not only matches with government perceptions of Roma 
refugees and – to a great extent – supports the protective measures 
introduced in Bill C-31, but also offers a demonstration of Canada’s 
broader immigration policy. It is not uncommon for countries to articulate 
their issues with transnational crime, in this case trafficking in persons, in 
the context of state security and national immigration policies. Driven by 
these concepts, governments are prompted to formulate their fight against 
transnational crime by curbing irregular migration (Sanderson 2004). 
In this particular case, trafficking in persons was perceived to be a 
threat to state integrity and the nation and immigration has been viewed as a 
matter that challenges state sovereignty (Bigo 2002). Addressing trafficking 
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in persons, as well as human trafficking, has become central in security 
studies and has evolved to be a school of thought that is substantiated by 
the assumption that these issues are primarily a matter of immigration 
policy and state security. The focus, therefore, is on the state and public 
rhetoric frequently engages terms such as ‘national defense,’ ‘terrorism,’ and 
‘safeguarding borders,’ in order to solicit public support. 
In contrast to perceiving immigration and crime in the context of state 
security, it is possible to view them within the framework of humanitarian 
principles. In doing so, one shifts the spotlight on the victim and perceives 
transnational crime in the context of human rights violations (Clark 
2003). Some of the terms that would be used in this case are ‘human 
condition,’ ‘vulnerability,’ ‘socio-economic conditions’ and even ‘women 
and children.’
While acknowledging these ostensibly contradictory approaches, 
security and humanitarian discourses can be mutually supportive, as states 
are required to provide not only secure borders but also the security of 
people living within them (Arhin and Quayson 2012). 
Roma Refugee Claimants: Economic Migrants or ‘Real’ Refugees
It is instinctive to place the issue of Roma refugees in the context of 
Canadian immigration policies that have largely focused on the state 
and the protection of its borders and citizens, especially in light of the 
aforementioned Hamilton case. This inevitably results in a debate as to 
whether Roma are coming to Canada as economic migrants, looking for 
jobs and better life, or are fleeing to Canada based on fear of persecution 
in their home country. 
As illustrated throughout this article, Roma refugee claimants have 
consistently been placed in the context of the immigration-crime nexus. 
Having such a high profile case involving Roma trafficking Roma from 
Hungary to Canada, members of which applied for and obtained welfare, 
provides fertile ground for building an image of criminal elements arriving 
with the intent to abuse Canada’s refugee and health system. 
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On the other hand, considering the harsh realities that Roma in 
particular face in Hungary, it remains uncertain whether recent criminal 
activities that surfaced in Canada can overshadow the socio-economic 
hardships and persecution that force Roma to leave their countries of origin.
Analyzing cases that emerged in the media during this time might 
offer some new points of inquiry and consideration. In December 2011, 
Embassy, a Canadian foreign policy newspaper, ran a story on István 
Kamarás, a Roma historian and political analyst (ostensibly Deputy Prime 
Minister Zsolt Semjén’s top Roma affairs adviser), who sought refugee status 
in Canada (Shane 2011). Activists hurried to declare this case the prime 
example that Hungarian Roma were fleeing to Canada based on their fear 
of persecution and not for economic reasons – the argument commonly 
expounded by the Hungarian government. In his email correspondence 
with the newspaper, Kamarás said he left “because of the ever-growing, 
strengthening, aggressive prejudice against Roma.” Meanwhile, when 
asked his opinion, Hungarian Deputy Head of Mission, Tamás Király, 
stated that, although he was not fully aware of the details of this case, he 
believed that it was an instance of economic migration. He also noted that 
there was substantial misinformation about what a refugee claim implies, 
citing a case of a Hungarian couple that actually emailed the embassy to 
ask how to apply for one. 
Another high profile case involved Viktória Mohácsi, a Roma rights 
activist and Hungary’s former Member of the European Parliament (MEP), 
who allegedly left the country in December 2009 to apply for political 
asylum in Canada after filing for police protection in Hungary, due to 
serious threats she had received (Hungarian Roma activist 2012). 
Both cases make an attempt to highlight the push and pull factors 
behind Roma’s decisions to seek refuge in Canada, in line with one of 
the earliest theories of migration supported by Ravenstein (1889) and Lee 
(1966). Fear of persecution, poverty, lack of employment and education 
opportunities, discrimination, restrictions on legal migration, socio-
economic and cultural norms, and family violence are among the most 
often cited push factors. On the other hand, pull factors might be at play, 
78
A N T O N E L A  A R H I N
such as the main factors forcing one to migrate including globalization, 
demand for cheap labor, illegal (but still) employment opportunities, and 
perceived better life abroad. It is not difficult to relate many of the push 
and pull factors to Roma’s refugee claims in Canada, in particular those 
referring to fear of persecution and discrimination, which supports the 
argument that they are indeed ‘real’ refugees.
Counter to the notion that Roma are refugees fleeing their countries 
of origin and perceiving their circumstances as human rights violations, 
the Canadian government has focused on corroborating a link between 
‘dubious’ refugee claims and recent crimes committed on Canadian soil. 
In addition to the 2010 Hamilton human trafficking case, Canadian 
authorities are currently investigating an alleged human smuggling ring 
that has brought hundreds of Romanian Roma refugee claimants to the 
Toronto area via Mexico (Bell 2012). Authorities believe that smuggled 
migrants are being charged between $10,000 and $30,000 for passage 
from Mexico via Texas to greater Toronto, which is to be re-paid to the 
smugglers using welfare benefits once in Canada and by engaging in petty 
criminal activities. Just one month prior to this incident, the Durham 
Regional Police Department arrested 34 Romanian Roma who targeted 
convenience stores, jewelers, and seniors by distracting them and then 
stealing goods. The officials called it the dismantling of an “organized 
crime ring” that resulted in booking over 260 separate offenses made 
while collecting allegedly over $2 million in social assistance benefits since 
January 2012. Investigators also identified over $1 million in suspicious 
wire transfer overseas (‘Distraction theft’ 2012). 
In January 2012, Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) completed 
a report analyzing charges against 311 Hungarian-born people who were 
jailed in Ontario between January 2010 and December 2011 (CBSA 2012). 
The report states that 226 of them were foreign nationals, of which 187 
had claimed refugee status. It concludes that Hungarian Roma refugee 
claimants post a “significant” risk of committing crime upon their arrival 
in Canada, based on their finding that 25% of those 226 committed a 
criminal offence within three months of making their refugee claim 
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(Elliott 20120). The report states that “the information received is not 
all encompassing, nor is it a depiction of all members of the community, 
however it serves to demonstrate that there is significant criminal activity 
occurring within this group.” In order to support such claim, the report 
cites several documented examples:
•	 Filing recurring claims even after being rejected and using altered 
or falsified names;
•	 Credit and debit card fraud and check theft;
•	 More than 20 Hungarian nationals who continued to receive 
benefits after being deported;
•	 The 2010 Hamilton human trafficking case, involving 19 
Hungarian Roma victims, that resulted in 12 convictions of 
Hungarian nationals;
•	 Cases where people after claiming refugee status leave Canada 
with thousands of dollars and in possession of electronics and 
laptop computers.
Conclusion
In the last two decades, Canada has handled a great deal of Roma refugee 
claimants from Hungary and Czech Republic. As a result, Citizenship 
and Immigration Canada has introduced multiple legislative and policy 
instruments to control these admissions, such as visa restrictions, a 
‘lead case’, Balanced Refugee Reform Bill C-11, Protecting Canada’s 
Immigration System Act Bill C-31, along with a host of ministerial rhetoric 
over Roma’s illegitimate claims of being refugees fleeing persecution. 
In order to facilitate the return of failed asylum seekers to their home 
countries, the Canadian government has teamed up with the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM) to institute the Assisted Voluntary 
Return and Reintegration Pilot Program (CIC 2012c). The program is now 
fully operative and has already assisted some 91 failed asylum seekers to 
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return to Hungary in little more than two months into the project. While 
those returning are provided with free airfare and up to $2,000 in in-kind 
resettlement services, the Roma Community Centre views this process as 
a bribe and claims that people are given money to give up before they have 
exhausted all their remedies (Cohen 2012b). 
Undoubtedly, more research into the underlying root causes of Roma 
migration to Canada is warranted, perhaps within the parameters of a 
wider theoretical framework which further would shed light on the internal 
dynamics of the migration process (de Haas, 2010). 
At the moment, however, the dichotomous relationship between 
perceiving Roma refugee claimants in the context of regular refugee flows 
and also as economic migrants continues to exacerbate the debate between 
Roma activists, human rights advocates, and Canadian government 
officials, leaving modest prospect for it to be resolved in the near future. 
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Introduction
The aim of this paper is to examine a recent form of migration from the 
Czech Republic to Canada. More specifically, it explores the asylum-seeking 
process and reconstructs the migration trajectories of a specific network of 
Roma from one southern Bohemian town to Canada, and their return. 
It draws on short-term ethnographic fieldwork, semi-structured interviews 
with individuals, and informal group discussions. Rather than formulating 
an overarching theory on Roma asylum seeking migration, this paper 
provides a qualitative study reconstructing a particular migration process 
through the perspective of the Roma migrants themselves, thus formulating 
an ethnographic response to the prevailing top-down approaches to studying 
Roma migration. It also situates the experiences of the Roma migrants 
within a particular socio-economic and historical context embedded 
simultaneously within a micro-cosmos of a small South Bohemian town 
and also within larger kinship and friendship networks of Roma extending 
to other parts of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Great Britain and Canada. 
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A comparison of Roma migration trends in the Czech Republic
Examining the extent of Roma migration is difficult for a host of complex 
reasons, related to the lack of any reliable statistical data (Guy 2004; Uherek 
2007). This shortfall makes providing any estimates on Roma migration 
very difficult. With the exception of asylum seeking migrations (in which 
Roma migrants claim asylum status based on discrimination or persecution), 
migrants’ ethnicities remain highly invisible within statistical data on 
mobility, since most of Roma migrants identify themselves during migration 
as Czechs or Slovaks. This is, for example, the case with Roma migrations to 
Great Britain after 2004. In the context of recent migration trends stemming 
from the Czech Republic, Roma mobility does not seem to differ greatly from 
the Czech Republic’s overall migratory patterns.43 Thus, the only significant 
difference remains the waves of asylum migration to Canada and other 
western European countries (mainly prior to the Czech Republic’s accession 
to the European Union). Similarly to other Czech citizens, some Roma have 
participated in trans-border migration to Germany and Austria.44 Roma 
have also been active in terms of labor migration to other western European 
countries, which has frequently been associated with their previous asylum 
migrations to these countries (e.g. Great Britain, Belgium). This has been 
especially the case in regards to migration to Great Britain following the 
Czech Republic’s accession to the European Union in May 2004. Roma and 
the majority alike found themselves migrating to Great Britain and following 
very similar trends. However, in comparison to non-Roma Czech migration, 
several aspects of Roma migration differed. For some of the initial Roma 
migrants, their arrival to Britain depended most frequently on knowledge 
43 Based on an estimate made by the author of this report.
44 Roma migration to Great Britain might have been more significant than trans-border 
migration to Germany or Austria, considering the generally lower level of education held by 
Roma migrants and the types of jobs they would take on in these labor markets. Of course, 
these migratory trends depend on particular localities: some borderland areas between the 
Czech Republic, Germany, and Austria have developed certain patterns of trans-border 
migration. At the same time, more recent forms of migration to western European countries 
seem to have taken on a more massive dimension. This is particularly the case in regards to 
migration to Great Britain, where many Roma entered the low-skilled jobs market in urban 
areas of Britain.
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attained during their previous migration experience to Britain as asylum-
seekers or a social connection with networks of Roma who had been in Britain 
before (either having stayed on after being granted asylum or having overstayed 
after their claim was rejected). These resources were also reinforced with Roma 
family networks and their intense communication within the transnational 
social field that stretched between the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Britain. 
Additionally, one of the important and distinctive features of Roma migrations 
is that Roma tend to migrate in families and only rarely as individuals. Roma 
labor migrants in Great Britain usually occupy low-level positions that do not 
require skills attained through formal education. Most migrants enter low-
skill, temporary, and exploitative jobs. For example, being placed by temporary 
job (temp) agencies in food production factories (cf. Grill 2011).
What also distinguishes recent Roma migration from the general 
trends in the Czech Republic are the waves of asylum seeking movements 
(Guy et al. 2004) and the impact of these waves on the more general patterns 
of Roma migration. According to some approximations, around 10% of 
Czech Roma have participated in some type of migratory movement, with 
one notable instance being the migrations to Benelux countries.45
As for Roma migration to Canada, we can distinguish two main 
waves of asylum seeking; the first reached its peak in Summer 1997 and 
the second in 2008/09. Although the connections and continuities between 
these two waves are important, it is beyond the scope of this paper to 
analyze these (but see e.g. Tóth 2010) or examine in greater detail the larger 
context of their asylum seeking migration. Rather, this paper focuses on the 
most recent wave of asylum seeking migration, which started in late 2008. 
In 2008, Canada recorded 859 asylum claims (with 84 migrants granted 
status, 128 returned, and 35 withdrawn). In the following year, there were 
2,210 applications, out of which 93 were granted asylum status, 76 returned, 
and a considerably higher amount (728) withdrew their request. 46
45 This estimate was made by Roman Krištof, based on research conducted for several reports 
made for the International Organization for Migration in Prague (IOM) and the Czech 
Ministry of Interior regarding Roma migrations to/from the Czech Republic. (http://www.
rozhlas.cz/zpravy/politika/_zprava/776445) 
46 http://www.cdp-hrc.uottawa.ca/projects/refugee-forum/projects/documents/REFUGEES
TATSCOMPREHENSIVE1999-2011.pdf
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Beyond ‘push-pull’ and other models of migration
Most research on Roma migration is based either on discourse analysis or on 
interviews with Roma immigrants in the destination countries. To a lesser 
extent, interviews may be sometimes conducted with would-be émigré in 
their countries of origin. They rarely trace the migration trajectory between 
and within both regions. Such interview-based accounts47 are then analyzed 
through the lens of the ‘push’ and ‘pull’ model of migration. This model, 
developed initially by E.S. Lee (1968) to create a demographic typology 
for migration movements, tends to portray migrants as either balancing 
between or driven by the ‘push’ factors of deprivation and discrimination 
and the ‘pull’ factors of imagined improvement in their standards of living 
and perceptions of the destination countries as a less racist society (see 
e.g. Fremlová et al. 2009, regarding recent Roma migration from Central 
Eastern Europe to Western Europe).
The migration of Czech and Slovakian Roma to West Europe and 
Canada at the turn of the twenty-first century tends to be portrayed 
one of two ways: either as a result of economic choice, calculation, and/
or ‘profit-seeking’ – often involving the organized exploitation of other 
migrants and of state systems (Krištof 2008) – or as a mass movement to 
escape the racism and discrimination faced in the countries of origin.48 
These narrow conceptualizations fail to examine the specific conditions of 
Roma emigration and the concrete pathways through which Roma come 
to migrate, navigate, and experience their movement. Thus, they risk the 
danger of sliding into popular, stereotypical depictions of Roma as cunning 
‘economic migrants’ or ‘bogus refugees’ (by receiving states) or as the 
ever-oppressed victims of ethno-racial discrimination (by Roma activists). 
Additionally, practically no studies have addressed the topic of migrants’ 
return to the home country from an anthropological perspective (see for 
exceptions Janků 2007; Vidra’s introduction to this volume).
47 See, for example, Cahn & Guild 2008; Fremlová et al. 2009, regarding recent Roma 
migration within the EU.
48 This position has been supported by representatives and associates of the Roma Community 
Centre in Toronto (see e.g. Csanyi-Robah 2012)
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The waves of Roma asylum seeking migrations throughout the 1990s 
and early 2000 became the topic of major political debate as well as the 
impetus for a number of social researchers to investigate and actively engage 
with asylum seeking migrants. The resulting studies have approached 
the subject from a variety of contexts and perspectives.49 While many of 
these challenged the stereotypical interpretations of ‘Gypsy migration’, 
providing adequate contextualization and overview of these migration 
trends, few accounts focused on concrete biographies, social trajectories, 
and the personal migration experiences of individual Roma migrants (see 
for exceptions, Janků 2007; Kovats 2002). In comparison to previous 
migration waves, the most recent Roma asylum migrations to Canada 
have not been investigated in an analytically rigorous fashion and further 
research is needed to examine its dynamics.
There is one frequently cited study on the most recent wave of asylum 
seeking migration to Canada50 (Krištof 2008). According to this study, 
asylum migration has been organized around a ‘client system’ with a 
central role played by so-called ‘prospectors’. The prospectors are former 
emigrants from Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic, who, since 
their immigration, frequently organize migration runs benefiting from it 
both ‘professionally and financially’. Krištof asserts that these prospectors 
are embedded within the social network of human right activists in the 
Czech Republic and Canada. One of the key points of the study is that 
asylum migration is organized by these prospectors (and other previous 
asylum seekers) whose circles, to some certain extent, overlap with more 
affluent and better-situated Roma as well as with various non-governmental 
organizations. This network of prospectors orchestrates the migration, 
communicating to their acquaintances in the Czech Republic, when the 
time is right, about when to travel and/or what story to tell the Canadian 
49 See Clark and Campbell 1997; Kovats 2002; Klimova & Pickup 2003; Matras 2000; 
Sobotka 2003; Stewart 2002; Guy, Uherek, and Wernerová 2004; Uherek 2007; Vašečka et 
al. 2000
50 It is interesting to note that the author of the study has refused to make public who 
commissioned the study. Some of the critiques of the report seem to suggest that the report 
was commissioned by the Czech government.
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institutions upon arrival. Krištof says migration can be seen more as a 
‘business’ driven mainly by a variety of economic interests and to a much 
lesser extent by issues of racism and discrimination. However, in one media 
interview, he somewhat modified his opinion by suggesting that the term 
‘organized migration’ might be too strong and he proposed using the term 
‘mediated’ (zprostředkování) when referring to the role of prospectors and 
Roma rights’ organizations.51 From 2008 to 2010, Krištof presented his 
findings in various newspapers and other media sources and became seen 
as an ‘expert’ in the field of Roma migration.52 It was primarily the findings 
from his research report, often filtered through the interviews he gave to the 
media, which came to influence the public discourse on Roma migration. 
So, it was also his selective interpretations that contributed to the simplified 
and rather generalized interpretation of Roma asylum migration.53 Krištof 
purported that Roma’s decisions to migrate were always orchestrated by a 
network of prospectors and, further, migrants themselves were unable to 
grasp the difference between labor migration and asylum claims.54 While 
the report provides descriptive observations and other kinds of data55 
regarding the migration process (obtained mostly from interviews), its main 
51 See Holec, P. 2009. Jak užít Kanadu. Reflex 30. This journalistic account includes an 
interview with Roman Krištof. It is also here that he states: “But Roma migration is neither 
trafficking nor illegal. These people go towards better [migrate towards a better life], 
they don’t see it as abuse of the asylum system.” One of them described this to us by the 
term užívání. The term užívání can be translated as ‘making use of ’ or ‘using’, but also as 
‘enjoying.’
52 It is telling to note how his positioning and referencing of a report (which to my knowledge 
was never made publicly accessible) and a study (without specifying what the research 
consisted of ) resulted in legitimizing his position as having some kind of ‘expert knowledge’ 
whereas the data produced by activists was seen as bias - supporting their particular interests 
in the discussion on the asylum migrations.
53 See, for example, http://www.lidovky.cz/emigrace-romu-je-byznys-byt-nekdo-veri-ze-
pomaha-dobru-pf7-/ln_domov.asp?c=A090705_084621_ln_domov_mtr
54 http://www.rozhlas.cz/zpravy/politika/_zprava/776445
55  Krištof does not explicitly clarify his methodology or the techniques he used in order to 
obtain his data. The work appears to be based on interviews with several Roma and with 
representatives of institutions who represent Roma, or who interact with Roma asylum 
seekers. The report also includes excerpts from two interviews with Roma families who 
claimed asylum in Canada.
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analytical points and interpretative frameworks appears to be flawed – in 
the light of empirical scrutiny and when compared to the findings in the 
concrete case study presented here. Krištof ’s report tends to over-emphasize 
the role of ‘prospectors’ and to highlight economic reasons over other 
aspects of migration trends while also omitting to address the individual 
Roma migrants’ agency, reducing the weight of complex social forces, and 
using particular circumstances and fitting these into a rather generalized 
account of asylum migration. In the case study provided here, we do not 
aspire to provide an overall analysis of Roma asylum migration. Rather, its 
findings aim to challenge some of the assumptions that have been made in 
the past by engaging in a concrete ethnographic critique. In the following 
case study, the prospectors play a rather marginal role, migrants had no 
contact with the ‘key players’ prior to their migration, and their decision to 
migrate was driven by a mixture of motivations, some contradictions, and 
with the ultimate trigger being a violent incident. 
The intention of this present paper is to contribute to the better 
understanding of Roma asylum seeking migration from the perspective 
of the returned migrants themselves. Examining migration through the 
migrants’ own perspective and experience enables us to leave behind overly 
mechanistic ‘push’ and ‘pull’ models, and to avoid passing judgment over 
migration as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ (for Roma, for the home countries, or for the 
societies both within the state of origin and in the destination country). It 
is only by paying attention to the lived experience of migration processes 
that we can debunk the tendency to reify and homogenize Roma migration 
as is done in academic, popular, and state-generated accounts. This paper 
aims to further challenge ‘either-or’ assessments of migration by following 
the ‘more or less/to what extent’ social logic of migration, looking for the 
specific contexts and conditions that produce, as well as being products of, 
migration movements.
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Fieldwork
The account presented here is based on a concrete case study, a research project 
deploying a combination of methodological tools of an anthropological 
fieldwork as well as desk research reviewing available media and literature 
sources. The main bulk of fieldwork was carried out in a small town, which 
I will refer to here as ‘Bombary’,56 located in South Bohemia.57 The town 
became well-known for the significant number of its Roma inhabitants who 
took part in the most recent wave of asylum-seeking migration to Canada.
Methods
Members of several interrelated families who had returned from Canada 
were interviewed over the course of several days and visits. The interviews 
were carried out in informal and semi-structured ways. The interviews lasted 
between one-and-a-half to three hours and were conducted simultaneously 
in Romany and Czech. Although most of the respondents communicated 
in Czech, the older respondents at times switched into Romany. Although 
I introduced a set of open-ended questions, the interviewees often changed 
the topic and flow of discussion and took off in different directions. 
Additionally, the format of the interviews moved from a single narrative 
of individual interviewees to multi-vocalized account – as relatives and 
neighbors (both Roma and non-Roma) joined in and left the conversations. 
Thus, at times, the interviews turned into a group discussion, as new 
participants entered the conversation. 
Rather than formally setting up a focus group, I was inadvertently 
able to participate in informal meetings where I found that respondents 
participated more freely and discussed their migration to and from Canada 
with less reservation. This was made possible by the specific arrangement of 
56 Bombary is a pseudonym. Additionally, I have changed the names of participants appearing 
in this report.
57 Additionally, I also visited another town in southern Bohemia with a larger population of 
Roma inhabitants who had participated in a recent wave of asylum migration to Canada. 
However, the main focus of this report is the Roma networks in Bombary.
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the spatial setting in which the interviews took place. The interviews and 
group discussions were conducted on benches at a playground nearby the 
participants’ homes. During my first visit, I conducted an interview with a 
Romani woman and obtained a rather ‘standard’ version, singular narrative 
about her and her family’s experiences of migration and return. On my 
second and third visit, I was able to record other narratives and stories that 
were, at times, contradictory and, at other times, supportive of the narrative 
recorded in my first visit. The second and third visit finally gained me the 
necessary level of trust from my Roma interviewees, who then were more 
open to share their stories and knowledge on the different issues and factors 
influencing their migration strategies.
I feel it is important to mention that this informal setting allowed 
me unique access to contested narratives and descriptions of the migration 
experience. Due to the short-term nature of the project and research period, 
most of the data consisted of interviews and could not be juxtaposed against 
empirically-observed practices. 
In order to include the perspective of local institutions that deal 
with Roma, I also conducted an interview with one employee at the town 
council. In her position working in social affairs, she has worked with local 
Roma. Her observations, as she emphasized, did not necessarily represent 
the opinion of the municipality as an institution. However, her thoughts on 
the Roma migrations to (and returns from) Canada were influenced by her 
daily interactions with Roma clients (in the institutional context), as well as 
her background, having lived in Bombary all her life. 
Additionally, I carried out some relatively short interviews with a 
lawyer who represented the returning Roma families in a court case against 
the town of Bombary. Finally, I reviewed media coverage of the recent 
Roma migrations, in order to determine what the dominant representations 
of Roma asylum seeking migrations were.
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Roma in Bombary
The majority of Roma from Bombary are descendants of Slovakian Roma 
families who migrated to the Czech borderlands during the aftermath of the 
Second World War, a place from whence the German-speaking population, 
long inhabiting this area, were displaced. The actual number of Roma 
inhabitants in this small South Bohemian town oscillated throughout the 
second half of the twentieth century. The current total population is 4,068 
people.58 There are no official statistics regarding inhabitants of Roma 
origin. In the last decade, some Roma moved away from Bombary in search 
of better opportunities, as a consequence of marriages and other family 
matters. Yet, they also left as a consequence of the present mayor’s efforts 
to get rid of default tenants in municipal housing. Several families who 
historically resided in the centre of the town have now moved to the outskirts. 
The real numbers of Roma families living in town also differs from the 
statistics, as some of them do not register their permanent residency when 
they move to Bombary. According to the local social worker I interviewed, 
to date, there were about 40 Roma families living in town. For her, ‘they 
are all one big family here.’ Her comment highlights the general perception 
of the Roma as some kind of homogenous community, interconnected 
through a web of kinship ties. This depiction of Roma as a homogenous 
ethnic group is a widespread perception amongst the local non-Roma 
population. In comparison, the Roma themselves made fine distinctions 
within their community, showing a complex web of kinship relations, but 
also emphasizing significant frictions and fissures that overlapped with 
Bombary residential patterns: the Roma families who migrated to Canada 
were from families traditionally residing in the town’s centre or in the 
neighborhoods nearby, while there were also several families living at the 
city limits who were not related to them and did not migrate to Canada. To 
a certain extent, these differences also reflected socio-economic statuses and 
hierarchies between the more affluent families and more marginal Roma in 
Bombary.
58 This is the official number provided by the municipality office in June 2012.
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Most of the persons interviewed (Roma and non-Roma) mentioned 
that there have not been significant tensions between local Roma and non-
Roma in Bombary. Some keenly emphasized their rootedness and sense of 
belonging in Bombary. This was demonstrated throughout the interviews 
that took place on the playground, as several non-Roma friends of my Roma 
respondents stopped by the benches for a small chat. Additionally, the 
respondents also established their claim for belonging by emphasizing their 
familiarity and intimate friendship with some local non-Roma neighbors: 
“the people know us here. [some of] the local gadže59 have known use since we 
were kids and we have grown up here.” At one point during the interview, 
this sense of closeness and familiar intimacy with the local non-Roma 
living in the surrounding block of flats was then contrasted with comments 
indicating mistrust of, and/or complete absence of knowledge about, the 
non-related Roma who live on the margins of the town.
This was confirmed by the local social worker who stated, although 
“Bombary earned the reputation of being a ‘Gypsy’ town” (implying that the 
town has a rather negative reputation with outsiders due to their Roma 
population); she herself opposed such a view. She did not consider the 
situation there to be any worse than in other towns with Roma inhabitants. 
The situation changed after a violent incident in November 2008. A fight 
broke out between several Roma and members of staff (non-Roma) at the 
local discothèque in the Hotel Šemík. This incident triggered a change in 
interethnic relations in town and also influenced several Roma families to 
make the decision to migrate to Canada.
Most of the Roma in Bombary are officially unemployed. Both the 
local social worker as well as the Roma interviewed confirmed this to 
me. Women, in particular, are considered the long-term unemployed, 
some finding occasional temporary jobs. Some men commute to work on 
a weekly basis, usually employed on construction sites and with menial 
labor. I was told that several Roma men are working in Germany and 
Austria and return only for weekends. The interviewed Roma asserted that 
there is “no chance to get a job here,” and frequently added that this is 
59 Non-Roma
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also particularly due to the discrimination against Roma. The local social 
worker says the problem of Roma unemployment is also further reinforced 
by their reluctance to commute to work, “especially by bus”. Her statement 
seems to be a contradiction to the relatively high number of Roma we found 
commuting to work from Bombary, or labor migration from Bombary, as 
recorded throughout our research.
Considering the worsening socio-economic situation, migration arose 
as one of the possible options available to improve one’s situation. However, 
not all forms of migration were necessarily international migration. Some 
families frequently migrate to other parts of the Czech Republic in search 
of better opportunities via family connections. These connections have 
crystallized during the second half of the twentieth century, following the 
migration of Roma from Slovakia into Czech territory. Most of the Roma 
migrants had once moved from Slovakia to borderland towns that were 
left depopulated following the forced displacement of German-speaking 
inhabitants in the post-World War II period. Many Roma living in the 
Czech countryside today have maintained extensive kinship ties with 
relatives in other Czech cities and parts of Slovakia. 
A History: Migration to Canada from Bombary
A previous history of migration
Unlike the Czech Roma that participated in earlier waves of asylum 
migration, the Roma from Bombary had no previous experience of this 
kind of migration prior to their departure to Canada in 2008-2009. Their 
migration to Canada was not built on connections. However, several local 
families had migrated to Great Britain following the Czech Republic’s 
accession to the EU in 2004. In 2006, Mrs. Věra first migrated with her 
husband, one son, and two of her daughters, to Britain. Her eldest daughter, 
her two children and husband, stayed in the Czech Republic. Věra explained 
her move to Britain: 
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“Half of my family, from my husband’s side, lives in Britain…
first we went only for a holiday. We were there for three weeks 
and then I had liked it there so much that we took our things 
and went there [to live].”
Her husband’s relatives, all originating from another part of the Czech 
Republic, helped them with their first steps in Britain. His four siblings and 
their families migrated to Britain in the late 1990s, during one of the first 
waves of asylum seeking migration by Czech and Slovak Roma. They all 
live in Britain and have obtained legal residential ‘status’ in Britain. Věra 
spoke highly of her migratory experience in Britain: 
“I’ve got a job immediately, and my husband as well, [our] girl 
went to school – everything without any problems. I’m always 
saying that the foreign country – the Czechs can’t beat that.”
She said that although they had to work very hard, for 12 hours’ shifts 
in a food production factory (packing fruits and vegetables), they enjoyed 
Great Britain. Having a personal history of once migrating to Britain 
informed her migration experiences and strategies when moving to Canada. 
Additionally, Britain often appeared as a point of comparison between the 
two. When juxtaposing their migration experiences, Canada often appeared 
to come out on top, as a better place in almost all aspects. At the same time, 
the legal framework, the visa regime, and stricter immigration procedures 
against the Roma asylum seekers, as well as the long-distance – dividing 
families between Czech Republic and Canada – were reasons that made 
Canada worse in comparison to Great Britain. 
Věra’s family did not plan to leave Britain any time soon. However, 
one of her teenage daughters, who had come back to their hometown in the 
Czech Republic earlier, became pregnant and the whole family came back, 
Věra says, “because of her” in autumn of 2008. It was shortly before their 
return to Bombary that the violent incident took place at the local disco. It 
involved several of her close relatives and proved to be the turning point in 
terms of a sudden intensification of interethnic tensions and, for many, an 
incentive for making the decision to migrate.
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The triggering incident: Fight at Hotel Šemík
The incident at the local Hotel Šemík took place in November 2008. Several 
Roma men were involved in a brawl with security guards at the hotel disco. 
The reason for the fight was not clear from all the various accounts, but 
it seems likely that it involved some racial abuse against the Roma. One 
of the Roma men, Věra’s brother, was badly beaten up and ended up at 
a local hospital. As the fight took place, several bystanders ran for help, 
to the relatives and friends of the Roma who were being beaten up. The 
incident stirred up mixed emotions of fear, anxiety, and anger, as a new 
crowd of people spontaneously rushed towards to the discothèque in order 
to help and/or possibly take a revenge for the fight. Many of these men were 
reportedly armed with various tools (such as hammers or axes). Afraid of 
being attacked by the crowd, the hotel staff locked the door, but also kept 
the injured Roma men inside with them. The crowd tried to attack the 
hotel, in an effort to get their relatives. In the ensuing chaos and tension, 
the security guards took their guns and shot several times (accounts vary as 
to whether these were warning shots aimed in the air in order to prevent the 
crowd from entering or actually shot into the crowd). Shortly after, police 
intervention brought the fight to an end, and the police took several actors 
(both Roma and non-Roma) involved in the fight into custody. 
The days and weeks that followed the Hotel Šemík fight were charged 
with a mixture of fear and tension in town. Although none of the security 
guards involved in the beatings were from Bombary,60 the violent incident 
had a negative impact on interethnic relations in town. I was told that, 
in the aftermath of this incident, there was a series of verbal threats and 
increased tensions along interethnic lines. The situation resulted in a series 
of discourses and interactions that evoked the ‘interethnic tensions’ and 
consequently brought them into being by instilling the increasing fear and 
suspicion into the minds of many local residents. While Roma and non-
Roma interviewees agreed that, in general, “there was no big racism” in 
60 Interestingly, several of the Roma respondents reported that the guards who attacked their 
relatives were “foreigners”… “not from here.” The non-Roma security guards were not from 
Bombary and had not lived in the town.
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town, they also asserted that this conflict worsened the situation. The Roma 
I interviewed reported that they experienced verbal attacks and threats. 
For example, they recalled when several young non-Roma drove up in 
front of their flats in order to threaten and swear at them. Similar types 
of verbal threats, a sudden increase in tensions, and mutual mistrust were 
mentioned in my interviews with local non-Roma, too. Although no similar 
acts of physical violence occurred after the Šemík incident, the tension, 
verbal threats, and general feeling of insecurity negatively influenced the 
relationships and interaction between Roma and non-Roma. Additionally, 
the media contributed to the situation by selectively portraying the situation 
as a result of “interethnic conflict,” ascribing homogeneity of opinion to the 
two ‘groups,’ despite the variety of social discord. 
According to Věra, after “the Gadžos badly assailed my brother, we had 
enough.” Later on, she added that, “ it’s not that there would be, God knows, 
how big kind of racists in Bombary, but [then] we had enough of that.” Some 
members of the families came up with the idea of going to Canada. The 
idea was discussed amongst various family members in what she called as 
informal ‘family gathering.’ However, the decision was made. This is how 
Věra summarized her family’s decision: “I did not hesitate for a minute. One 
day I just said I’m finished here.” Although the incident described above 
played a crucial role in influencing their decision to seek asylum in Canada, 
there were other important factors that need to be considered in analyzing 
their move. The incident operated as a trigger, however, a mixture of factors 
also influenced them; a general sense that the socio-economic situation was 
worsening, a perceived lack of opportunities fused with a perceived rise 
in anti-Gypsy sentiment in the employment sector, and discrimination all 
informed their decision to migrate. All these are mentioned in the recorded 
interviews. For example, while discussing media coverage of Roma migration 
to Canada, highlighting how one-sided and negative these representations 
had been, it was mentioned that, “ it would look as if Roma are going to 
Canada just for money.” Several respondents rejected this interpretation but 
also admitted that a part of their reason to migrate was financial. Another 
family reported that the situation seemed “no longer bearable” and that’s 
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why they “decided to move towards [something] better.” Here, they referred 
to a general sense that the quality of life was dropping and that there was 
a shrinking sense of possibilities in Bombary, accentuated by the constant 
(rising) suspicion and increasing exclusion on the side of non-Roma.
Unlike simplistic and overly deterministic top-down accounts 
that portray asylum seeking migration to Canada either as economically 
motivated or as a matter of discrimination, my interviews with Roma 
migrants indicated a more complex picture, at times combining a variety 
of motives, at times emphasizing one at the expense of other, at other times 
contradicting these claims and then finding a balance between both at 
another time. The interviews showed certain oscillations and contradictions 
in relation to other factors.
Departure to Canada
Following their collective decision, several Roma families left for Canada 
at the beginning of 2009. The family members tried to fly together, though 
some followed them later for variety of reasons. In the case of Věra’s family, 
they purchased their tickets from the savings they made during their time 
in Britain and by borrowing some money from her sister. Her sister had 
also lived in England prior to going to Canada (and later on returned to 
England from Canada). All of her six brothers and their families went with 
their families, too. Other relatives had to borrow money for their trip. They 
borrowed money from their relatives, friends, and some also from personal 
credit sources.61 But I was also told that some families had to sell their flats 
in order to be able to afford the tickets to Canada. Thus, Věra’s sister sold 
her flat and supported her relatives. Additionally, some other Roma families 
sold their flats in order to raise enough money for their family’s tickets 
to Canada. Věra’s family purchased ten tickets for their family members, 
61 One of the popular sources of quick cash-loans was the financial company Provident. 
Companies like this, offering small loans to individuals with lower credit ratings at high 
interest rates, were one of the reasons why so many of the returning Roma found themselves 
greatly in debt.
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costing a total of 186,000 CZK.62 The family members included Věra and 
her husband, their children and grandchildren, and also Věra’s mother. This 
was relatively exceptional strategy in relation to other families, since many 
elderly Roma often stayed behind. One of Věra’s daughters was about to 
give birth, so Věra stayed with her while the other family members departed 
to Canada. It took them almost three months before they received all the 
official documentation and permission required for traveling with such a 
small baby. Věra’s granddaughter was a little more than two months old 
when they joined their family in Canada.
In comparison to traveling to Britain, which she “was used to and 
frequently traveled alone,” Věra was a bit worried prior to her trip to 
Canada. She was concerned about the long transatlantic flight, her small 
granddaughter, and also because she did not know what to expect when they 
arrived in Canada. However, her previous migration experience to Britain 
somehow gave her more confidence than the other Roma who traveled for 
the first time. She laughed as she told me “our Roma – stupid [laughing] – 
they didn’t want to eat on the plane as they thought that they would have to 
pay.” She contrasted their inexperience and ignorance with her knowledge 
obtained during her migration in Britain. It was also this cultural capital 
that helped her not only to manage the flight but also to adjust to the new 
country and living conditions.
Upon landing in Toronto, the Roma migrants arrived with a sense of 
angst, not knowing what to expect from the “heavily armed police waiting 
at the airport.” After the Roma families said “emigration,” the border guards 
took them aside. It is interesting to note that most of the interviewees claimed 
to “know what to say” upon arrival. As one respondent explained, “you can 
go to Canada either as a ‘refugee’63 or for ‘ holiday’. So, we went as a ‘refugee.’ 
You just tell them “emigration” and they already know, you don’t need to say 
62 This amounts to approximately EUR 7,480. Agata paid back the loan from her sister while 
in Canada. She was “only able to pay it back because we were in Canada. Here [the Czech 
Republic] I would not be able to pay her back.”
63 Although the interviews were carried out in Czech, these expressions were pronounced in 
English.
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anything else.” 64 Although they claimed to have no family connections in 
Canada, they seemed to have gained this specific knowledge from another 
source, possibly from a more distant friendship connection with Roma 
families already in Canada. Apart from knowing what to say at the airport, 
the respondents suggested that they did not have much knowledge about 
Canada prior to their departure. It can be said that while they possessed 
certain amount of cultural capital (Bourdieu 1986) from their previous 
migration experience (mainly to Great Britain), this was not necessarily 
linked to Canada but was converted while becoming incorporated into 
the social networks of other Roma families and institutions assisting the 
asylum seekers in Canada. 
The Canadian experience
One of the greatest outcomes of migration to Canada was the encounter 
with a multicultural society, wherein ethno-cultural difference does not 
automatically translate into different and/or worse treatment (in contrast 
to their experiences in the Czech Republic). Practically all interviewees 
highlighted this experience as one of the most positive features of their lives 
in Canada. “What is great there is that no one can call you names. Over there, 
we were like them. No one was making any differences.” Another migrant 
suggested, “there, no one looks at whether you’re black, yellow, or whatever. No 
one looks at you as a Gypsy!” This observation was made both in reference to 
interactions in everyday life and also in reference to institutional treatment. 
Another person expressed a similar opinion; “[over there] they can’t call you 
a Gypsy because [they would] be sent to jail immediately.” This experience 
was often contrasted with their encounters with racism, discrimination, and 
being treated as second-class citizens in the Czech Republic. Additionally, 
many Roma migrants valued diversity in Canada greatly and did not 
perceive themselves to be at the bottom of ethnic hierarchies. Most of the 
Roma women also noted how women and children get treated with more 
respect and their rights are more protected in Canada. 
64 This usually takes place already at the airport, upon arriving to Toronto (cf. Krištof 2008:2).
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All the Roma migrants praised the treatment they received from 
institutions in Canada. This was often contrasted with the Czech Republic. 
For example, their experience with medical staff was said to be incomparably 
better. Věra was diagnosed with breast cancer in Canada. She said, when 
she sought medical help, “over there, this is altogether different. The attitude 
of the doctors…When they found out that I had a tumor in the breast, I had to 
say that I was very worried…when I came, the doctor gave me a hug and said 
‘ don’t worry, we’ ll help you, we’ ll treat you’…and here [the Czech Republic] 
when we came back? [They said,] ‘Go back to Canada’.” They emphasized the 
medical staff’s empathy, openness, and reassuring friendliness. While the 
migrants had much praise for the attitude of (and treatment by) institutions, 
the system nevertheless posed some misunderstandings, uncertainties, and 
insecurities for the newly arriving Roma. This was especially the case when 
communication proved difficult and, at times, it took much longer to be 
seen for an appointment. This led some migrants to worry and to complain 
about the system and some of them thought that the Czech health system 
was quicker in terms of getting the necessary treatment. Some migrants 
thought this might be simply the attribute of big cities, in which “there 
are thousands of patients who need to be seen and, thus, they do not have that 
much time.”
Additionally, what most respondents highlighted was the higher 
standard of living and improved socio-economic situation they experienced 
in Canada. This referred simultaneously to being “treated better”, feeling 
a greater sense of possibility, and also notable socio-economic opportunity 
and improvements. One of the respondents summarized this saying, “ in 
Canada we used to live like raja [kings].” This was further illustrated by 
stories of the greater variety and quantity of food one could buy, but also, 
for instance, a one-day trip to Niagara Falls. Some migrants gave examples 
of other Roma who were granted refugee status in Canada eight years ago 
and now regularly go on holiday.
In Canada, the most recent wave of asylum seekers did not only receive 
the support given to asylum seeking applicants (interviewees used the same 
term – sociálka – as for Czech social benefits), but some also found jobs 
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in the informal sector: work at construction sites, cleaning, or other low-
skill, manual labor. These were usually jobs mediated through their Roma 
connections and acquaintances they made in Canada. The combination of 
the state support, informal work, and/or merely from receiving the state 
support for refugee claimants, families found sufficient coverage for their 
socio-economic survival. Some of the respondents suggested that they 
were able even to save some money in Canada and, when considering 
their Canadian experience from a merely economic perspective, they often 
regretted their return: 
“If someone would tell me to go to Canada [again], I would not 
think for a second. What a (great) life was there...I managed 
to bring some savings back from the Czech Republic. And I’m 
not counting the money, which I had sent home to those who 
left earlier (for the Czech Republic). When they called on Skype 
and said ‘I need some 100 dollars’…and this money [I sent 
to them] are irrecoverable. It wouldn’t exist if we would be 
coming home to Czech Republic and then we would ask for 
this money back. Never! We were all equal over there. One 
didn’t have money and another one gave. [There were] so many 
Gypsies [over there], strange gypsies and we were all one family. 
We’ve made ourselves a new Canada here.”
[J.G.]: What do you mean by a ‘new Canada’?
“Because we somehow became more united when abroad. The 
families even more…not just from Bombary. So, for example, I 
have millions of friends in Teplice  now. Some of them are like 
my sisters now.”
The above excerpt from one of the interviews reveals not only a socio-
economic in betterment, but also other important aspects of the migration 
process that were described by several respondents. It shows how migrants 
participated in the transnational social field and communicated via Skype 
with their relatives. They also supported members of the community at 
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home with remittances. Moreover, many of the migrants reported that they 
forged new ties of friendship in Canada and that they experienced more 
egalitarian ethics and better treatment amongst fellow Roma asylum seekers 
in Canada. One interviewee suggested that “Roma stuck together more.” They 
highlighted new friendships with other Roma, but also with other migrants. 
This greater solidarity and mutual help was illustrated in the above cited 
exert, not only referring to lending money when needed, but also through 
other forms of help and support. For example, one respondent said that 
because her son learned English very quickly he was often helping people 
with their institutional interactions. She suggested that this is due to his “big 
heart” and “unwillingness to take money from families who might need it for 
their children.” Being in Canada, thus, contributed to re-configuring some 
previous social relationships and building a certain sense of community 
through what was perceived as a more egalitarian ethics of mutuality. 
According to the interviewees, this code of ethics not only enhanced 
solidarity amongst Roma migrants, but also served as leverage to prevent 
unwanted behavior. This becomes apparent in the following quote, which 
reflects upon the alleged change in behavior of one family with a previously 
bad reputation: “Gypsies were keeping an eye on each other65 [in Canada]. Even 
those who were stealing in the Czech Republic didn’t dare to steal there. Over 
there, they would be reprimanded…Besides over there they did not need to steal.”
At the same time, the example of translating for free and helping 
others was contrasted by the mention of a very competitive and self-serving 
network of non-related Roma and non-Roma that offered their help for 
a fee. This led to the creation of differentiations and the deepening of 
fissures between some family networks. Services ranged from helping with 
interpretation at institutions to advising on the asylum process. Although 
the interviews did not reveal in depth the extent of this business or its 
organization, the interviews suggested that a lot of people were involved in 
the business of asylum seeker ‘assistance’.
65 The verb merkovat has an ambiguous meaning and can be interpreted as ‘watching over’ 
each other - as a form of help and support -, but also ‘keeping an eye’ on the others so they 
don’t do something bad.
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For many of the migrants, Canada also represented a space of relative 
abundance and greater variety of food and clothes. As Věra recalled, “ for 
me it was nothing new, since I’ve been in England before, but for those who 
were abroad for the first time…when they saw it, all these brands and things, 
they were amazed.” Similarly, the diversity and quantity of food available to 
them was well received. These aspects of the lifestyle were highly praised 
and were considered by some to be the advantage of moving from a small 
peripheral town in the Czech Republic to a diverse, metropolitan city. 
Speaking after their return, the sense of possibilities offered by Canadian 
cities was nostalgically remembered: “I love living in cities. If I could, I 
would live in the city immediately.” The interviewees enjoyed the variety of 
goods and diversity of the people they encountered. At the same time, not 
everyone found the move to the city as positive. For example, some of the 
migrants said they did not like the city lifestyle, where “there was nowhere 
to play with the children.” One male respondent in his fifties commented 
that he did not like the fact that he did not have anywhere to go in Canada 
and spent most of the time in flat with his nuclear family. Some migrants 
also noted that one’s experience also varied, depending on the area in which 
one lived. On one hand, the migrants generally considered Canada to be 
a safer place to live than the Czech Republic, which overlapped with the 
sense of greater multicultural tolerance. On the other hand, some migrants 
suggested that they did not feel safe in certain areas of Toronto. This fear 
was, at the time, connected to their move to a big and foreign city. Although 
the interviewees said that the area they lived in was not particularly nice 
and they considered it to be fairly dangerous to go out in the evenings, 
they also contrasted their experiences with other families who lived in areas 
seen as much worse, even dangerous, and as having a higher proportion of 
street violence. Apart from the deportations implemented after the asylum 
claims’ refusal, these negative aspects also played a part in many people’s 
decisions to withdraw their asylum application and to return.
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Motivations for and different routes of return
There are two ways of returning from Canada. First, if application for 
asylum is refused, then the unsuccessful claimant will be deported to the 
country of origin. The respondents mentioned that deportation could be 
significantly postponed by filling an official appeal to the decision. As most 
of them remarked, concerning their claims during this most recent wave of 
asylum migration, “ it has become almost impossible [to be granted asylum]…
the government [Czech Republic] went there and said that the Gypsies are not 
discriminated against and all that rubbish!”66 The second way of returning 
home, and this was the case for the majority of Roma interviewed for this 
research project,67 is to return to the Czech Republic after giving stopka68 
and withdrawing one’s asylum application. It is this latter case that we will 
focus on here.
For the interviewees, one’s individual well-being was often embedded 
within the collective well-being of their family. This was encapsulated in 
someone’s comment that, “we’re like that. If one has a pain, we all have 
the pain. That’s how we are. It’s different for gadže.” Thus, families who 
left behind some of their close relatives often felt a mixture of conflicting 
66 Although reflections upon the political representatives’ views on Roma asylum migrations 
did not appear in the migrants’ accounts, from several comments it was clear that the Roma 
were aware of some of the public discussions and controversies circulated in media.  One 
of the latest public waves of attention drawn to the issue of Czech Roma asylum migration 
followed events in May 2012. It was during his speech, appealing to Canada to lift the visa 
obligation for the Czech citizens, that the Czech Prime Minister, Petr Nečas, stated: “There 
is no reason for any citizen of the Czech Republic – regardless of his/her ethnic origin, 
religious beliefs or political opinion – to seek political asylum anywhere in the world...The 
feeling that one feels better somewhere else is not a (sufficient) reason for political asylum.” 
His comments were stated with regards to Canadian implementation of visas for the Czech 
citizens and stirred discussions prior to the official negotiations between Canada and EU 
about trade cooperation.  (See: http://zpravy.ihned.cz/c1-55866040-jestli-kanada-nezrusi-
vizovou-povinnost-pro-cechy-muze-cekat-problemy-varuje-necas)
67 It must be emphasized that at the time of the interviews, there were many Roma families 
still in Canada who were waiting for the decision regarding their asylum applications. In 
this project, only returned migrants were interviewed and these were usually among the 
first ones who decided to return for a wide of reasons. This context needs to be taken into 
consideration when analyzing the recorded interviews.
68 Stopka refers to their withdrawal of asylum applications.
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emotions about their move to Canada. Although regular contact was 
maintained through Skype and phone calls, there was still an intense 
feeling of loss and homesickness for the close relatives left in the Czech 
Republic. These were often children, grandchildren, or grandparents. This 
grew especially strong when someone in the Czech Republic fell gravely 
ill. Roma migrants described states of unbearable pain and heaviness 
stemming from being apart from their beloved relatives who were suffering 
from illness. This was one of the most frequently reported reasons to give 
stopka – to put in a request to end their asylum claim and return home. 
The research recorded a number of similar requests to return – based on 
illness or a family problem back in the Czech Republic. For the Roma 
migrants, the decision they made in these circumstances was simply the 
most obvious choice. However, for many of the political commentators 
and institutions processing their asylum claims, this appeared to be an 
insufficient reason for returning and only contributed to growing negative 
impressions of Roma asylum seekers. Additionally, the interviewees noted 
that, on more than one occasion, Roma gave stopka due to a suddenly 
arising personal problems in the Czech Republic, but later changed their 
mind and no longer wanted to return (for example, one’s relatives’ health 
having improved, or a similar problem being resolved). However, these 
changes found little understanding in the Canadian legal system, in which 
there was no space for such retrospective changes of mind. Thus, whoever 
submitted their request for stopka was sent to the Czech Republic, with no 
chance of ever receiving asylum status again.
For Věra’s family, the decision to return was again driven by an array 
of factors. Unlike other families whose grandparents stayed in the Czech 
Republic, her elderly mother came to Canada with them. However, her 
deteriorating health and homesickness played an important role in their 
decision to return back. Additionally, it was also Věra who fell gravely ill 
in Canada after being diagnosed with a breast cancer. Although she was 
pleased with the attitude and care provided by the Canadian health system, 
she grew nervous and increasingly worried over what she perceived as very 
slow progress in treating her cancer. She confessed that she lost her patience 
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and got worried that the slowness of Canadian health system, the waiting 
for and at appointments, might critically delay her treatment and endanger 
her chances to fight the illness in time.
“I caught nerves and lost my patience. They were still saying “all 
right” or “no problem” but this made me very nervous. I had a 
tumor of this size [gesticulating its large size] and was afraid.”
Her worries over the ineffectiveness of Canadian system eventually 
contributed to the decision to undergo the examinations and operation in 
the Czech Republic. While they did not like the way in which they were 
treated by the medical staff in the Czech Republic, many said that at least 
they understand them and feel that they get appointments quicker and 
that the Czech system allows for more in-depth examinations. In other 
words, the Czech health system was more familiar to them and the Roma 
migrants felt they know how to navigate it easier. In addition to her health 
problems, Věra’s family encountered a problem with one of their Canadian 
acquaintances, being in a long-standing conflict with a family of Albanian 
migrants who lived nearby. The conflict began with a short-lived love affair 
between Věra’s son and a young Albanian girl. However, the affair abruptly 
came to an end after her family found out. Věra’s entire family had to live 
under constant threat from the girl’s brothers. As Věra put it: 
“Ever since he started to have something with her, we’ve got 
into problems. Her brothers were threatening us with a gun…
they were saying that they are going to shot Peter [Věra’s son]…
Or, they would follow up on the street in a car and threatened 
us verbally. Another time, they would ring us at our flat and 
kept threatening…My youngest daughter, she used to be like 
this [gesticulating her well-built figure with her hands]. But 
then she had lost so much weight because of the constant fear we 
lived in, because she feared that they would kill or beat up her 
brother…we’re like that…if something happens to our closest, 
we feel horrible and share the same pain.”
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The conflict and ensuing tensions between the families suddenly 
transformed their lives and made their living in Canada more insecure. 
This experience of insecurity and fear significantly contributed to their 
decision to request stopka. However, their decision cannot be explained in 
one explanatory framework. It was the multiplicity of mutually reinforcing 
factors, which lead them to make the decision to return. Once they made 
that decision, it was only a matter of time before they got tickets and 
returned home.
Finally, it should be mentioned, that a frequently mentioned reason 
for returning ‘home’ was homesickness; or rather a lack of certain shared 
cultural intimacy (cf. Herzfeld 1997) and familiarity. Although, in most 
cases, this reason alone would not be enough to convince a migrant’s return, 
it played an important role in their construction of home. Although some 
migrants referred to Canada as their ‘home’, the majority of our interviewees 
tended to imagine the Czech Republic as ‘home’. Roma migrants greatly 
acknowledge the positive aspects of life in Canada and saw their migration 
as an opportunity to move in a future-oriented movement. However, they 
also expressed that their ‘roots’ were still in the Czech Republic.
Returning ‘home’
Most of the migrants’ reflections on their return were a combination of 
contradictory feelings and emotions. On one hand, migrants described 
feelings of regret, saying “I already realized that I made a mistake when we 
landed in Prague,” or “when I came back, I realized how horrible it is here.” 
Yet, on the other hand, the very same persons simultaneously suggested 
that their return was also determined by one’s roots, which “will always 
keep pulling you home. Here [Czech Republic], you have your acquaintances 
and friends.” Other returning migrants emphasized how they did not feel 
home in Canada and were looking forward to be back. These comments 
frequently drew on an imagined cultural intimacy and familiarity with 
things and social relationships in the Czech Republic.
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However, their actual return to the Czech Republic was not as 
positive an experience as they had imagined. Their arrival was paved with 
difficulties and it pushed many of them into more marginal and excluded 
positions vis-à-vis the dominant society. On one level, this was certainly 
the case in regards to the local non-Roma Czechs, who made them feel 
unwelcome. I have heard several complaints articulated in an upset tone 
that “one of the first things we’ve heard was ‘why did you come back, if you 
wanted to go [to Canada] so badly?’” This account was supported by several 
of the local non-Roma, who characterized their fellow Roma’s migration 
as “adventure migration,” “going to try their luck,” or as some kind of 
“holiday.” As some of the local non-Roma commented, “when they found 
out that even in Canada they won’t get everything easily without making any 
efforts,69 they started to come back.” For example, the local non-Roma social 
worker summarized her reflections:
“They went to try their luck … but when it didn’t work out, 
they came back…They didn’t try hard enough, even in Canada. 
Some of them did not even learn good English and they were 
there for over a year!”
Her comment is telling, not only because it reveals her assumption that 
their migration was mainly motivated by ‘trying their luck,’ but also that 
their ‘efforts’ can be measured by their proficiency in English (or a lack 
there of, as she suggested). Many of the returning migrants encountered 
similar reactions, reflecting widespread assumptions that their migration 
motivations were primarily driven by economic interests and that the Roma 
are unwilling to adapt. These representations were almost a mirror image 
of media portrayals, depicting the Roma negatively, as a special kind of 
migrant, a particularly non-adaptive ‘group’ of ‘scroungers’. In both these 
forms of representation, the Roma have been continuously, negatively “all 
lumped together,” as one of the respondents critically pointed out. 
69 The exact idiomatic expression used here was “when they realized that they won’t get the 
baked pigeons straight into their mouths.” This idiomatic expression refers to receiving 
something without making any effort.
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The returning migrants complained about the attitude they 
encountered at the institutions, as well as a sense of powerlessness and 
exclusion they felt after being told that: 
“After we came back, we were told that we are not entitled for 
a single crown for three months.”
“It’s true that we came back and went to sociálka70 to register 
and apply for benefits. We were told, ‘you don’t have the right 
to claim.’ And so I told them: ‘And why? I’m still a citizen of 
the Czech Republic. I didn’t disavow the Czech Republic. I 
disavowed the Canadian Republic.’ They were staring at me 
like morons.”
Despite their difficulties at the beginning of their return, the migrants 
eventually managed to get social support. Although most non-Roma 
reactions were negative, such as with the local mayor who was said to be 
“the biggest racist ever – she hates Gypsies.” They also encountered non-
Roma who were more sympathetic and understanding of their situation. 
For example, I was told of one officer who was willing to help with their 
re-applications and negotiations with various institutions. As one of the 
Roma women said:
“There is one good gadži71 (at the municipality offices) who helps 
us with the papers…I bought her a chocolate and she has helped 
me with everything and now when I’m helping people [i.e. her 
relatives] who are returning only now, she always helps.”
These encounters came part and parcel with the institutional 
exchanges and financial debts that awaited them upon their return. The 
local mayor’s reaction to their arrival illustrates this well and is indicative 
of the main difficulties many families faced upon their return to Bombary 
70 Social Benefits’ Office.
71 Romani word for a non-Roma woman.
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concerning their housing. In one interview with the Mayor of Bombary,72 
she summarized her reluctant attitude in the following statement: “ if 
our citizens would like to return from some kind of holiday in Toronto, 
unfortunately, they will not have their council flats here.” She was referring to 
the municipality-owned social housing situated in the centre of the town, 
several of which had been rented by the Roma migrants’ families, prior to 
their departure to Canada. However, many of these families left for Canada 
without officially notifying the municipality about their departure and, 
in some cases, leaving outstanding rental debts or other utility bills (e.g. 
electricity, gas, etc.). Most of these flats were in relatively poor condition 
to begin with, but were further vandalized during the migrants’ absence. 
When they returned, most of the flats were in rather critical condition and 
the mayor decided not to allow the Roma families to move back to them.73 
This left several Roma families in a precarious living situation.
The mayor embraced a politics of ‘hard-fist’ by refusing to rent out these 
flats, or provide any alternative assistance, upon their return. She admitted 
that this might possibly lead to exposing the returning migrants to the risk 
of temporary homelessness, but refuted her role in this by suggesting that 
“everyone is responsible for his/her own luck” and “they are adults and they 
will have to take care of themselves.” The mayor’s attitude created a set of 
tensions between several returning Roma families and the representatives 
of local municipality. In desperate need of living space after their return, 
many ended up living in relatives’ overcrowded flats. Some returned Roma 
families filed an official legal complaint and case against the municipality. 
However, most were unsuccessful. The authorities backed the mayor, saying 
that “since they stopped paying their rent and left without notification [thus, 
72 Reportéři ČT: Romští navrátilci z Kanady nemají kam jít. See on-line: 
http://www.ceskatelevize.cz/ct24/domaci/83513-reporteri-ct-romsti-navratilci-z-kanady-
nemaji-kam-jit/
73 It is also interesting to note how the deterioration of these flats was implicitly ascribed by 
the local mayor to the collective Roma/Gypsies community – by asserting that the Roma 
had contributed to the radical deterioration of these flats prior to their asylum migrations 
and by assuming that “the others” [i.e. other Roma] were the ones who destroyed the 
flats after the original Roma tenants left for Canada. http://www.ceskatelevize.cz/ct24/
domaci/83513-reporteri-ct-romsti-navratilci-z-kanady-nemaji-kam-jit/
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breaking the tenancy agreement], the municipality office has no obligation to 
provide flats to them after their return.”
Finding new flats proved to be a very difficult task, since they often 
had to search outside of Bombary. Their search was often complicated by 
the fact that, as they themselves said, “today, no one wants to rent a flat to a 
Gypsy [in the Czech Republic].” The Roma experiences lead to a lack of trust 
and hope in finding a flat to rent, with most landlords unwilling to rent to 
‘Gypsies’. Several families bought themselves a house from their Canadian 
savings, dividing the costs of the remaining monthly installments between 
the inhabitants. However, other families that did not have sufficient 
economic capital were left impoverished. Some of them faced difficulty in 
securing the amounts needed for renting a flat at all. This situation put 
several families in limbo and forced them to search for housing elsewhere. 
Some of them had to move away, which often resulted in the weakening 
of their social capital and further contributed to their socio-economic 
marginalization.
In the case of Věra’s family, they did not return to Bombary. Her 
family first moved to Teplice, where one of her brothers lived and where it 
was easier for them to find a flat. However, since Věra’s mother’s health was 
deteriorating (she had gone back to Bombary), Věra had to commute every 
week between North and South Czech Republic. Finding this long-distance 
commuting and the separation from her mother and other members of 
her close family physically, mentally, and economically unbearable, Věra 
decided to move back to Bombary.
In addition to the institutional and the housing challenges, the 
returning Roma migrants often faced a great deal of debt. These 
outstanding debts had accumulated over the time of their absence and 
they often incurred additional fines and interests on loans (the ones they 
had taken prior to their departure). Some of the families were in a position 
to pay these debts from their savings. However, the majority of returning 
migrants continued to live under continual duress from businesses and 
collection agencies.
One of the key factors influencing the level of re-integration of the 
returning families was the amount of capital at their disposal and their 
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housing situation.74 Migrants who returned to their privately owned 
homes, or those who had enough savings to buy a flat, were in a better 
position. However, those lacking economic means found their return more 
difficult. Additionally, a network of relatives and friends proved crucial in 
the readjustment period following their return. For example, families who 
ended up without their flats stayed at their relatives’ flats and, thus, relied 
on their social capital. Additionally, those who knew how to interact, speak, 
and negotiate with institutions found it easier to return.75 The combination 
(and a skilful use) of these variously accumulated forms of capital proved to 
be crucial to the extent in which they succeed to reintegrate. 
The way Roma migrants coped with their return was also influenced 
by their migration experiences in Canada. More specifically, returning 
Roma migrants gained experiences with transnational migration and a 
multicultural society, which shaped their self-understanding and increased 
their sense of self-empowerment. The research here recorded how they used 
their Canadian experience as a reference point when formulating a critique 
of everyday relations and processing the deeply ingrained racial inequalities 
encountered in the Czech Republic. For example, the migrants viewed 
Canada as incomparably better, in terms of the institutional treatment 
of Roma clients. However, they also formulated this in terms of Canada’s 
imagined societal advancement, in contrast with the Czech system’s 
‘backwardness’. I recorded several remarks such as “that would never happen 
in Canada,” or “people would never treat us like that, [they] would be sent 
to prison” (for calling someone a ‘Gypsy’). When discussing how specific 
non-Roma still treat Roma as underlings and second-class citizens, one 
of the respondents noted that “before [going to Canada] I would be always 
silent, but now I won’t overlook/tolerate it anymore.” His statement implied 
an intention to defend himself more actively. Additionally, this acquired 
sense of empowerment, in reference to the Canadian experience, was also 
used pragmatically, in order to increase one’s standing and recognition vis-
à-vis other Roma families and non-Roma neighbors.
74 I refer to P. Bourdieu’s conceptualizations of capital (Bourdieu 1986).
75 Following Bourdieu, we could call this a volume of accumulated cultural capital (Bourdieu 
1986).
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Possible futures?
At the time of this research project, I encountered the family members of 
several networks who had returned from Canada over the course of the past 
two years. Some families had just arrived back, and others were about to 
return (so I was told). Yet, there were also some families who were planning 
to remain in Canada and were waiting for their asylum claim to be approved. 
The families stayed in touch using long-distance media and kept almost 
in daily contact via Skype. Although distant physically, they maintained 
intense social relationships via these transnational connections and fields.
The returning families I interviewed in the Czech Republic all expressed 
their dissatisfaction with their treatment after they returned. However, they 
were divided in opinion regarding the future and to what extent they would 
consider migrating again. Some families regretted having returned from 
Canada and I would often hear individuals say, “I really regret coming back. 
If I could, I would go back straightaway” or “I realized that I made a mistake by 
coming back as soon as I returned.” Some of these respondents expressed their 
desire to leave the Czech Republic soon. Frequently, they said that there 
was something that keeps them in Bombary for the moment but once this 
particular bond is resolved, they will leave again. For example, one woman 
suggested that “I’m just waiting for my daughter to finish her schooling here 
and I’m off.” She was referring to her youngest daughter who had one year 
left of elementary school. I found that one of the main reasons for staying 
was the illness of a relative. This was the reason many came back and what 
also kept them in Bombary.
At the same time, I encountered several interviewees who had no 
intention of leaving again. These were often members of the younger 
generation (in their late teens or early twenties) who, for various reasons, 
did not like particular elements of their experience in Canada. Although 
they identified many advantages to their move to Canada, they also raised 
issue with a number of disadvantages they encountered. They felt that they 
had to spend most of the time indoors, in their flats, in Canada. In the 
Czech Republic, one of the most common daily routines is hanging out, 
outside of one’s flat, with one’s friends and family, or going to visit relatives 
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who, in a place like Bombary, live in close proximity. This was not always 
the case in Canada and it was frequently mentioned that neighborhoods 
in Canada are not particularly safe in the evenings. Additionally, some of 
the returning migrants simply did not feel ‘at home’ in Canada. One of the 
interviewees, a young woman in her early twenties, had this to say:
“I don’t want to go anywhere again. Otherwise, I would feel 
that I’m (becoming) like one of those wandering Gypsies and I 
would not have home. I don’t want to leave again.”
By contrasting herself with the image of wandering Gypsies, she also 
implicitly made a claim about her sense of belonging. Others suggested that 
they do not want to migrate abroad again, but might possibly move within 
the Czech Republic. They did not envisage another international migration 
move in their futures, although they did not exclude the possibility of 
moving elsewhere in the Czech Republic, if a better opportunity presented 
itself elsewhere.
Additionally, there were some who, at times, had been hoping to 
migrate but were also reluctant and critical of making such a big move and 
of living abroad. For example, another respondent, a young mother in her 
mid-twenties with two children, expressed this contradictory mixture of 
feelings: 
“I liked it there but I wouldn’t like to go there again…My 
children are going to school here…though for the children it 
was better there [in Canada)]. They learned English perfectly 
and their equipment in classes, those computers were much 
better…Czechs can’t compete with that…but I wouldn’t go 
again. It would be different if I would be single, but with the 
children, no. They’ve got used to the school here again.”
While it is difficult from the present perspective to make any predictions 
about the whether these returnees will migrate again, one can argue that 
there is a shared understanding between many that the Canadian migration 
experience is a closed chapter. While some of the respondents suggested 
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that they “would love to return to Canada,” most of them also conceded 
“this is no longer possible” … “once you give stopka you won’t be allowed to 
come back.” Considering the existing visa regime for Czech citizens, Roma 
migrants see their return to Canada as practically impossible (at least at 
this particular point in time). At the same time, some of them have been 
exploring the possibility of further migration and Great Britain featured in 
several interviews as one of the options, as a place where established kinship 
and family connections exist.
Conclusions
The last two decades have seen an increase in Roma migrations from Central 
Eastern Europe to western European countries and Canada. These included 
various forms of labor migration within the European Union as well as asylum 
seeking migration to Canada (and previously to other countries). Although 
this report focused on the most recent wave of Roma asylum migration to 
Canada by examining one particular Roma asylum migration network to 
Canada, its findings indicate some similarities to other forms of recent Central 
Eastern Europe Roma mobility, in that these migrants all strive to achieve ‘a 
better life’ abroad (cf. Grill 2012). This is particularly the case with many 
Czech and Slovak Roma who participated in different forms of migration 
to Britain (as well as other western European countries) and to Canada. 
They all went in search of a better and viable life. To view Roma asylum 
migrations as the constant struggle ‘in search of better life’ has been noted 
by several researchers (Kovats 2002; Krištof 2008; and others). However, 
these authors differ in their understanding of what ‘striving’ and ‘movement 
towards betterment’ actually mean (both analytically and for the migrants 
themselves). In the present text, I have tried to outline some aspects of Roma 
migrants’ struggles for a better life as simultaneously both an existential 
struggle for a greater sense of possibilities and a dramatic move forward that 
might (but might not) overlap with socio-economic betterment.76
76 Theoretically, this approach draws on G. Hage’s work on homemaking amongst migrants in 
Australia (Hage 1997).
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Considering its focus on one locality and its limitations as short-term 
fieldwork, the presented accounts are inevitably partial and fragmentary 
and do not pretend to generate a general explanatory framework for ‘Roma 
migration’ from the Czech Republic. At the same time, by choosing to 
focus on one particular network of Roma migrants, this paper was intended 
to challenge some of the established, dominant representations regarding 
Roma migrations (not only) to Canada.
This report also shows how a particular violent incident can trigger a 
chain of family migrations to Canada, as well as describing how the decision 
itself was embedded within a larger configuration of growing dissatisfaction 
and worsening conditions, as well as socio-economic impoverishment and 
marginality within the Czech Republic. Although the violent incident was 
a relatively isolated event in Bombary (and in the Czech Republic) that 
year (2008), since then Central Eastern Europe has witnessed an ever-
worsening socio-economic situation and an increase in anti-Gypsism, with 
more explicit forms of intolerance and violence spreading across the region 
(Stewart 2012; Vidra and Fox 2012). In the case of the Czech Republic, 
several regions experienced a surge in tensions, a rise in the number of 
extreme-right groups (and their support), as well as ever-worsening living 
conditions for Roma (see e.g. Kafková et al. 2012) leading to the increasing 
likelihood that conditions will result in conflict and physical violence. The 
deteriorating conditions certainly played an important factor in influencing 
Roma to migrate in the past. However, contrary to the one-sided view 
espoused by many human right activists, these serious factors should not 
obfuscate our ability to consider other important elements within our 
analytical framework. The case study on Roma networks from Bombary 
clearly exhibits that the most recent migration cannot be understood in terms 
of ‘either-or’ (either refugee migration or economically driven migration). 
By paying attention to ethnographic details and observing in depth the 
often contradictory claims and actions of my subjects, it was my intention 
to present the migration process as defying any simple categorization and, 
thus, pushing beyond some of the mechanical applications implemented in 
the ‘push and pull’ model.
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Contrary to dominant representations of Roma asylum seeking 
migrations (see e.g. Krištof 2008), the present ethnographic case study does 
not support the hypothesis that asylum seeking migration is always preceded 
by prior contact, based on family ties or other connections to organizational 
structures within the potential host country. As my ethnographic examples 
show, Roma asylum migration does not necessarily result from prior social 
connections between families of former and present migrants, and is not 
necessarily orchestrated by Roma and/or non-Roma mediators in Canada.77 
Unlike other groups of migrants from Central Eastern Europe, Roma 
mostly migrate in families. If a united migration of the family is not 
possible, the divided families strive to reunite as soon as possible. Being 
apart from other members of a close family has proved to be one of the most 
difficult challenges for Roma migrants to Canada and has often led to the 
withdrawal of their asylum claims. This paper also attempts to document 
some of the social conditions, dispositions and emotional implications of 
migration as well as how individual and collective well-being merges and 
informs each individual member’s social actions.
This study also was able to reconstruct the migration trajectories of 
one migration network, in which several families from Bombary were 
participating. It focused on their motivations, socio-economic conditions prior 
to their migration, their decisions to migrate, and explored their migration 
experiences in Canada. Additionally, it documented some of the hardships and 
difficulties met by returning migrants, with many returnees ending up in a 
more vulnerable and marginalized position than they had been in prior to their 
migration to Canada. The study shows that the return of Roma families was 
accompanied by a backlash from the surrounding communities and documents 
their difficulties in finding adequate housing and jobs. Just as the possibility 
of their success during outward migration depended on  a combination of 
social, financial, cultural, and symbolic capitals, the extent of their success in 
returning to the Czech Republic depended on very similar factors and capitals.
77 However, this does not exclude the possibility that transnational networks and connections 
exist in other cases of Roma migrants from other localities. It also does not imply that the 
role of transnational social field and flows of information does not play a significant role 
in migration process.
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Introduction
In our paper we formulate some hypotheses and raise a few questions with 
regards to what we label ‘Roma migration’, concentrating on one specific 
destination, Canada. The paper is based on explorative fieldwork in which 
families with migrant histories were interviewed in Borsod county, a region 
from where out-migration has been heaviest in terms of numbers. 
Our approach is both anthropological and sociological in the sense 
that both tend “to emphasize social relations as central to understanding 
the processes of migration and immigration incorporation.” (Brettel and 
Hollifield 2008: 5). Nonetheless, due to the different historical roots of the 
two disciplines, migration anthropology usually focuses on the sending or the 
sending and the receiving ends while sociology on the receiving society and 
on the process of immigrant incorporation (Brettel and Hollifield 2008). In 
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that respect we took a more anthropological approach by studying exclusively 
the sending society. At the same time, we are also more anthropological 
in our epistemology because we are not focusing on global or large-scale 
processes but rather on micro-phenomena. Also, “anthropology’s focus 
on culture, which includes the study of interaction between beliefs and 
behavior, of corporate groups, and of social relationships, has resulted in an 
emphasis in migration studies on adaptation and cultural change, on forms 
of social organization that are characteristic of both the migration process 
and the immigrant community, and on questions of identity and ethnicity.” 
(Brettel 2008: 114) During our fieldwork we examined several aspects 
typical of anthropological studies: e.g. we looked into social relations and 
social organizations while studying networks and migration strategies, we 
explored cultural beliefs and behaviors while investigating motivations for 
leaving and returning. 
The first hypothesis formulated relates to the conceptual framework: 
how should the phenomenon of ‘Roma migration to Canada from Central 
Eastern Europe’ be interpreted? Based on some relevant literature our 
assumption is that it should firstly be understood as a mix of classic labor 
migration and asylum seeking (Klimova and Pickup 2003; Brettel 2008). 
Our second hypothesis is more empirical for it focuses on the Hungarian 
experience of the recent out-migration process started around 2008 with 
the lifting of Canadian visa requirements for Hungary. It presumes that 
in the early 2000s people and families of somewhat higher social status 
migrated (Kováts 2002) whereas migration from 2008-2009 was different 
- an additional group, lower-status individuals and families, started to 
migrate as well. 
Under our second hypothesis we set out some research questions, each 
looking at different aspects of the migration process. Our questions were: 
What kind of migrant groups can be identified? How can we identify these 
groups? What pushed low-status, deprived Roma families to migrate? What 
made it possible for them to migrate? What kind of trends could be seen in 
changes in migration patterns between the two periods? What are the effects 
of low-status migration on transnational networks? Why the strategy of 
‘whole family at once’? What awaits low-status Roma migrants upon return? 
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In this paper we look more closely at our hypotheses and each of these 
questions and hope to give some analytical insight into the migration process 
of Roma to Canada. We emphasize this study is a pilot investigation, making 
our conclusion more of a synthesis of the relevant questions.  This will open 
up further questions rather than reach any final answer at this point.
Labor-migration trends in Hungary
Emigration from Hungary between the 1989-90 regime change and the 
country joining the EU was moderate compared to other countries in the 
region. In contrast to predictions that joining the EU would radically 
change the situation, labor migration remained rather similar to the 
previous period. E.g. in Germany, the first target country of Hungarian 
labor migrants, the number of Hungarians arriving fluctuated as follows: 
51,905 in 1999, 55,953 in 2003, 54,714 in 2004 and 56,075 in 2007 (Hárs 
2009: 233). Also, compared to other countries from the region, in the 
post-accession period the proportion of Hungarian labor migrants in the 
UK lagged behind dominant migrant nations, such as Poland making up 
71.3% of all EU-8 migrants in 2007, Slovakia with its 10.5%, Lithuania 
with 6.8% against Hungary with only 4.2% (Hárs 2009: 235). Surveys 
into the migration potential of Hungarians also reveal that fewer people 
consider leaving this country than they do other countries in Central 
Eastern Europe. In 2005 migration intention of Poles and Lithuanians 
was the highest among these countries (9.9% and 9.6%), Slovaks had 
5.4% and Slovenians 4.1% against Hungarians at 3%. The lowest rate 
of migration potential was found among Czech citizens, 1.4% (Hárs 
2009:  232).
There are several factors that are traditionally looked at while seeking 
explanations for migration trends in a country. Economic development and 
GDP are among the most frequently used explanatory factors. In Hungary, 
in the 1990s, and especially the second half of the decade, the state of the 
economy was a good predictor for low migration. Hungary’s economic 
output was comparatively good, accounting for low emigration rates. 
However, while other countries were catching up economically, migration 
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rates still remained the same: higher in some other countries, such as Poland 
or Lithuania and lower in Hungary. Authors point to other factors for reasons 
“why Hungarians don’t (want to) migrate”. The moderate unemployment 
rate had been an explanation until the 2008 crisis, as well as the generosity 
of the welfare system. “Benefits in Hungary are comparatively generous in 
terms of child care and social and unemployment benefit, as well as pension.” 
(Hárs 2009: 245) This, as we will illustrate, changed in the second half of the 
2000s and became an important migration push factor for various segments 
of the population including low-status Roma people. And indeed, in the 
2012 statistics the migration potential of the Hungarian population showed 
an important shift from previous data. “Migration potential peaks in 2012”, 
it has never been this high: now every fifth Hungarian plans to migrate 
either in the short, medium or long term (Sik 2012). 
Roma migration trends
Among typical labor migrants it is very unlikely that we find a significant 
number of Roma given their weak position in the labor market and low level 
of education. There are some special types of migrants, such as musicians, 
where Roma may be overrepresented. Low demand for unskilled labor in 
the target countries explains why asylum seeking was to become a typical 
migration strategy for Roma from Central Eastern Europe. Applying for 
refugee status is in most cases the only way for Roma to migrate. Given 
that the desperate social-economic situation of the vast majority of Roma 
is accompanied by widespread discrimination, migration push factors are 
indeed significant for this population (Kováts 2002). However, asylum 
seeking in European Union countries from Hungary before EU accession 
was substantially below that from other CEE countries. From aggregated 
data we know that until 1999 counting Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Hungary together, refugee applications in 
European states by Hungarians represented only 0.67% of all claims from 
these six countries (Kováts 2002: 17).
At the same time, an important number of Roma people from 
Hungary chose Canada as their target country of migration. The number 
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of refugee claims most often exceeded the number of claims from all other 
CEE countries in Canada. Added to this, the number of Hungarian refugee 
claims occasionally, in 2001, 2010 and 2011, led the list of claims for asylum 
in Canada by originating country, exceeding even such migration sources 
as China, Columbia, Mexico, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, etc.78 
From Hungary, asylum-applying migration started around 1998: “In 
the late 90’s the Czech and Hungarian Roma have discovered Canada. (...) 
in December 2001, Canada imposed a visa requirement on Hungary. In that 
same year, Hungarian Roma was the largest group of Refugee Claimants in 
Canada.” (St. Clair 2007) The following data show the gradual and steady 
rise of the number of Hungarian refugee claims: 10 in 1994, 38 in 1995, 64 
in 1996, 300 in 1997,79 982 in 1998, 1,579 in 1999, 1,929 in 2000, 3,851 
in 2001.80 Following the lifting of visa requirements, the number of asylum 
claimants from Hungary started to rise again. In 2007 around 300 people 
submitted refugee applications,81 in 2009 2,426, in 2010 2,300 and in 2011 
4,423 asylum seekers were registered.82 
Fieldwork
The explorative fieldwork83 was conducted in Borsod country in the middle 
of 2012, just around the time when the Canadian government passed its 
new refugee bill, Bill C-31, aiming to “crack down on so-called ‘bogus’ 
asylum claimants”.84 
78 http://www.cdp-hrc.uottawa.ca/projects/refugee-forum/projects/Statistics.php
79 Kováts 2002: 15
80 http://www.cdp-hrc.uottawa.ca/projects/refugee-forum/projects/Statistics.php
81 http://www.origo.hu/nagyvilag/20111118-hogyan-fogadja-kanada-a-magyar-romakat-
riport-torontobol-elso-resz.html
82 http://www.cdp-hrc.uottawa.ca/projects/refugee-forum/projects/Statistics.php
83 The inteviews were conducted by the two authors of the article and by a journalist colleague, 
Ilona Gaal.
84 http://news.nationalpost.com/2012/06/10/controversial-refugee-bill-set-to-clear-house-
of-commons-monday/
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Given the aim of our pilot study to formulate research questions and 
hypotheses for the Roma migration process in general and to Canada in 
particular based on fieldwork observations and interviews with Roma return 
migrants, we looked for local communities supplying large numbers of 
people leaving for Canada in the previous couple of years, and to which some 
migrants had returned. As indicated above, the county with the highest 
share of Roma inhabitants, Borsod, appears to be the most affected by Roma 
emigration. We have to be careful with this statement since we lack statistical 
data on out-migration. All we have is the mirror statistics of the number of 
refugee claimants issued by the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 
recording the number of people entering the country with the aim of applying 
for refugee status. Localities supplying emigrants had to be identified from 
sources other than statistical data. Since our pilot study is primarily a 
qualitative investigation it seemed legitimate to start with newspaper articles 
as a source of information and to follow up by the snowball method to find 
communities where return migrants or families of migrants live.
Having concluded from collecting articles from newspapers that 
Borsod county is indeed a place from where lots of Roma families have 
left (and to where lots of them have also returned), we wanted to find a 
small community there in order to conduct in-depth interviews with 
inhabitants and institutions to map out networks, strategies, tendencies, 
local reactions, etc. The size of the settlement was important insofar as 
a smaller community might let us explore more easily how migration is 
organized on an individual (family) level and on a community level. 
Our choice was a village of some 2,000 inhabitants out of which 
around sixty percent declared themselves Roma in the 2001 census. 
According to our informants about 30 to 40 families had gone to Canada 
and only a few had returned at the time of the interviews. In the village 
we managed to interview family members of migrants still in Canada and 
one family who had just recently returned. Besides that we talked to Roma 
representatives as well as to the village school principal. Concerning the 
socio-economic status of the village, it belongs to the ‘most disadvantaged 
settlements’ category, with an unemployment rate of 90%. Poor as it is, the 
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village population is still stratified; there are families who manage to get by, 
and there are families who are in a much more desperate situation with no 
income whatsoever. 
During our interviews we came to the realization that the nearby 
small town pr, networks at home and in Canada, experiences in the target 
country (ways of managing life, work experiences, accommodation, friends 
and relatives there, school for children, relations with authorities and 
institutions, etc.), reasons for return, and life after return. The interviewees 
were contacted by using the snowball method. Since the migration process 
affected a rather large proportion of both communities, it was a relatively 
easy task to find family members with a migration history. The only difficulty 
we came across was the distrust of us some of them initially expressed. As 
was later revealed, in some cases people had bad experiences with either the 
Canadian or the Hungarian authorities that made them reluctant to speak. 
Most of the interviews were family interviews with various members of the 
family present. Thus, we managed to have accounts of different experiences, 
of adults and children as well as of younger and older people. Altogether 
some ten families were visited in the two settlements. 
First hypothesis: Mix of labor migration and asylum seeking
As it was put forward in our first hypothesis, we assume that the current 
Canadian migration should be understood as a mix of classic labor migration 
and asylum seeking. Our assumption concurs with the conclusions of a 
scholarly debate on this issue appearing in Nationalities Papers: 
“At the beginning of the debate, activists and scholars almost 
unanimously challenged the portrayal by government officials 
and media of Roma as economic migrants. However, opinions 
have begun to polarize in the last couple of years. While some 
activists and scholars still maintain that Romani asylum seekers 
leave their countries of origin only because of racism and 
discrimination, others believe that Romani requests for asylum 
are also economically motivated. They argue that migration 
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can be seen as a strategy employed by Romani individuals who 
turn to Western societies for tolerance in the hope of obtaining a 
more equal opportunity for personal economic, educational and 
social development.” (Klimova and Pickup 2003) 
Added to this, it needs to be emphasized that in migration anthropology 
enforced migrants (refugees) and other migrants are conceptualized as being 
the same or at least similar since their experiences show many resemblances 
once they are in the new country; refugees, “can be theorized in much the 
same way as other displaced peoples”. (Brettel 2008: 115) 
In effect, it would be misleading to handle the issue exclusively as being 
either one or the other phenomenon since the process contains the elements 
of both labor migration and asylum seeking. The fact that receiving refugee 
status in Canada for Roma people is a viable way of entering Canada and 
staying in the country, does not mean that among the original motivations 
and the later strategies one cannot find typical labor migration patterns. 
Asylum or refugee status can be seen as facilitators of labor migration. On 
the other hand, it would be also a misunderstanding if we excluded the 
asylum motive from the process. As we will discuss it later, discrimination 
and different kinds of persecution are indeed among the push factors that 
help for a decision to leave one’s home country.  
In the accounts we found different explanations of the original 
migration motivations that illustrate well the mix of reasons: 
“Our plan was to return. (…) We wanted a better life, to be 
able to buy a few things that we need in our household.” (Mr. 
Pál) 85
“My brother tries to make as much money as he can so that they 
have something to live on when they come back, to pay back 
their bank loan.” (Mr. György) 86
85 Mr. Pál from the village. He had just returned two months earlier from Canada with his 
family.  
86 Mr. György from the village. His brother was among the first ones to go. Later his brother 
was followed by several of his siblings and their families. 
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“We have tremendous racism in Hungary. You have to 
make a hundred times more effort than a Hungarian. I am 
disadvantaged because I am Roma.” (Mr. Görgy)
“Here in the village everyone would like to go. But Canada was 
the only possibility. Normally, we don’t even have money to go 
to the nearby town to the swimming pool.” (Mrs. Márta)87 
Second hypothesis: different migration waves, different social status of 
migrants
It was pointed out earlier that Roma migration to Canada could be split 
into two major periods. The first period lasted until 2001 when Canada, for 
very much the same reasons that the country later introduced a new refugee 
law in 2012, imposed visa restrictions for Hungarian citizens. The second 
period started in 2008 when visa requirements were lifted so it became 
relatively easy to enter the country and apply for refugee status. 
Based on our interview data we formulated the hypothesis that in 
the early 2000s individuals and families of somewhat higher social status 
migrated, while from 2008-2009 we see more lower status individuals and 
families leaving as well. 
Stemming from the modernization theory, migration is seen as a flow 
from rural to urban or, as in our case, from areas with scarce capital and 
abundant labor to regions or countries with high levels of capital and low 
levels of labor (Brettel 2008). Low-wage labor migration between these 
areas has its historical roots and patterns, e.g. “wage labor is viewed by 
these individuals as offering more opportunities than subsistence farming 
(Mitchell 1969) and can, in fact, provide the cash needed to succeed in 
the rural context – to accumulate bride-price, provide a dowry, or buy a 
home.” (Brettel 2008: 118) Indeed, low-status migrants could be easily 
identified with wage-labor migrants if their motivations, return strategies 
87 Mrs. Márta, a young woman from the village with small children. Her brother and his 
family is in Canada. 
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and comportments are compared. This conceptualization is valid for the 
low-status migrants we observed, but it could also be valid for the higher 
status migrants we described. This draws our attention to the fact that our 
examples of lower and higher statuses should be handled carefully since 
the status difference is rather minor in the two types. As we will see from 
the interviews, higher status can refer to slightly different opportunities 
and access to resources and networks. E.g. somebody having had the 
opportunity to be employed in the state sponsored public work scheme for 
a wage under the subsistence level still allowed him to accumulate enough 
money to migrate whereas somebody without this opportunity was simply 
unable to do the same. 
While coming up with this hypothesis we examined different questions 
such as the types of migrating groups, push factors, migration patterns and 
changes in migration patterns, transnational networks and experiences of 
return. In the following sections we will examine each of these questions 
relying on our interviews and fieldwork observation data collected in the 
two settlements. 
What kind of migrant groups can be identified?
Roma migration to Canada, as we have seen, has a history dating back to 
the 1990s. As is always the case, migration statistics or any exact data on 
migrants are difficult to collect. Except for Canadian refugee statistics, we 
have no clear picture as to who are the migrants, how many are they, or where 
they are from. This is also true of the earlier migrants, the ones leaving before 
the 2001 visa restrictions. We can, however, rely on some research results of 
a project conducted by Kováts et al. at the beginning of the 2000s in which 
various aspects of the Roma migration phenomenon were studied (Kováts 
2002). The project identified certain groups as potential migrants. These 
were mobile communities, families and individuals (musicians, showmen, 
traders); educated university graduates, young Budapest intellectuals; 
businessmen; and some refugees from local conflicts. Those who left for 
Canada in the 1990s or early 2000s could be assumed to belong to these 
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typical migrant groups. Nonetheless, it was found that a good proportion of 
the well-off businessmen rarely decided to emigrate due to a lack of business 
contacts, language skills and other useful knowledge. Underprivileged 
Roma were hindered by lacking financial means to even make the journey, 
so emigration remained “a mere desire to many”. (Kováts 2002: 24) The 
new wave of Roma migration to Canada, as we assume, affected, besides all 
other types, the deprived, underprivileged segment of the Roma population 
to a much larger extent than before. In fact, this is the main focus of our 
pilot research: we intend to explain the causes and consequences of this 
‘new type of Roma migration’ characterized by a much larger outflow of 
underprivileged people than before.
How can we identify migrant groups?
As already indicated, migration statistics are hard to produce, and 
identifying migrant groups is probably an even more difficult task. 
Researchers usually use various proxies to assess migration ratios. In case 
of the Canadian migration process, the task is somewhat easier given the 
recorded number of asylum claimants. For our purposes we would have 
benefited however from more detailed data than the number of refugees. 
From our fieldwork experience we concluded that even without hard data 
some kind of qualitative approach might help to identify migrant groups. 
To delineate migrant groups one way to proceed is to assess the social 
status of migrants. Since our pilot study focuses on ‘new migration’, that is 
the mass migration of underprivileged Roma, we wanted to pick out certain 
social characteristics that would be more typical of lower status migrants 
than other groups. We presumed that one good proxy would be to look at 
what risks migrants were willing to take to engage in the migration process. 
The idea is that lower status people tend to take greater risks for they have 
fewer resources. Poverty in general entails greater risks in any social actions 
than higher social status does.  
The major risks we identified are material on one hand, and risks of 
moral temptation on the other hand. Material risks refer to the financial 
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resources that one needs to have to make the journey to Canada. Usually 
whole families with several children emigrated. This meant that the money 
needed for air tickets far exceeded the financial resources of those families. 
We have seen several different ways people secured money for the costly 
journey all involving different degrees of risk-taking. There were families 
who had made plans well before the journey and saved up money for as 
long as two years. 
“I was putting money aside for two years. I had some occasional 
jobs in Budapest, we worked at construction sites.” (Mr. Pál)  
It was nonetheless more common to borrow money from close relatives, 
distant acquaintances or even people already in Canada. 
“My brother in Canada paid for the ticket for my other brother, 
three years ago.” (Mr. György)
Saving money all alone seems to involve less risk than borrowing 
money from someone for the simple reason that if somebody is capable 
of collecting this huge amount he is probably somewhat better-off than 
if somebody has to rely on external help. However, paradoxically, saving 
corresponds to a higher level of risk whereas borrowing may match reduced 
risk. This is mainly because the way a migrant gets access to the amount 
of money needed for the journey is indicative of the degree of her/his 
embeddedness in different types of networks. As already pointed out by 
Kováts et al. (2002) many of the migrants relied on the funds of those 
living in Canada to be able to start their journey. It was found that in the 
new migration wave the same process is still at work; many of the potential 
migrants receive either the whole amount or part of it from their relatives or 
friends in Canada that they are supposed to pay back after they get there. 
Or, the family back home makes the effort and collects the money for some 
family members or even for a nuclear family (e.g. a young parent with small 
children) so that they can migrate. Receiving money from abroad is at the 
same time the first act of assistance that one can count on in the migration 
process. So saving alone is truly a sign of more effective self-reliance but in 
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migration, at least the type we observed where mainly poor people were 
concerned, networks are more valuable than individual resources. 
The risk can also be high from relying on networks but only if one 
happens to fall prey to a delinquent network. Mainly in accounts of returned 
migrants we heard stories of people becoming victims of moneylenders 
(usurers). They received financial help for their journey but were never able 
to escape their debts while in Canada. Without being able to assess how 
widespread this type of dependency is, we can surely say that there are 
different forms of networks and the moneylender type is only one of them. 
Most likely if one comes from a village or community where people are 
entrapped by usurers then this tight network will not let them get free of 
these entanglements even when migrating. 
“There were people who tricked others, they invited them to 
go to Canada and then they used their credit cards and they 
cheated with them.” (Mr. Pál) 
Nonetheless, for anyone in an underprivileged social class, migration 
entails a huge risk. Either saving money alone or borrowing it, all families 
left without anything (sometimes even selling all their furniture or even 
their houses) while knowing that they might have to return. None of them 
had any idea of how they would manage their lives if they were forced to 
return or they came back voluntarily.88 
There can also be a risk of moral temptation. Often people did not 
deregister when leaving the country,89 and they continued using the social 
assistance system, e.g. taking family allowance payments. This put them in 
danger of being penalized upon return. For various reasons, people did not 
deregister, mostly because they had no information on their obligations. At 
the same time, this small amount of money still came in handy occasionally 
in Canada. One woman told her rather humiliating story. When she came 
back from Canada with her husband, she was immediately transported 
88 See later section on return experiences. 
89 According to the rules, a citizen entitled to social assistance is obliged to deregister if he or 
she leaves the country for more than three months.  
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from the airport and taken into custody. She was released next day and 
fined the amount she had taken without entitlement, plus of course an extra 
penalty payment. 
From better to worse:  
What pushed low-status, underprivileged Roma families to migrate?
Our next question addresses the ‘push factors’: what were the most 
important reasons that could explain the new migration wave of Roma to 
Canada and what could account for what we called the mass migration of 
the underprivileged? For that we will outline some important social and 
political changes with a focus on the most deprived social classes.  
The situation at the turn of the millennium differed from the previous 
decade. In the early 2000s there was increased economic growth after the 
economic crisis of the 1990s and the political regime change. The economic 
boom was marked, among other factors, by growing foreign investment. 
Multinational companies (MNC) hired extra unskilled workers. Although 
these MNCs typically did not locate in the most underprivileged areas such 
as Borsod county (the major geographical area of out-migration to Canada), 
Roma from disadvantaged areas were able to work in other parts of the 
country. Many of them who had some funds to move migrated from the 
region to find work at these MNCs (Virág 2010). In addition to relative 
economic growth and extra employment for a certain layer of low-status, 
unskilled people, public and political discourse was far less anti-poor and 
anti-Roma than it later became. 
Compared to the early 2000s several other changes have occurred 
that may be among the push factors. To name a few, we should look at 
the transformation of the welfare system with its increasingly anti-poor 
tendencies, ethnic conflicts, reactions by the political elite, and the rise of 
the far-right and growing racism.
Generally speaking the whole political elite (both left and right) has 
become more anti-Roma and anti-poor both in discourses and policies in 
the course of a couple of years. Regarding some of the welfare measures, 
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the mid-2000s saw an attempt on the part of the government to launch 
policies to alleviate poverty (e.g. family aid programs, launching of the 
child poverty government policy, a child poverty model program).90 It is 
doubtful if we can speak of failure, but politically it came to be seen as 
a misconceived political strategy to tackle poverty in that pro-active way. 
Slowly the dominant political discourse assumed that poverty alleviation 
programs increase welfare dependency and generated conflicts between the 
working poor and social-aid beneficiaries. The socialist government (2002-
2010) decided to stop the program and replaced it with the ‘Pathway to 
Work Program’, a public work scheme that obliged social-aid recipients to 
take up public work at the local government to ensure their entitlement to 
social aid. The ‘Pathway Work Program’ was further developed in a more 
punitive direction under the consecutive conservative government that 
came into power in 2010 (Ferge 2008, Kérmer 2008, Váradi 2009, Csoba 
2010); the new government initiated and launched more and more anti-
poor policies, e.g. reduction in job-seeking aid,91 preconditions for social 
aid,92 maximized amount of social aid per family.93 
At the same time it is also true to say that the nature of ethnic conflicts 
has changed in the last 5 to 10 years. Until the mid-2000s inter-ethnic 
conflicts had been typically between institutions and local communities. 
From 2006 Roma as individuals started to feel more unsafe and insecure, 
even in danger when the far-right and its paramilitary organization, the 
Hungarian Guard, came into being and started organizing marches in 
local communities where significant number of Roma lived. The aim was 
to intimidate and threaten Roma inhabitants and generate local conflicts 
90 www.gyerekesely.hu
91 From 2011 job-seeking aid has been granted for 90 days instead of the former 270 days. 
http://hvg.hu/gazdasag/20110830_kozmunka_kisokos_segely_kontenervaros
92 As a precondition of social aid and wage supplementing benefit, local governments can 
insist claimants keep their house and garden tidy. http://hvg.hu/gazdasag/20110830_
kozmunka_kisokos_segely_kontenervaros
93 Local governments can determine a maximum amount of social aid per family, 
and it cannot exceed 90 percent of the wage received in public employment. 
http://hvg.hu/gazdasag/20110830_kozmunka_kisokos_segely_kontenervaros
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between Roma and non-Roma. The Hungarian Guard, under a different 
name, is still organizing its paramilitary demonstrations. The purpose of 
the marches is to help the far-right to gain political support by enhancing 
fear and fuelling local conflicts. The political elite and institutions are slow 
to react. They even play a cynical role by not taking action against these 
clear cases of hate crime. In addition, in the history of post-communist 
Hungary, starting in 2008, a series of racially-motivated violent attacks 
were committed against Roma leading to 6 deaths. Many claim that the 
rise of the far-right was a consequence of the reluctance of almost of the 
entire political elite to implement measures to stop the spread of hate crime. 
Moreover, by letting racist discourse become part of the mainstream or 
even nurturing it themselves, the elite contributed to the overwhelmingly 
anti-Roma political atmosphere (Vidra and Fox 2012).
What made it possible for them to migrate?  
The role and nature of networks
We have already discussed some aspects of assistance networks especially in 
the initial phase of the migration process. They are essential both in helping 
to start migration (raising money for the journey, providing information 
on applying for refugee status) and to manage life in Canada (emigration 
authorities, welfare issues, accommodation, school, translators, etc.). As 
was recorded in the earlier wave of Canadian migration, networks already 
started to emerge and played similarly important roles in helping migrants 
to leave and to settle in the target country back then (Kováts 2002) as in 
the later wave. 
Presumably, the second wave of migration characterized by a bigger 
outflow of more underprivileged Roma needed more extended networks. 
It was noted in 2000 that “the poorer the person’s or family’s conditions 
are, the more important the lack of funds will be as a hindrance” (Kováts 
2002: 23). The statement is still true today with an important change, 
namely that many of the new migrants come from extreme poverty and 
the lack of funds should in theory be an unmanageable hindrance to all 
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of them, while they somehow make their way to Canada. This makes us 
believe that networks have become tighter and more reliable. As a matter 
of fact, based on observations, it is possible to say that the networks are 
actually the original community networks and very often they are based 
on family contacts. One other phenomenon at play is the earlier migration 
experiences of relatives or just village and neighborhood acquaintances. In 
the researched town an important number of people had already been to 
Canada in the early 2000s providing not only a migration pattern but also 
important networks. Many of them became second-time migrants in the 
recent wave as well. 
One additional factor could have been decisive in generating an 
increased ratio of emigrating underprivileged people. That is the digital 
revolution and globalization often mentioned by migration researchers: “The 
technological revolution, which has facilitated travel and communication 
across national borders, also supports the maintenance and expansion 
of transnational social networks created by the migrants themselves.” 
(Heisler  2008: 92) 
We observed that families of migrants in Canada keep close and 
intense contact with their overseas relatives via the internet using e.g. 
Facebook. Transnational networks have become easier to operate with the 
new technology. 
“Friends told us what you have to say when you enter the 
country. We discussed it over Facebook.” (Mr. Pál) 
Very importantly the families we came into contact with belong to 
the studied category, the underprivileged Roma. They live in very poor 
conditions, often in dilapidated, run-down houses, without proper heating. 
Nonetheless, the internet is available in some of the households, and if one 
family has it then the whole neighborhood has the opportunity to have 
access to it. Moreover, children can have access to internet at school as 
well. Oftentimes, internet access had been installed as part of the “wireless 
village” program to take internet use and computers to poor villages and 
neighborhoods. 
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What kind of trends could be observed in the changes of migration 
patterns?
It was pointed out that migration patterns are equally important in 
understanding migration trends. From our fieldwork data we made a few 
deductions about our main research focus, low-status migration. Studying 
migration patterns may give us some additional insight as to how low-status 
migrants leave their home country despite financial and other hindrances. 
We use the term migration patterns while we refer to certain social practices. 
Massey et al. (1994) talk about the “culture of migration” meaning that 
moving and returning might be deeply rooted in the social practices of a given 
community. From our fieldwork observations it is hard to assess if we could 
describe these patterns as being embedded cultural patterns. Nonetheless, the 
dynamics of how migration waves occur might indicate some aspects of it. 
Our assumption is that migration patterns have both a social and a 
geographical aspect. According to our observations there is usually a specific 
direction of social patterns in migration trends: the move is from higher 
status to lower status that is applicable in both a geographical and a social 
sense. First, usually people living in higher status localities, e.g. bigger cities 
or towns, have the possibility to migrate and people in lower status localities, 
such as small villages follow only later. Similarly, first people from higher 
status families can mobilize enough resources to migrate whereas lower 
status families have this chance only after enough information has been 
spread and enough networks have been established. In certain sense we can 
call this ‘migration pattern flow’. Using this idea of ‘migration pattern flow’ 
helps us understand why certain migrant groups behave the way they do, or 
in our case why and how low-status people migrate. 
During our fieldwork we came across the phenomenon of some 
families migrating from the researched town in the early 2000s. These 
families came back and some of them left again (and many of them have 
returned since). This could be labeled as yo-yo migration (Margolis 1995), 
a phenomenon that many researchers described in various geographical 
regions and social settings while observing the characteristics of return 
migration (Brettel 2008: 117). 
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We can state that in that town – and in that specific neighborhood 
that we studied – a certain migration pattern existed. In fact, those families 
that had an earlier migration experience were indeed better-off compared 
to the rest of the community. Their well-kept houses were located in the 
more decent part of the neighborhood and as we found out, some were also 
in a rather good social position (entrepreneur, minority politician). The fact 
that they had been in Canada at the beginning of the decade was common 
knowledge and a reference point in the neighborhood. Anybody asked 
would know who these families were. Some of the people leaving in the 
second wave apparently had lower status and had to rely on the networks and 
information provided by the earlier (usually somewhat better-off) migrants. 
We also observed migration pattern flows from a higher to a lower 
status locality. In the nearby village migration started only in 2009, and 
nobody in the early 2000s had been to Canada. In fact, in the accounts 
of our interviewees the researched town served as an important point of 
reference. While explaining how the first migrants decided to leave, it was 
mentioned that they saw reports on TV about refugees in Canada from that 
town and from Miskolc. Nonetheless, we assume that there were no direct 
contacts with the people from the town for they had a very bad reputation 
in the eyes of the villagers, perceived as delinquents: 
“Lots of people have gone from that town, they left their houses 
behind. But they screwed it up in Canada, they have broken 
into houses there.” (Mr. György)
What are the consequences of low-status migration with regards to 
transnational networks?
Low-status migration, as we have seen, probably has to rely on networks 
more than other types. Not only is the beginning of the migration process 
heavily dependent on the help of overseas relatives or friends but also all 
the following steps require special local knowledge (besides the language) 
without which one cannot get by in Canada. From our interview data we 
made some observations regarding how transnational networks work and 
what consequences this may have on low-status migration.  
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One of our assumptions is that earlier migrants – those arriving in 
the first wave and earlier in the second wave – had better opportunities 
in certain fields than those who came later. One of the areas where they 
definitely had an advantage was the labor market. 
“We tried everything that other Hungarians who came 
earlier had done. But the newcomers didn’t have so many 
opportunities.” (Mr. Pál) 
People with refugee status can apply for work permits94 and work 
legally in the country. However, since most of the people arriving in 
Canada do not speak the language, this option is almost entirely useless for 
the majority of them. It is rather networks that may help people find some 
kind of job. These could be either legal or illegal depending on the network. 
“It is very difficult to find a job without speaking the language. 
(…) Circles of friends and relatives who had already been there 
for a longer period of time could work, they took their friends to 
work, and they took responsibility of them.” (Mr. Pál) 
One typical work our interviewees recounted is “garbage picking”, an 
activity that is not a legal job but not illegal either. You need a network 
for that, car, information, etc. This activity was recorded equally in the 
first migration wave as typical “work” done by Roma refugees in Canada 
(Hajnal 2002).
“They find brass in the garbage. People put it outside in front of 
their houses and then they go and find it and sell it for a good 
price. They take friends and relatives with them. They know 
where to find the garbage places.” (Mrs. Ildi)95 
“Besides their jobs they go to pick garbage. This is not theft. 
From one family six of them go and they make enough money 
for a month in one weekend.” (Mr. György) 
94 http://www.settlement.org/sys/faqs_detail.asp?faq_id=4000556
95 She is a woman from the village. Her family members are in Canada. 
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There are also people with legal jobs where they do not have to speak 
English. We heard of factory jobs as well as work in construction. One of 
the men from our researched village started an enterprise and established a 
network of his relatives and fellow village people. 
Why do we think that those arriving first, without networks, have 
better chances to engage in some money-making activity and thus ensure 
a better outcome to their migration adventure? One of the explanations 
is that social networks get saturated; people will maybe help their closest 
relatives but will not assist their fellow village friends or acquaintances once 
they feel they have to be at the service of too many. 
“My other brother couldn’t go, the tickets would have been too 
expensive. Those already there, should they pay for all others? 
We are ten brothers and sisters. You have to decide if you help 
all your brothers, also the hell-raisers, or you spare money for 
yourself, so when you come back in five-ten years your kids will 
have money to live on. My brother helped the others but I saw 
he had enough. He would have been much better off if nobody 
had followed him. They held him back. He gave them over a 
million96 that he will never get back.” (Mr. György)  
As a consequence, a competitive situation evolves where the least 
experienced and the least embedded are the ones who lose out. They tend 
to perceive everything in a very negative light. One of our interviewees who 
had no close contacts had to tackle hardships all alone that made him give 
a negative account of everything they went through. 
“Nobody helped us. They [acquaintances] put us up, but they did not 
help with anything. We had to find a translator, we just met one by 
accident. He’s been there for forty years. We had to pay him, 50-100 
dollars for a couple of sentences. He helped us with arranging the 
official papers. The people we stayed with were not relatives, they 
were just from the same village. They were in a more advantageous
96 App. 3,300 to 3,600 Euros. 
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 situation but they did not share any information with us. (…) We 
didn’t even know how to pronounce street names. It was tough, 
especially the first two months.” (Mr. Pál)
A further explanation relates to the social status of the migrants and its 
consequences on how they succeed in their migration endeavor. The lower 
social status somebody has the more he or she lacks cultural and economic 
capital. These disadvantages determine their life chances not only in their 
home country but also in the new target country.
The lack of cultural capital prevents them from learning the language, 
or makes it extremely difficult for them. Without language skills, managing 
life, including finding a job, is almost doomed to complete failure except if 
one remains in a helpful network.  
“You can’t work. We didn’t learn the language. We couldn’t 
go to school because of the distance. We had to get up at 5 and 
got back home at 5 in the afternoon. (…) After two months we 
didn’t go to school any more, we already wanted to come back.” 
(Mr. Pál) 
Most of the families arrive with no money in Canada; they might 
not have sold their house but almost certainly all their furniture. The 
lack of economic capital and financial resources leads to the same “fatal 
dependency” on networks. They are fully reliant on the networks yet since 
these are already saturated. Therefore only very close – immediate family 
– networks are apparently helpful. Those without such contacts are surely 
among the ones who interpret their migration as a negative experience. 
Why the strategy of ‘whole family at once’?
We should mention one more phenomenon that differentiates low-status 
from higher status migrants. Earlier migrants usually had the strategy 
that could be described as the classic labor migrant strategy whereby 
the head of the family and some male members went first to collect 
viable information on the possibilities and conditions that one had to face 
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once in the new country (Kováts 2002). In fact, we observed that when 
migration starts in a new community, such as in the small village where 
we did part of our fieldwork, then the early birds, the pioneers, go and 
actually follow the above pattern. The males go first and are then followed 
by their families. 
“My brother collected the money, he had a friend there, a 
family. He went alone to sort out the financial situation so 
that the family doesn’t have to live on welfare. (…) His wife 
followed him one year later.” (Mr. György)
They are gradually followed by more people and they, as we could see, 
had lower social status. Lower status migrants, as was observed, tend to go 
with their whole family. Paying for the journey of families with three or 
more children requires a huge effort since the plane tickets themselves cost 
a fortune. The question arises then why these very poor families believe that 
going together is the right choice to achieve their migration expectations. 
The first obvious answer is that the classic labor migrant strategy is simply 
unrealizable for there are definitely no funds to undertake more than one 
journey. The ‘all at the same time strategy’ is built on the assumption that 
refugees are entitled to welfare but only a big family with three or more 
children receives enough to live on. It was often said in the community that 
“no way to manage with only one child!” From this respect it is indeed a 
rational strategy.
“It’s not worth being there with one child only. My other 
brother has one kid, they can hardly survive. Especially since 
there’s been a cut in medical aid.” (Mr. György) 
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Why voluntary return?
From the official statistics we know that the abandonment rate of refugee 
applications is quite significant.97 In fact this was probably one of the main 
factors that led the Canadian authorities and politicians to switch to a more 
exclusive and restrictive refugee policy. Roma refugees from Hungary and 
from other CEE countries had been accused of refugee fraud; they were 
seen as taking advantage of the welfare system of the country and then 
withdrawing their refugee claims and returning home. As we stated earlier, 
our conceptual frame in which we proposed to interpret Roma migration 
to Canada was a combination of classic labor migration and asylum seeking 
since both aspects are essential elements of the process. Looking at the 
motivations for leaving reveals a myriad of reasons, where craving for a 
better life and escaping from economic deprivation and political or social 
discrimination are all at play. 
It would also be important to understand the motivations or the 
interpretations for voluntary return, how people justify or account for 
their moving back. Most of the returnees mention that they had different 
expectations; they did not think that life would be so difficult there and 
above all they could not get access to any extra income besides the welfare 
money that was just enough to live on. 
“The whole thing was a big disappointment. Free medical care 
for refugees was abolished, we had to pay for everything. And 
we didn’t receive much more money than in Hungary. We had 
to make more effort to save money. (…) We regret having gone 
to Canada. Not even half of the money spent on the tickets 
came back.” (Mr. Pál)
In their case return meant failure. They failed to create a better life for 
their families either there or back at home through saving some money in 
Canada. 
97 In 2009 there were 2,426 new Hungarian refugee claims and the same year 55 were 
abandoned and 208 withdrawn, in 2010 2,300 new claims, 117 abandoned and 967 
withdrawn, and in 2011 4,423 new claims, 249 abandoned and 838 withdrawn. 
http://www.cdp-hrc.uottawa.ca/projects/refugee-forum/projects/Statistics.php
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Interestingly another dominant discourse was to refer to their own 
sickness, or sickness of some relative at home. Somehow, bodily sickness 
was a symbolic expression of homesickness. They claimed that they had to 
return because they fell sick and they did not trust Canadian doctors could 
cure them or they had to return because a relative was very sick and they 
felt that nobody else could take care of them at home. 
“Children were constantly ill. In the first two months there 
wasn’t any problem but then they got flu, they had allergies. 
They gave some medicine to my wife that her body didn’t 
recognize and she fell sick. We had to go to the hospital where 
we waited for three hours and then they sent us home. She 
could never recover after that. The children were OK but we 
came back because of the health problems.” (Mr. Pál) 
This latter motivation is similar to what most anthropological studies 
describe. Often return is not motivated by economic factors but rather by 
strong family ties. From this respect return is not a financial failure. To 
be “called back home” could be the result of very different things and it is 
usually a “powerful blend of motives” (Brettel 2008: 116).  
What awaits low-status Roma migrants upon return?
We have seen various aspects of low-status migration and looked at the 
major motives for voluntary return. It is equally important to see what 
happens after resettlement, whether returning families face new problems 
or perhaps manage to restart their lives under better conditions.  
Among the earlier migrants in the first wave there were also voluntary 
returnees. Their stories were very different from that of the new migrants. 
As said before, first-wave migrants came from somewhat better social 
backgrounds and had better opportunities in Canada. These families all 
recounted a “success story”: e.g. they managed to acquire some savings that 
they could spend on buying a house or renovating their old house at home. 
Later migrants, on the other hand, typically found themselves in much 
worse situations, at least temporarily. Those who did not deregister and whose 
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family allowance was not suspended had to face criminal persecution charges 
upon their return. Moreover, returnees are not entitled to social assistance 
until they register again and it takes time before the administrative procedure 
is completed. Until then, according to our information, for a couple of 
months, many of them are left without any income at all. Most of them have 
to refurnish their houses and buy everything else for their everyday life. The 
most common experience is that they have a negative financial balance at the 
end and some of them become even more indebted then before. 
“You sold everything and it won’t pay back. We paid 1,400 
dollars for rent and from the welfare we had 50 to 100 dollars 
left. (…) We could spare some money because we didn’t pay last 
month’s rent, but we needed this for returning to our village.” 
(Mr. Pál)
It is quite important, however, to see some of the positive outcome of 
the migration experience. These are obviously less direct and hardly tangible 
but could become positive assets at a certain point in the migrants’ lives. 
Next to the negative accounts of their different experiences in Canada, 
there are a few very positive memories that marked them all. It is not an 
exaggeration to say that these were experiences of positive cultural shock. 
The most striking one told by everyone was the humane atmosphere that 
they met in Canada: 
“There everybody makes you feel that you are a human being. 
Wherever we went, any official place, you are welcomed politely 
in that nice and rich country. You can sit down, they respect 
you and they offer you coffee. There, human beings are human 
beings indeed. Since it is an immigrant country. They don’t 
know Gypsies.” (Mr. Pál)    
It was so much the opposite of their everyday experiences in Hungary 
that they were practically shocked by being treated as fellow citizens and 
human beings. For some it was a revelation and they realized to what extent 
they had been discriminated against and humiliated in their previous life 
in Hungary.  
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Another salient experience that all of our interviewees talked about 
was the way children were treated in Canada. It was, according to their 
accounts, not only that Canadians were extra attentive and protective of 
children, but they also tried and to a certain degree managed to transfer 
this attitude to the migrants. 
“We had been to the school, we were called upon to go to see the 
teacher in the office. They told us how to treat children, what 
to do with them. I was aggressive before but there everything 
is very calm. They teach people how to deal with kids. Gypsies 
are an angry type. In Canada they pay more attention to kids 
but some people are still aggressive with their kids, they take 
them inside the house so that nobody sees. But there are cameras 
everywhere, you can’t behave aggressively.” (Mr. Pál) 
Similarly gender equity and emancipation of women was mentioned as 
a new and unforgettable experience although not always in a positive tone: 
“Women are stronger there, they make men feel that there is 
female dominance. For example, their behavior changed, they 
wanted to rule things and men did not have the chance to 
manage life by themselves. It was the same in every family.” 
(Mr. Pál)
Although adults usually could not take advantage of the language 
courses offered to them neither did they manage to learn the language or 
at least pick up something by themselves, but children who had to attend 
school did learn English to various levels.
Conclusions
In the last one and a half decades thousands of Roma people left Hungary 
for Canada as asylum seekers. The rate of Hungarian refugees was actually 
the highest from the region. Unlike other Central Eastern European 
countries, Hungarian Roma preferred Canada to other, mainly European, 
destinations. 
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Our pilot study was an attempt to formulate hypotheses and questions 
on this migration process based on an exploratory fieldwork carried out 
in the region of Hungary most affected by out-migration. Interviews were 
conducted with individuals and families who had been to Canada or 
whose families had been or were still there. It needs to be emphasized that 
our project did not intend to give a full-fledged picture of the Canadian 
migration process. This was not feasible given the scope of the project and 
the methodology used. 
Our first hypothesis was that Roma asylum seeking in Canada should 
be conceptualized as being a mix of classic labor migration as well as refugee 
migration. We assumed that the process cannot be analyzed without taking 
the characteristics of both types of migration into account. Our hypothesis 
was in line with what many scholars claim now, namely that Roma 
migration of this sort should not be reduced to refugee migration as it was 
the case for long. The reasons for that were mainly political. Civil activists 
supported by some scholars previously argued that the main driving force 
behind migration is discrimination and not accepting this amounted to 
blaming the Roma for taking advantage of the refugee systems of other 
countries. From an analytical point of view, however, not accounting for 
other reasons for migration outside discrimination risks losing insight into 
the process. 
The second hypothesis we formulated was based on our fieldwork 
experience. We observed that in the late 2000s a second wave of migration 
started that was to some extent different in nature from the previous trends. 
In the early 2000s, mainly better-off people and families were able to make 
the journey to Canada while in the late 2000s a new group was observed to 
be among the migrants, the more underprivileged families. Our questions 
and points of analysis were mainly directed at this new phenomenon of 
low-class migration. 
We identified the major social and political changes that created a 
more desperate situation for poorer Roma in Hungary from the mid-2000s. 
The subsequent governments introduced various social-welfare measures 
that had negative impact on the poorest strata of the population and 
launched public work programs that had the indirect purpose of punishing 
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the most vulnerable. These were not only theoretical push factors, but our 
interviewees mentioned them among their migration motivations. As to 
the political climate, the rise of the far-right and the spread of racism were 
tangible reasons that some Roma decided to leave. 
Canada was the main destination of Hungarian Roma because, 
at least in the second wave, networks had already been established. For 
people coming from extreme poverty, accumulating the money to pay for 
the journey would have been impossible unless migrant networks helped 
them. So it seemed that networks became even more crucial than before 
because for the most underprivileged the lack of resources had to be 
overcome somehow and not only for the journey but for life in Canada as 
well. Indeed, it turned out that migrants relied on these networks to a large 
extent, but the way they functioned was not always helpful to everybody. 
Lots of people migrating from the same village or neighborhood is a 
widespread phenomenon and this entailed that these people could not assist 
one another. As we heard, networks also became saturated after a while, 
leaving some without any help. These people became the most desperate 
returnees since their balance at the end was negative having spent all their 
“fortune” for the journey without managing to save any money in Canada. 
In fact, the major incentive for migration could be summarized as 
searching for a better life. What each migrant meant by better life was 
different. There were various strategies and migration plans listed by the 
migrants. Settling down in Canada was among the plans but having 
examples of returnees and having only vague ideas about what they should 
expect there, the most common aim of migration was not to permanently 
leave. The goal was rather to save up some money and return and with 
the money saved improve the life of one’s family at least for a while. The 
prospects for improving one’s living standard were nonetheless very modest 
given the fact that the resources and possibilities these people generally have 
are very limited. Among the most important goals we found was renovation 
of a house, or the hope to pay off one’s mortgage or simply the desire to 
purchase a home. More than that was hoped only among those with a 
somewhat higher social status who planned to provide a better education 
for their children when they returned. 
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It was also important to see that latter migrants tended to go with 
their whole families, a strategy that does not necessarily seem very logical, 
and which contradicts usual migrant strategies. In effect, earlier migrants 
did go alone or in male companies and were joined only later by their 
families. The difficulties of the entire family going together was thought 
to be worth facing because of the belief that in Canada only big families 
managed to survive. The point is not if this was true or not but the fact 
that people in extreme poverty took the risks of migrating believing that 
they had nothing to lose. However, because of the meager chances of 
finding a job in Canada (that would have allowed families to save a little 
bit of money), and because of the gradually more severe welfare, medical 
and refugee policies of Canada, the migration plans of these people were 
doomed to failure, giving them no better life either in Canada or back at 
home. Only a few things were found among the positive outcomes, such as 
some of the experiences they went through: the realization or crystallization 
of their humiliating situation, the fact that they had not been treated as 
human beings in Hungary, the admiration for how children were handled 
in Canada and the rights women had there. 
All in all, as we assumed the most adequate way to theorize about 
Roma migration to Canada is to take into account both the labor and the 
refugee migration aspects. Roma decided to leave because of the desperate 
social situation they were in as well as the discrimination they had to 
face on a daily basis. Because Canada had a refugee system that provided 
chances for surviving without any personal resources, families from lower 
status backgrounds could also leave. This would be less imaginable in a 
classic labor migrant situation. From a certain point of view, the underclass, 
unprivileged Roma people’s attempt to create a better life for their families 
through migration – basically an unsuccessful story for most of them – 
ties in with their constant struggles for some improvement in their life 
conditions. The struggle of migration has however proven to be overall a 
negative experience. 
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Introduction
After forty years of closed borders under the socialist regime in the former 
Czechoslovakia, migration became one of the legitimate living strategies for 
many people in Slovakia. Newly established democracy opened possibilities 
to bring more freedom into people’s lives. Roma, like other citizens of 
Slovakia, became part of this. Furthermore, Roma (due to discrimination 
and unequal social status within Slovak society) faced many obstacles 
in achieving the “better life” promised by the fall of the communist 
regime. One of the active strategies that Roma use to alleviate their 
harsh socio-economic situation and position at home is migration abroad 
(Kompaníková and Šebesta, 2002). Apart from economic factors that 
prevail in the discussions on motives for migration, in Slovakia migration is 
also determined by asymmetrical power relations between Roma and non-
Roma in the country. Given the majority’s unwillingness to accept Roma 
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as full-fledged members of the community, migration serves as a means 
to symbolically change Roma’s inferior status (Grill, 2011). Particularly 
migration to western European countries typical for their familiarity with 
cultural diversity gives many Roma hope of getting rid of the ‘Gypsy’ stigma 
that they have to bear in Slovakia.  
‘Winners of Socialism’ and ‘Losers of Transformation’
Slovakia ranks among countries with the estimated highest share of Roma 
population. According to the 2011 Census 2% of the population claimed 
to be Roma, which is a slight increase compared to the Census in 2001. 
However, experts estimate the numbers of Roma to be much higher, around 
320,000 – 400,000 people. Marginalized Roma in Slovakia are the most 
deprived population group in the country in which unemployment currently 
peaks at 14%.98 Segregated Roma communities are mainly concentrated in 
eastern Slovakia where unemployment reaches almost 20%.99 A rapid fall 
of the Roma into deep poverty began shortly after the political transition in 
1989. Owing to their position as objects of socialist social engineering Roma 
found themselves particularly unprepared for the socio-economic changes 
brought about by the transition in 1989 and early 1990s. The communist 
regime strove to completely rebuild society’s natural stratification and 
systematically assisted lower social classes at the expense of the higher 
ones. Most Roma belonged to a lower social class and became an object 
of numerous socialist social experiments aiming to improve their social 
status. The various measures were based on the Marxist presumption that 
alleviation of Romani social circumstances would eventually change their 
behavior and eliminate negative phenomena supposedly associated with 
their ethnic affiliation (Radičová, 2001). The socialist regime constructed 
Roma as a social group, as opposed to a national minority, that needed to be 
socialized, civilized and assimilated into what they called a “socialist folk” 
98 http://portal.statistics.sk/showdoc.do?docid=48056
99 http://portal.statistics.sk/showdoc.do?docid=1801, Prešov self-governing region – 17.8% 
and Košice self-governing region – 19.6% in 2011.
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(Lajčáková, 2007). To this end the socialist regime employed numerous 
policies nowadays labeled as social engineering such as dispersal of the 
Roma within Slovakia as well as from Slovakia to the Czech Republic; 
disintegration of natural Romani communities; removal of the rural 
Romani population from their natural settlements to cities and industrial 
areas; destruction of natural bonds between the Romani community and 
the majority population; insensitive and forced allocation of flats to Roma 
from socially disadvantaged environments; forced compliance with general 
compulsory employment using the threat of imprisonment; statutory 
enforced school attendance for children; and the obligatory participation of 
Roma in disease-prevention campaigns. Indeed, many Roma did improve 
their socio-economic standing and reached a status comparable with the 
majority population. However, it was achieved by force and without their 
active participation. Needless to say, the majority never truly accepted 
Roma no matter what their social and economic situation became. The 
transformation period with its fundamental changes in the economy, social 
policy, civic and political rights thus negatively affected the most vulnerable 
social groups, particularly Roma, who were the first to lose their jobs after 
the disintegration of state-owned businesses. Given their low levels of 
qualification, previously encouraged by the socialist regime, most Roma 
had very limited chances to access opportunities and compete for socially 
valued resources. Chances to maintain their social status as members of the 
so-called Roma middle class (or upper working class as Vašečka and Vašečka 
coined it in 2003) thus approached zero. Not surprisingly many Roma 
view the socialist regime as the “good times”. Numerous survey findings 
confirm their view that “all troubles came with democracy” (Radičová, 
2001). Not only had they lost their jobs and a relatively satisfactory social 
status but they became the transition’s “scapegoats” which potentially led to 
increasing tensions between the Roma and non-Roma population. When 
Radičová (2001) speaks of Roma as the “losers of transformation” it applies 
particularly to the Roma who were the “winners of socialism”, i.e. the Roma 
who did improve their social and economic standing. Transition processes 
with their specific impact on Roma led to their gradual marginalization and 
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exclusion. Liberalization of housing with rents soaring to unprecedented 
heights (rises of up to 200%) pushed the Roma to cheaper flats and lodging 
houses and eventually forced them to return to Romani settlements on 
the outskirts of towns and villages (Radičová, 2001). The state introduced 
policies of social assistance and a social safety net which, however, construed 
poverty as an individual failure and provided only those goods necessary for 
one’s survival. Social policies did not address the broader context of poverty 
and thus reproduced a culture of dependency (Radičová, 2002). 
Inter-ethnic Relations and their Impact on the Socio-economic Status 
of Roma
Owing to all this, the social distance between the Roma and non-Roma 
population continued growing, with the majority population believing 
that most Roma are unable to adapt to existing social norms (Vašečka 
M., 2003). The majority’s negative attitudes coupled with long-term lack 
of employment opportunities and low levels of qualifications among 
Roma led to unprecedentedly high unemployment for Roma which in 
some communities reaches almost 100% (Puliš, 2002). Roma themselves 
perceive wide-spread discrimination in the labor market and refusal of 
private businesses to employ Romani job seekers as the main cause of their 
unemployment. In a 2001 Roma Human Development Project as many as 
84.5% of the respondents stated their ethnic, Roma, origin as one of the three 
main obstacles in finding an employment (Puliš, 2002). A dire situation for 
the Roma in the labor market is closely connected with their position in the 
educational system. Roma children are systematically overrepresented in the 
special education system earmarked for children with mental disabilities. 
In the school year 2008-2009 approximately 60% of all children in special 
education in Slovakia were Roma (Friedman et al., 2009). Not only are 
Roma children systematically steered into special education, but even in 
regular schools they are segregated into separate Roma classes. The cardinal 
prerequisite for success in Slovakia’s labor market is passing the school-leaving 
exam allowing one to graduate from secondary education. The only form of 
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special education to produce graduates qualified for skilled work is special 
technical school. The vocational certificate allows its graduates to work only 
under supervision by more highly skilled workers. Specializations taught to 
such graduates are, however, poorly suited to the jobs available (Friedman 
et al., 2009). Without improvements in Roma children’s access to quality 
education, their position in the labor market can hardly be enhanced. 
Long-term unemployed, among them large numbers of marginalized 
Roma, have become targets of several reforms, including the extensive 
reforms of social policy in 2003-2004. Interestingly, the reforms seemed to 
be designed to punish the long-term unemployed for their poverty rather 
than help them overcome it. The 2003-2004 reforms in particular seemed 
to be based on the proposers’ conviction that unemployment and poverty is 
due to lack of willingness to work hard on one’s success. The then minister 
of labor, social affairs and family, Ľudovít Kaník, proposed a new Child 
Benefit Act abolishing contributions to child benefit. The minister argued 
that the contribution did not motivate individuals with dependent children 
to provide for the families via regular employment. The new system was 
criticized for its potentially detrimental effect on the socio-economic 
situation of the unemployed, elderly or physically disabled individuals caring 
for dependent children. At the same time, the minister introduced further 
restrictions to the disbursement of material needs benefits and justified 
them by the government’s attempt to motivate the long-term unemployed to 
seek employment. The reform’s opponents argued that the amendment had 
no positive effect on unemployed individuals’ motivation or opportunities 
to enter the labor market (Zachar, 2004). The reforms led impoverished 
and frustrated Roma in eastern Slovakia to riot which, however, turned 
public opinion against them and reinforced the majority’s conviction that 
the only way to ‘civilize’  the Roma is “a long whip and a small yard”. Even 
as an opposition MP, former labor minister Kaník continues his efforts to 
tighten social-welfare benefits for the long-term unemployed and so-called 
‘maladjusted’ citizens (a pejorative expression earmarked for marginalized 
Roma that has recently been introduced in order to avoid being criticized 
for explicitly referring to ethnicity). Radicalization of political and public 
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discourse towards the Roma played a  major part in the parliamentary 
election campaign in 2011-2012 in which even parties claiming to endorse 
democratic and humanistic values of solidarity and equality competed for 
the reputation of tackling the so-called ‘Roma problem‘ most effectively. 
Openly racist campaigns by some candidates for the centre-right party 
SDKU-DS in eastern Slovakia confirmed the highly disturbing trend of 
rapidly decreasing solidarity with the most deprived population groups, i.e. 
marginalized Roma (Lajčáková et al., 2011). The context of their poverty 
and exclusion is most often neglected. 
Ways out of Poverty
One of the active strategies that Roma families use to solve their dire 
social and economic situation is migration in search of better employment 
opportunities. It is either internal migration within the country’s borders 
or emigration to western, more economically advanced, countries of the 
EU. The IOM survey (2000) pointed out that the main reason for Roma 
migration to EU member states was a desire to maintain or restore the 
living standards they had achieved during the socialism era (see above). 
“Every single Romani person with whom IOM researchers have spoken 
claimed it was easier for Roma to live in Slovakia before 1990. One of them 
said, ‘It is necessary to return the Roma to where he was 10 years ago’” 
(Vašečka and Vašečka, 2003: 36). Roma, who during socialism managed 
to break out of the vicious circle of poverty and established relatively good 
social networks and socio-economic status, gradually lost their gains as a 
result of transformation processes already in the early 1990s. This rapid 
fall by the “winners of the socialism” might be attributed to the fact that 
they were never truly accepted as equal and full-fledged members of society 
despite their socio-economic advancement, achieved through across-the-
board coercive socialist measures externally imposed on the Roma without 
respecting their contextual needs and participatory rights. 
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Migration Trends in Slovakia
The change of regime in 1989 and consequently opening of the borders 
brought significant changes to migration opportunities in Slovakia. 
Migration patterns among Slovaks started to change radically already in 
the early 1990s. Available data are based on the numbers of citizens who de-
registered their permanent residence before leaving Slovakia. Even though 
this is a legal obligation of each citizen changing his/her place of permanent 
residence there are no sanctions for failing to do so. It is estimated that 
only 5 to 10% of emigrants actually deregister their permanent residence. 
Numbers of Slovak citizens moving abroad might be therefore much higher 
than figures suggest. Very rough estimates indicate that in 2003 around 
100,000 Slovak citizens (1.86% of the overall population of Slovakia) 
worked abroad officially. Currently, this number is likely to be higher owing 
to Slovakia’s membership of the EU and the open labor market of most 
other EU countries. In the following paragraphs we will depart from the 
available statistics provided by the Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic, 
bearing in mind that those figures are not quite accurate.
General migration trends and Roma migration in the 1990s
Since the early 1990s emigration from the Slovak Republic has been primarily 
motivated by seeking better economic opportunities outside the country’s 
borders. After Czechoslovakia split in 1993, Slovakia’s economy was left in 
a dire situation, and severely lagged behind the Czech economy. Owing to 
a more developed industrial structure Czech Republic was more ready to 
embrace changes associated with the transformation processes. Immediate 
rises in unemployment in 1990 (practically from zero to 10%) left many 
people in Slovakia jobless without hope of improvement. As mentioned 
earlier, Roma were the people hit by rapidly growing unemployment 
the hardest. Emigration was thus seen as a strategy for improving one’s 
unfavorable socio-economic situation. If ethnic majority members were 
primarily leaving the country due to economic underdevelopment and 
in search of better job opportunities, factors driving Roma abroad must 
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include economic as well as social and political reasons (Vašečka I., 2001). 
Economic reasons for Roma migration tend to be stressed by experts and 
the ethnic majority members. However, the Roma themselves emphasize 
“discrimination, racism, skinheads, the wrong treatment from the side of the state 
or local authorities as well as current poverty, the lack of money, unemployment, 
housing and health problems...” (Divinský, 2004: 30). Even though their 
economic situation was among the major motives for their departure 
we cannot talk about labor migration per se. Due to various restriction 
measures, lack of access, visa policy and other factors, many Roma chose 
asylum application as an avenue to enter western EU countries – allowing 
them to migrate with their families as opposed to as individual sojourners. 
It is assumed that applying for asylum might have been viewed as a form of 
safe migration and a system providing relative security at the starting point 
in a new country along with protection against discrimination.
In 1990, according to official statistics, up to 10,940 people (0.2% of 
the overall population of Slovakia) left Slovakia, out of which 92% left for the 
Czech Republic. Czech Republic remained the main destination country of 
Slovak emigrants throughout the early 1990s. Based on the survey carried 
out by the Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic at the time (Pohyb 
obyvateľstva…1990-2010) we can conclude that the big wave of emigration 
to the Czech lands was associated with the break-up of Czechoslovakia since 
large proportion of emigrants stated family reasons as the main motives 
for leaving Slovakia. It is assumed that the share of emigrants stating 
family reasons constituted members of mixed, Czechoslovak families, who 
eventually moved to the Czech lands to join their relatives. Moreover, given 
the Czech Republic’s low unemployment rates (2.6% in 1992 compared with 
Slovakia’s more than 10%) it is plausible that family reasons were coupled 
with economic reasons hidden under ‘other’ reasons in the survey and 
many of those leaving for the Czech Republic were actually labor migrants. 
Each year several tens of thousands of Slovak workers find employment in 
the Czech Republic (e.g. 72,000 officially registered Slovak citizens were 
employed in the Czech Republic in 1996). One should bear in mind there 
are several more thousand Slovak citizens working in the Czech Republic 
illegally (Divinský, 2004). Apart from the Czech Republic, Slovak citizens 
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also headed for Hungary, Germany, Austria, Canada, Australia and United 
States of America in the early 1990s. 
The official number of emigrants dropped radically in 1994 to only 
154 Slovak citizens moving abroad and remained rather low until 2001 
when it reached 1,011. In 1997, according to official numbers the share 
of citizens leaving for the Czech Republic decreased to 37% of emigrants 
leaving Slovakia. Slovak citizens recognized the potential of the labor market 
in countries such as Austria, Germany, Hungary and Italy. Particularly 
Austria has attracted Slovak citizens owing to its close proximity letting 
them commute frequently between the place of employment and their 
homes. The number of Slovak workers officially registered in Austria was 
approximately 5,000 in 2002 (Internal statistics of Arbeitsmarktservice, 
2003 in Divinský, 2004). Germany has also been much favored by Slovak 
labor migrants due to its good employment opportunities and proximity. 
The number of seasonal workers from Slovakia in Germany rose from 5,288 
in 1997 to 10,984 in 2002. Long-term workers from Slovakia amounted 
to 535 in 1997 and 848 in 2002. As seen from the figures above, official 
Slovak statistics compared to experts’ estimates provide a significantly 
skewed picture of out-migration. 
Even though the official statistics indicate that prevailing motivation 
to move abroad (excluding the Czech Republic) constituted family 
reasons (i.e. marriages and family reunifications), the largest proportion 
of emigrants continued to state ‘other’ reasons as major motives for their 
departure (Divinský, 2004). It is plausible that this category may entail 
labor reasons as other labor-related survey categories allowed rather limited 
answers, i.e. ‘change of employment’ and ‘moving closer to my job’. Such 
formulations would assume that one already has employment as opposed to 
those who move abroad in search of employment. It is therefore likely that 
great share of emigrants in the mid- and late 1990s were labor migrants. 
Slovaks’ interest in working in the EU 15 countries increased in the mid-
1990s, and the United Kingdom, Italy, France and Switzerland were added 
to the list of Slovak citizens’ most favored destination countries. Advanced 
western economies promised better job opportunities even for unskilled 
workers from Slovakia which has struggled with high unemployment since 
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the break-up of Czechoslovakia. In 1992 unemployment in Slovakia passed 
10% (while in the Czech Republic it was only 2.6%) and continued to 
rise until it peaked at almost 15% in 1995, and still at 14.1% in 2011.100 
Unemployment in marginalized Roma communities often reaches 70%, 
in the most deprived communities it is almost 100% without any sign of 
improvement. In this situation the Roma employed migration to western 
EU countries as an active collective defense strategy (Kompaníková and 
Šebesta, 2002). In the ethnic majority’s view migration by the Roma 
is a separation from a society that provided them with help. It is either 
perceived as a proof of Roma disloyalty to the Slovak Republic and is 
pejoratively labeled ethno-tourism, or it is a result of Roma exclusion that 
began in 1989. According to Roma themselves, their migration is a result 
of extensive discrimination (Vašečka and Vašečka, 2003). As mentioned 
earlier, Roma chose to seek asylum in the western EU countries as a form of 
safe migration providing opportunities for whole families.
Migration by Roma from Slovakia to different EU countries began in 
1997, when approximately 800 Roma from Slovakia and Czech Republic 
applied for asylum in Great Britain. Western media commentators and 
politicians openly threatened to introduce visa obligations for Slovakia. 
This finally happened in 1998 when more than 1,000 Roma asylum seekers 
arrived in Great Britain (Kotvanová and Szép, 2002: 58). 
Another group of 500 Roma claimed asylum in Belgium in 1998. 
Only three of them were successful. Given the large numbers of asylum 
seekers from Slovakia, which was considered a safe country of origin, most 
asylum claims were rejected as manifestly unfounded, being assessed in an 
accelerated procedure (Petrus, 2002). The Slovak and Belgian governments 
made an agreement for the organized return of those whose asylum claims 
were rejected (Kotvanová and Szép: 59). Belgium even amended its asylum 
system as it feared exploitation of the EU asylum system and its social-
welfare system (Petrus, 2002).
100 Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic. Available at http://www.statistics.sk/pls/elisw/
casovy_Rad.procDlg
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More than 1,000 Slovak Roma sought asylum in Finland in June 
1999 (Vašečka and Vašečka, 2003: 28). Finland, along with Denmark and 
Norway, introduced temporary visas during 1999. None of the asylum 
claims from Slovakia was successful in these countries. Sweden was the only 
state that never even opened a discussion about imposing visa requirements. 
The total number of asylum seekers in Scandinavian countries was around 
2,000 in 1999 (Kotvanová and Szép, 2002: 59). 
Non-existent precise data on Roma migration allow us to draw only 
limited conclusions on the actual extent of Roma migration. Divinský 
(2004: 35) provides some figures outlining a certain picture of Roma 
migration to selected EU countries (Table 9.)
Table 9. Numbers of asylum seekers from the Slovak Republic in 
selected European countries in 1998-2002 (Divinský, 2004, p.35) 
 
State 
Year
CZ B DK FIN NL D UK S NO IRL Total
1998 6 985 90 20 293 0 2,207 17 0 69 3,687
1999 12 1,175 987 1,250 360 313 6 132 233 0 4,468
2000 723 1,392 10 434 977 0 3 109 964 39 4,651
2001 387 855 312 88 211 138 60 348 187 69 2,655
2002 842 637 35 421 200 673 115 781 324 0 4,028
Total 1,970 5,044 1,434 2,213 2,041 1,124 2,391 1,387 1,708 177 19,489
Source: Internal documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2003, ICMPD 2001 and Boris 
Divinský’s calculations (in Divinský, 2004, p.35)
After several EU countries imposed temporary visa requirements, 
Roma migration became central to public and political discourse. Several 
senior Slovak political representatives including the then Prime Minister 
Mikuláš Dzurinda admitted that the recurrent “mass exodus” of Slovak 
Roma represented a serious threat to Slovakia’s accession to the EU. Roma 
migration also drew the attention of EU representatives interested in 
Slovakia’s human and minority-rights protection. The so-called Romani 
174
E L E N A  G A L L O V Á  K R I G L E R O V Á  A N D  A L E N A  C H U D Ž Í K O V Á
“exodus” to Finland aroused negative public responses and repeatedly 
worsened relations between the Romani minority and the Slovak 
majority. Because the country’s potential EU membership might have 
been jeopardized by the issue, the then Deputy Prime Minister Pál Csáky 
and Deputy Foreign Minister Ján Figel established an interdepartmental 
committee to tackle problems related to emigration in July 1999 (Vašečka 
and Vašečka, 2003: 28). The government’s report on foreign policy 
in 1999 reporting achievements by the Slovak Republic in the field of 
country’s integration into European structures identified only one problem 
in relations with Belgium and Finland – a “continuing influx of Roma 
asylum seekers from Slovakia”. According to the report, the Belgian side 
appreciated the flexibility of Slovak authorities in solving this problem via 
repatriation (Správa o plnení...: 34). With respect to relations with Finland, 
Slovak representatives saw their most crucial task as explaining to Finns the 
“oppression of the Roma” (sic!) (Ibid.: 37). As the report states, “the Finnish 
political elite quickly understood that asylum claims of the Slovak citizens 
are unfounded and unjustified.” 
Romani migration continued also after 2000. Nevertheless, its scope 
and political reactions were not as “hot” as before. Slovakia was on its way to 
joining the EU and concerns about failure to integrate proved unfounded. 
Migration patterns also changed. The so-called ‘massive exodus’ of Slovak 
Roma to any particular destination stopped, although departures by 
individual families and small groups of Roma to various EU member states 
became a regular phenomenon.
Migration after Slovakia joined the EU
Slovakia’s accession to the EU in 2004 brought dramatic quantitative and 
qualitative changes in the field of emigration. Among the major reasons 
for leaving the country were family reasons (50% in 2004; 27% in 2009) 
and search for employment (7.5% in 2004; 9.5% in 2009) although these 
figures are thought to be underestimated and labor migration is assumed 
to have dominated the overall migration trends from Slovakia after 2004 
(Pohyb obyvateľstva....). According to the Statistical Office’s survey ‘other 
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reasons’ constituted 41% in 2004 and 61% in 2009 containing, inter 
alia, the search for employment. A significant proportion of this group 
was likely represented by labor migrants. Due to most emigrants’ failure 
to deregister their permanent residence, data on emigration are highly 
inaccurate. It is estimated that only 5 to 10% of those leaving the country 
actually do inform relevant state authorities and de-register (Divinský, n.d.). 
Immigration records of destination countries are generally more reliable 
and according to Divinský (2007) the number of emigrants from Slovakia 
reaches at least 15,000 citizens a year (approximately 0.28% of the overall 
population according to the 2001 Census). Slovak citizens continued to 
move to Germany and Austria. Furthermore, the United Kingdom became 
of particular interest due to its open labor market requiring no visa or work 
permit. Shortly after the country’s accession to the EU, Slovakia became 
one of the main countries sending labor migrants to the UK along with 
Poland, Czech Republic, and Lithuania. In 2004 alone, the UK’s Worker 
Registration Scheme (WRS) received 13,020 applications from Slovak 
citizens. This number rose to 22,425 in 2007 (Blancheflower, Lawton, 
2008). Given that many labor migrants from A8 countries (countries 
joining the EU in 2004) do not register with WRS, even these figures are 
understated. Czech Republic, Ireland, and United Kingdom, particularly 
its industrial regions of Sheffield, Birmingham and Newcastle, are the most 
frequent destination countries of current Roma labor migration. It is often 
the case that men leave their wives and children at home while they work 
abroad and send home remittances that are later used for improving their 
living situation, such as building or refurbishing a house. 
Asylum migration of Slovak Roma occurred again in the late 2000s 
with Canada becoming the main destination country of Romani asylum 
seekers. As the job opportunities in the UK and Ireland became scarce 
with the 2008 economic recession Canada, with the possibility to claim 
asylum, represented a rational choice as a safe haven and a country that 
had not been affected so much by East and Central European migration 
waves. Table 10 indicates numbers of asylum applications from Slovakia in 
Canada. Even though ethnic origin is not recorded it is believed that all of 
the asylum seekers were Roma.
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Table 10. Number of asylum seekers from Slovakia in Canada 
andresults of their asylum applications
 
Year Asylum claims Recognized refugees Rejected asylum claims
2009 331 2 6
2010 258 4 58
2011 329 3 12
Source: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada
Even though numbers of migrants from Slovakia dropped mildly during 
the economic recession, Slovak citizens still perceive western economies as 
providing better opportunities for socio-economic advancement. It should 
be noted that the advancement often occurs at the expense of one’s skills and 
qualifications as many labor migrants are overqualified for the jobs available 
for them abroad. On the other hand, lack of unskilled workers abroad is 
an opportunity for Romani job-seekers with few qualifications who find it 
difficult to find employment in Slovakia in harsh economic circumstances 
and the increasing exclusion and marginalization of Romani communities.
Horná Dolná101 – Description of the Community
With the population of more than 8,000 Horná Dolná is the largest village 
in Slovakia. It is located in the north-eastern part of Slovakia, in the close 
neighborhood of the district centre of Spišská Nová Ves. Horná Dolná was 
established in the 13th century and became a privileged “royal settlement”; 
it thus has a very long and rich history. In the 15th century Horná Dolná 
was the second largest “town” in the Spiš region. At the end of the 19th and 
beginning of the 20th century, the structure of the population changed due 
to massive emigration to the United States of America.102 Historically, the 
Spiš region has been ethnically mixed with large populations of Slovaks, 
Jews, Germans, Hungarians and Roma. 
101 Horná Dolná is a fictitious name used for reasons of anonymity. 
102 Information provided by municipality via its website.
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Nowadays, people in Horná Dolná live in 880 houses and another 
41 blocks of flats (containing 1,700 flats), together in 1,755 households. 
Horná Dolná is a rural settlement with many urban characteristics due to 
close relationships with the district centre of Spišská Nová Ves. Table 11 
indicates basic information of the locality’s population.
Table 11. Age structure of Horná Dolná population
Age structure Number of people
0-19 1,246
20-60 5,310
60 and more 2,070
Average age 33
Source: Basic information about municipality available at municipality website
Currently, the population size is quite stable due to the balance 
between in-migration and out-migration from the village. In 2008, 299 
people immigrated to the village from different regions of Slovakia and 
289 emigrated103 (no information about foreign migration is available). The 
birth rate is slowly but steadily increasing. Unemployment is also relatively 
high. In the whole district of Spišská Nová Ves, unemployment in 2011 
peaked at 18.83%. According to the most recent available data for Horná 
Dolná, in 2008 the number of unemployed people reached 1,283. Only a 
few employers operate directly in Horná Dolná (in 2008 there were 147 
entrepreneurs offering 1,200 job openings). Almost 2,000 inhabitants have 
jobs outside the village. Owing to the lack of employment opportunities 
in the whole region Roma are not the only ones to face problems in the 
labor market. 
The ethnic structure of Horná Dolná is not as heterogeneous as it 
used to be in the past. Nevertheless, quite a large share of Horná Dolná 
population is of Romani origin. According to the official municipal 
103  Social and Economic Develeopment Plan of Horná Dolná for 2007 – 2015, available at the 
municipality’s website.  
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statistics, out of 8,397 inhabitants 2,260 were Roma (27%) and another 97 
claimed another nationality than Slovak or Romani. 
Roma in Horná Dolná live in quite good material conditions 
(compared to other Romani settlements in the region), but still, they are 
spatially as well as symbolically separated from the majority (the Romani 
part of the village is located approximately 200 meters from the main road 
on the other side of railway tracks). Needless to say, interactions between 
the Roma and non-Roma are also limited. 
According to the Atlas of Roma Communities (Jurásková et al., 
2004), the only official source of ethnic data gathered in Slovakia besides 
official census data, Roma in Horná Dolná live in 353 households. The 
average number of people per dwelling was 5.9 in 2004. This settlement 
(as opposed to other settlements in the region) is not a typical segregated 
Romani settlement since the vast majority of houses are made of bricks, 
are connected to the water supply (85%), and almost 50% of them are 
connected to the sewer system (Jurásková et al., 2004). According to Horná 
Dolná’s Social and Economic Development Plan, the Romani settlement 
had its access road rebuilt in 2007-2008 and the municipality built social 
housing for sixteen Romani families.
On the other hand, the present research found that the road 
reconstruction was more nominal than real and the current road is poor 
quality:
“It started to break down immediately after it was ‘constructed’. 
They [municipal office] built the road in their [non-Roma] part 
of the village and all construction waste was brought to the 
settlement as a basis for the new road. But they never fixed it in 
any way.” (Mr. Milan)
The quality of the access road in the Romani settlement is indeed 
much worse than in the rest of the village. The same applies for the “social 
housing”. Roma feel dissatisfied with the quality of social flats construction 
and their allocation. 
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“In the beginning we were told that social housing is only for 
those in social and material need. But at the end of the day, 
only families that could afford it now live in these ‘social flats’. 
Moreover, quality of buildings is very poor and the new tenants 
had to invest a lot of extra money to fix them to the level they 
can live in.” (Ms. Alica)
Although the Roma community in Horná Dolná is quite large (one 
third of the overall population) and living conditions for its inhabitants 
are not equal to non-Roma population, the municipal office does not view 
it as a special target group for developmental policy in the village. Horná 
Dolná’s Plan of social and economic development contains numerous plans 
and developmental projects but none of them targets Roma specifically as 
a disadvantaged group. It would be a very important symbolic expression 
of the municipality’s ‘will’ to help tackle the many difficulties local Roma 
face if they did.
Segregation of the Roma from the majority population along with 
their poor social and economic conditions also harms their mutual relations. 
Historically, relations between Roma and non-Roma in Horná Dolná were 
relatively good and conflict-free although they were still largely hierarchical. 
The quotation below indicates power inequalities in that the Roma were 
the service people. Roma had worked for their non-Roma neighbors as 
peasants or provided various services typical for the Romani population 
(e.g. blacksmiths). Moreover, mixed relationships were not unusual in the 
past. Many children had non-Roma parents owing to ‘informal’ relations 
between Roma and non-Roma.
During WWII, non-Roma even protected many of their Romani 
neighbors and thanks to their interventions many Roma avoided being 
transported to concentration camps:
“As soon as they [non-Roma] learned something was happening 
they came to our colony on horses and stopped guardsmen saying: 
‘We will not let them go, they are our Roma, our neighbors, 
they work for us, they serve us, we need them.’” (Mr. Milan)
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During communism, many Horná Dolná Roma achieved a relatively 
satisfactory social status compared to Roma in other Romani settlements 
in the region. Their socio-economic status was comparable to non-Roma 
living in Horná Dolná although they were still spatially separated. Since all 
of them were employed they could afford to build brick multi-generational 
houses very similar to the ones in the non-Roma part of the village while, 
however, never exceeding the borders of the Roma ‘colony’. In most cases 
Roma still live in these houses. After the fall of communism, relations with 
the majority deteriorated due to several reasons. One of them was the social 
situation of local Roma with an unprecedented increase of unemployment. 
The labor market became more competitive and Roma were the first to lose 
their jobs. Attitudes toward the Roma got worse generally in Slovakia as 
they became the ‘scapegoats’ of the transition period. Extreme deterioration 
in the social situation of many Roma families in Horná Dolná increased 
the distance between local Roma and non-Roma who refused to associate 
with ‘the lower class’. Another reason for corrosion in inter-ethnic relations 
in Horná Dolná is that traditional ties among the Roma and non-Roma 
changed after the arrival of ‘newcomers’ from different localities with poor 
social backgrounds (Roma as well non-Roma) that began after the fall of 
communism. According to one of our respondents, the social structure and 
‘atmosphere’ of the village rapidly changed and for the time being it can 
be characterized by growing tensions between the majority and the Roma. 
Methodology
Slovakia is in a slightly different situation than Hungary or the Czech 
Republic. Migration to Canada is a quite new phenomenon since larger 
groups of Roma started to leave Slovakia only in February 2012 although 
few families from the region left in 2010/2011. Roma migration to Canada 
has not yet been properly explored and no relevant research has been done 
so far. While searching for a relevant site for field research we could rely 
only on very limited sources of information, the mass media being one 
of those. Based on a preliminary monitoring of media coverage of Roma 
181
M I G R A T I O N  O F  R O M A  F R O M  S L O V A K I A  T O  C A N A D A
migration we decided to focus our attention on Horná Dolná since it was 
the only locality from which Roma migrated in larger groups. According 
to media coverage approximately 200 Roma from Horná Dolná left for 
Canada in 2012 with only few returnees so far (Jesenský, 2012). Finding 
respondents was, however, extremely difficult for several reasons. First, 
given the exceptionally negative media portrayal of Roma migration from 
Horná Dolná in February 2012, local Roma are reluctant to speak to anyone 
from outside the community. Second, early return from Canada without 
materializing one’s objectives is seen as a failure no-one is willing to speak 
about. Thanks to a local Romani activist (Mr. Milan) we found two locals 
who were related to the families who migrated to Canada and were willing 
to speak to us although we met outside the so-called ‘Roma colony’ as the 
respondents did not want to be seen with us.
Ms. Júlia104 is a mother of a young Roma (25 years old) who left 
in March 2012 with his small family (wife and a little child). Her son 
completed his university undergraduate education and was not able to find 
a job in Slovakia. Trying almost everything, he felt he was failing to provide 
for his family which is why he chose emigration to secure them a future.
Our second interviewee, Ms. Alica is a 36-year-old lady who had 
several relatives go to Canada. She keeps in touch with them on a daily basis 
and thus was able to describe the situation in Horná Dolná with respect to 
migration, motivations for migration and their situation in Canada. 
The already-mentioned local Romani activist himself was the third 
and a very relevant respondent. He was closely engaged in planning and 
organizing migration to Canada. His activities in Horná Dolná and strong 
relations with all Roma (and non-Roma) in Horná Dolná allowed him to 
provide us with very significant insights into transatlantic Roma migration. 
Despite the negative attitudes of people towards Roma migration, low 
numbers of returnees and the overall ‘unpleasant’ atmosphere in Horná 
Dolná in terms of inter-ethnic relations we were able to collect information 
on migration to Canada. Further research is needed in order to thoroughly 
investigate forces influencing Roma migration. Nevertheless, in the current 
104 Names of the respondents have been changed at their request.
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atmosphere it is almost impossible to access the local Romani community. 
Roma do not trust non-Roma, regardless of whether they are journalists or 
researchers. As described below, Roma fear negative inferences from their 
migration. Having internalized the stigma ascribed to them by the majority 
population they feel ‘guilty’ for leaving the country.
Roma Migration from Horná Dolná
Roma from Horná Dolná, especially those with relatively good social status 
acquired during the socialist era and their descendants, belong to a social 
group that lost almost everything as a result of the transition after 1989. Most 
of them lost their jobs and their social status decreased immensely. Although 
their housing situation is in many cases better than that of numerous other 
Roma communities in eastern Slovakia, their chances to find work and live 
a dignified life are slender. And for many of them, migration is one of the 
very few ways to improve their situation. Unfortunately, we do not have 
precise data on migration from Horná Dolná to other regions in Slovakia. 
During our research we found anecdotal evidence of migration to larger 
cities or to the Czech Republic, which in any case is a typical destination of 
Slovak Roma. Social and economic circumstances in the Czech Republic 
are perceived as much better than in Slovakia. Those who stayed in Horná 
Dolná maintain strong ties with their relatives who migrated to the Czech 
Republic in the past. Their perception of the situation in the Czech Republic 
is arguably inaccurate as unemployment in the Czech Roma is also very 
high and the attitudes of the majority towards them are getting worse. Inter-
ethnic tensions (including violent attacks on Roma) in the Czech Republic 
occur almost on a daily basis.
Many Roma from Slovakia (and also from the Spiš region) used to 
migrate to EU countries before Slovakia joined in 2004 (see above). The 
United Kingdom, Norway, Denmark and Sweden – all of these countries 
were destinations for Romani migration. Most of the Roma migrated to 
the United Kingdom, particularly from the Spiš region (and other south-
eastern regions of Slovakia). After 2004, migration to the UK provided 
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many Roma with an opportunity to advance their socio-economic standing 
as virtually no entry requirements were imposed on labor migrants from 
Slovakia. Labor migration thus became one of the few ways to break out 
of the vicious circle of poverty, particularly in eastern Slovakia. Successful 
Roma migrants use their savings from the UK to purchase the highest 
status symbols for the Roma – a house and a car – in Slovakia while 
continuing their jobs in the UK. However, only few plan to stay abroad 
permanently (cf. Grill, 2011 and 2012). In some regions, the migration 
experience allowed many Roma from segregated settlements to move out of 
the traditional ‘Gypsy colonies’ and buy houses in the non-Roma parts of 
villages. Tarkovce, for instance, has become more spatially ethnically mixed 
as a result of Roma returnees buying houses in the non-Roma parts of the 
village (Grill, 2011). Another example of a ‘sending’ village, Bystrany (a 
village located 20 km to the east of Horná Dolná) is perceived by the Roma 
as a ‘success story’ of Romani migration to the United Kingdom. Many of 
Bystrany’s Roma returned from the United Kingdom and used their savings 
to build or reconstruct their own houses, start their own businesses and 
improve their living conditions. Such investments actually cause a reversal 
of previous hierarchies as Roma building or reconstructing their houses 
often hire non-Roma building companies to do the job. Construction work 
gives various job opportunities even to unsuccessful migrants. Migration 
experience thus seems to have an impact on the community as a whole. Job 
opportunities provided by the British labor market are often considered as 
life-saving among the Roma despite physical hardship they have to endure, 
such as 12-hour shifts, night shifts or extremely hard work in low-paid 
jobs. However, migration is often presented as a dream come true despite 
the fact that for many Roma it means deepening their poverty as they have 
to borrow money for the journey. If unsuccessful in job seeking they end 
up owing large amounts of money and find themselves in a very difficult 
situation (Grill, 2011). The fact that not everyone ‘makes it’ abroad was 
confirmed also by our respondents who described the situation in the labor 
market of western EU countries as deteriorating. 
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“People who are in England are still satisfied but not as much 
as those who went here from Bystrany or Pavlovce nad Uhom. 
The ‘capital’ of the Spiš region is now in Birmingham or 
Sheffield...but it is not like it used to be. A single person, with 
primary education, no skills or vocational training could find 
a job knowing a single phrase: I am looking for a job. But those 
times are over.” (Mr. Milan)
The situation changed due to massive labor migration by workers from 
Ukraine and Poland who pushed wages down to an absolute minimum and 
filled demand for unskilled labor. In the past, Roma used to travel either 
with their whole families or as individual sojourners sending remittances 
home. If they no longer can earn enough money to provide for their 
families, labor migration is not an option any more.
Why Canada?
As mentioned earlier, Roma from the region have very few chances to 
improve their standards of living. The only ‘legal’ source of income meeting 
one’s most urgent needs is state-supplied social welfare. The other survival 
strategy is emigration. This was employed in 2010 by several Romani 
individuals and families who decided to leave for Canada. They were the so-
called ‘pioneers’ who later lent a hand to other newcomers from the region. 
In February 2012, more than 200 Horná Dolná Roma left for Canada and 
so far only very few of them have come back. 
Our informants saw Canada as a ‘promised land’:
“They [Canadians] make no differences between people... The 
only thing that counts is your own effort... Everybody has a 
chance to be successful (even without an education) if he or 
she makes enough effort... Canadians do not suspect or doubt 
anyone… Canada is a very safe country – they [our Roma] can 
go out with no fear.”
 (anecdotal evidence of feelings about Canada that emerged during the interviews)
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Selection of Canada as a destination country is based on a very 
rational consideration. Canada’s asylum system provides certain security to 
the newcomers, at least in the initial stages of their stay in the country. Even 
though their chances of actually being granted asylum are slender, being 
an asylum seeker provides a better starting point, particularly for those 
travelling with families, than regular labor migration with its uncertainty. 
Even if the asylum claim is rejected eventually, the asylum system secures 
satisfaction of basic needs and provides adequate living conditions to asylum 
seekers during the asylum review procedure. While waiting for the decision 
Roma can look for employment and secure their lives on their own.
Reasons for Migration
“There is no life here...” ( Ms. Júlia) 
This is a desperate but self-explanatory remark by one of our respondents. 
To be more specific: another respondent who served as our ‘informant’ 
during the research is a young, 25-year-old resident of Horná Dolná. After 
acquiring his undergraduate degree at a university he started attending 
various training sessions, seminars and workshops aiming to ‘empower’ 
young Roma. As a very active young man he helps other Roma with their 
everyday lives, communicates with the police, municipal offices, or the 
media. He is also one of the few to get a job in the region. Working manually 
in a nearby factory he has to wake up at 3.30 a.m. to get to work in Poprad 
(23 km from Horná Dolná). He earns less than 300 Euro per month. 
The socio-economic situation of Horná Dolná Roma is one of the 
major reasons for their migration. As mentioned above, unemployment in 
the region reaches almost 20% and is extremely high particularly among the 
Roma. The unwillingness of many employers to employ Roma complicates 
things even more. High competition in the labor market and widespread 
nepotism coupled with anti-Roma prejudice leaves them no way to improve 
their living situation. However, as our respondents stated, people want to 
live better lives. People who decide to migrate are often those with no other 
possibilities. 
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“Even if there are some job opportunities, they [entrepreneurs] 
employ only their relatives or other non–Roma.” (Ms. Alica)  
“It has been a strategy for a long time... people do not have jobs. 
I do not understand why all agricultural co-ops were closed 
and people fired. The same with other state-owned businesses. 
No one has a job now. (…) It would be better if people had 
jobs. I know I’m not well educated. On the other hand, you 
can´ t even get a cleaning job. They require courses for being 
a cleaner... and then you may earn 350 Euro a month. It is 
crazy.” (Ms  Júlia)
Housing is another area which the informants saw as troubling and 
causing many people to leave. Horná Dolná’s Roma population used to 
enjoy relatively high living standards acquired during socialism. With the 
transition after 1989 and its detrimental impact on the Roma population, 
living standards for Horná Dolná’s Roma gradually deteriorated even 
though they can at least live in the houses built during the socialist era. 
However, there is hardly a house in the Horná Dolná Romani community 
occupied by only a single nuclear family. Regular family houses were turned 
into multi-generational houses shared by members of extended families.
“People have trouble getting along but if there is nowhere to 
go, you have no other option but to learn to live together. Four 
families live in this one house, every family has one bedroom. 
Everybody cooks for their own family. We have no privacy. It 
is very hard to live in one room with children who are almost 
adults.” (Ms. Alica)
“Everybody wants their own house. That’s why everybody 
leaves.” (Ms. Júlia)
It is extremely difficult to build a new house or to buy/rent new 
apartments. For Roma, it is literally impossible to buy a plot outside the 
Roma colony or to buy/rent flats among the non-Roma. Inter-ethnic 
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tensions and anti-Roma prejudice in Horná Dolná confine the Roma in the 
segregated part of the village. 
Even if they have a plot of land in the colony they lack money to build 
a house. Many of them manage to at least start the construction but soon 
run out of money. In such cases, migration is a fall-back and a chance to 
earn more money to continue with the construction. When asked who the 
people migrating to Canada were, our respondents replied:
“Those were the people who for instance started building their 
own house. They built the basic walls and that was it, money 
was gone and they just couldn’t continue. Since they left, the 
situation improved a lot. They send money from Canada to 
their relatives and the house stands, is insulated and covered by 
a roof...” (Mr. Milan)
These are the so-called “winners from socialism” and their children 
who can still benefit from the social capital acquired during socialism. 
Their social networks, skills and social intelligence allow them to actively 
seek solutions to their situation and adopt active strategies of solving life 
difficulties such as unemployment or poverty. To be more specific, it is 
predominantly young Roma between the ages of 25 to 40 who leave in 
search of better life opportunities as they see no chances of advancing their 
socio-economic status in Horná Dolná. Our respondents described them as 
“young, ambitious and skilled”. 
“Our young children want to live a new life. They don’t want 
to live like us. They are more open-minded, want to have better 
education, better jobs and better conditions for living.” (Ms. 
Alica)
“My son has his new family. He finished university, had a baby 
and now he wants to live a proper life. And here there is no 
chance.”(Ms. Júlia)
The hopeless situation of many Roma can be described by the story of 
a young man who also left for Canada:
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“One of my friends also went to Canada. They [immigration 
clerks in Canada] could not believe he couldn’t get a job here 
in Slovakia. And then he showed them his undergraduate 
diploma from university and asked them how come he can’t 
get a job with this education. Then they realized he was 
right.”(Mr. Milan)
The study found striking evidence of guilt the Roma feel for leaving 
the country. On numerous occasions they tried to justify their migration 
by pointing out their reasons for migration as well as by stressing that they 
did everything that was required formally by the state or informally by the 
majority society:
“...First of all, he finished his studies and the he left.” (Ms. Júlia)
“...But the migration was OK… he went to the social assistance 
office to prove he had no obligations. And he de-registered from 
everywhere, the labor office, the Social Insurance Company.” 
(Ms. Alica)
Respondents also compared the majority’s perception of Romani 
migration with the non-Romani one by pointing out that (for instance) the 
media repeatedly blame them for doing something wrong. Thus they tried 
to justify migration by emphasizing every person’s right to go anywhere he 
or she wishes to. 
“If you behave and you want to find a job there, why is 
everyone so upset with this?(..) Not only Roma left. Many 
“whites” migrated as well even earlier and no one blames 
them.” (Ms. Júlia)
The sense of ‘presumption of guilt’ was eminently present throughout 
the entire interviews. Anything they do to improve their lives is suspicious 
to the majority. If they are unemployed and live only on social benefits 
they are blamed for exploiting the social welfare system. If they want to 
find a job nobody trusts their skills and working habits. If they migrate 
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they are suspicious for potentially exploiting the receiving country’s social 
welfare system. As a consequence, the Roma themselves internalize the 
stigma. They tend to underestimate themselves and accept the image of 
‘bad Gypsies’ from which they desperately wish to dissociate. Trying to 
convince the majority they are different on every occasion they explicitly 
emphasize they are “worthy” of living in this country. 
Interiorized stigma and lack of respect from the majority society is 
one of the reasons for leaving the country. Our respondents pointed out 
that relations with the majority have been deteriorating in recent years. As 
mentioned earlier, municipal offices do not respond to the problems and 
needs of the Romani community in Horná Dolná. The majority population 
keeps them ‘out’ of common social space. If they want to rent or buy a flat 
in a block of flats in non-Roma part of the village owners of the flats simply 
reject them. 
In the past, Romani children attended mixed schools together with 
non-Romani. Things have changed dramatically in recent years with 
numerous practices of segregation occurring in local schools. A school 
located close to the “Romani colony” is slowly becoming a school only for 
Romani children. Even if children attend mixed schools, Roma pupils are 
in separated classes. While having common meals in the school canteen 
Romani pupils have to sit at one separate table. Other Romani pupils wait 
in a line until others finish their meals and then take their places at the 
table. They also use separate cutlery and plates. The following story of a 
Romani mother describes the current situation:
“School established one class for Romani children in a church 
building. There was no blackboard or bathroom, the classroom 
wasn’t prepared for teaching. And the main problem was that 
we [parents] couldn’t escort our children into the class. We had 
to wait on the street (...) it was ordered by the priest. And I 
wanted to know what the classroom looked like, with whom 
my son would share the desk, and who the teacher is. So I 
decided not to send him there as long as they don’t let me in.” 
(Ms. Alica)
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Very low majority acceptance of Roma also affects communication 
with public officials. As our respondents pointed out, Roma usually do not 
get enough information about services provided by municipal offices or 
various social assistance offices. They have to make much bigger efforts to 
receive certain services and, most importantly, must learn to be assertive in 
order to get what they are entitled to. 
“I told her [the public official]... ‘you always help all non-Roma 
children and never provide us with any information’. You have 
to start yelling at them, otherwise you get nothing. They simply 
ignore you.”(Ms. Alica)
Inter-ethnic tensions are strengthened also by the increase in violent 
attacks by far right extremist groups in Slovakia (and media coverage of 
them). Roma fear these so much nowadays that they are constantly prepared 
to ‘defend’ their community. 
“Once we got the information that Kotleba´ s105 people plan to 
come to our village, Roma were so afraid. But then we realized 
there are 1,500 Roma adults to defend the community. We 
have to do it ourselves, nobody will help us. The Horná Dolná 
mayor wouldn’t do it.” (Mr. Milan)
In the course of the interviews, several other negative interactions with 
non-Roma from Horná Dolná were spontaneously mentioned. Children 
are not allowed to play at public playgrounds, non-Roma verbally abuse 
them calling them racist names in the streets. All of these manifestations 
of non-acceptance play a crucial role in creating negative ‘self confidence’ 
in the Roma. To be welcome and counted as a fully-fledged member of a 
‘common community’ is a very important factor of one’s well-being which 
is very difficult to maintain for Roma.
“On the one hand, they say you are free and equal. On the other 
hand you face all of these things... definitely it is also behind 
decisions of many Roma to leave the country.” (Mr. Milan) 
105 Marián Kotleba is the leader of an extreme right-wing political party The People’s Party – 
Our Slovakia.
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The rose-tinted picture of Canada as an accepting and fair country also 
confirms the lack of equality and genuine freedom in Slovakia as perceived 
by our respondents. State welfare and job opportunities in Canada are only 
part of the advantages.
“In Canada, no one makes any differences” (Ms. Júlia) 
Feelings of ‘being accepted as human beings’ play a crucial role in 
looking for a new life abroad. 
Arriving in Canada
Departure for Canada is a much more complicated process than leaving 
for the EU countries with their policy of free movement and open labor 
markets, such as the United Kingdom. Functional social networks therefore 
play a major role in organizing Horná Dolná’s Roma departure. Roma 
in Horná Dolná can be described as rather active in terms of searching 
for strategies of securing a livelihood. Long-term history of emigration 
to either the Czech Republic or the United Kingdom from the region 
suggests relatively good social capital enabling them to help themselves 
even in dire situations. It seems that the Roma community from Horná 
Dolná preserved the legacy of socialism to some extent – they are the Roma 
who somehow, inter alia, through internal and international migration, 
managed to avoid absolute poverty and maintain at least remnants of their 
social status gained during socialism. As a result, even today they relatively 
successfully employ various defense strategies, such as migration. Thanks to 
their social skills and functional social networks within and outside their 
immediate community they know what to do in order to leave for Canada. 
In 2012, around 200 Roma from Horná Dolná left for Canada following 
an example of a few other families from the region that had left for Canada 
in previous years. First emigrants from the region left in 2010-2011 and 
provided considerable assistance to those coming to Canada in 2012 in 
larger groups. The emigrants also help the newcomers with financial costs 
of the journey and let them stay in their houses in Toronto.
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Although it was not explicitly mentioned in the interviews, it appears 
that most travel arrangements are made by several individuals from the 
community who have social networks and skills allowing them to, for 
instance, book flight tickets – Roma from Horná Dolná know whom to 
contact when they want to leave in order to get flight tickets and secure 
transport to the airport in either Vienna or Warsaw. Transport is usually 
managed by local Roma entrepreneurs who, for business purposes, own 
vans taking up to nine people. The fee for transport is 350€ and family 
ties play an important role here, too – family members who stay in Horná 
Dolná chip in for the ones who leave in order to pay for the transport as 
well as for the flight ticket. It is also common that those already in Canada 
send money to those in Horná Dolná wishing to leave to let them pay for 
the flight tickets. 
“You know, those who were leaving knew they could get help 
from those who were in Canada. It wasn’t necessarily only 
family but others too, they sent some money... ” (Ms. Alica)
Mutual help is reinforced by the fact that emigration to Canada works 
by a snowball effect. The ones who left step-by-step help other family 
members come to Canada. Respondents explained this mutual help by 
solidarity and social or family cohesiveness, which enables Roma to leave 
the country. 
The transport thus takes them to either Vienna or Warsaw although 
Horná Dolná Roma prefer flying from Warsaw as, supposedly, Roma are 
not welcome to fly from Vienna. Our respondents could not explain why 
Vienna airport officials would not let them fly to Canada and ventured 
several possible interpretations.
“Vienna is against it [Roma leaving for Canada]. They don’t 
have to let you in the country, they can even block you at the 
airport. That’s why we don’t travel from Vienna anymore (...) 
It could be because of Hungarian Roma who travelled through 
Budapest or Vienna. And then there was a fuss from Canada. 
(...) Or the ones who were returned from Vienna simply didn’t 
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synchronize what they were saying. Instead of saying ‘ holiday’ 
in Vienna they said ‘emigrant’ and Vienna didn’t let them go.” 
(Mr. Milan)
Here they emphasized their good intentions again saying that they 
should be let into any country as long as they behave and are not trouble-
makers - as if trying to refute expected allegations. 
Separated family members stay in close touch via internet 
communicating almost every day with their loved ones through Skype, 
looking at pictures from Canada and learning about the way of life the 
emigrants live now.
“We talk through the computer, she shows us everything, what 
it looks like over there. We have a cousin there, her son, another 
cousin and other family members. So we talk about their lives 
over there. (...) They say the life is better there than here.” 
(Ms. Alica)
After arriving to Canada Horná Dolná Roma claim asylum and 
become regular asylum seekers living in an asylum centre. According to 
our informants there are two ways of staying in Canada – an asylum (azyl) 
and a refugee (refudží). The main difference is that being on azyl means 
being locked up in an asylum camp while being on refudží means staying 
with relatives or friends who vouch for the asylum seeker. 
“For instance if you had a family there you could move in with 
them if you didn’t want to be on azyl. They [the authorities] 
wrote down your name and everything and then you only go to 
check in once in a while to that azyl. You don’t have to be in 
the camp but can be like visiting a family and you just go report 
to azyl.” (Mr. Milan)
However, it seems that both azyl and refudží denote a  status of an 
asylum seeker. This confusion implies rather poor orientation within 
Canada‘s asylum system. Except for the residency (either in an asylum 
centre or in private accommodation) the respondents could not explain 
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the difference between these two statuses. It is plausible that terms 
azyl and refudží are derived from the vocabulary used in the respective 
environments. It is fair to assume that in asylum centers both personnel and 
residents speak about ‘waiting for asylum’ (azyl) and residents are referred 
to as asylum seekers. However, the general public may often use the term 
refugee for both asylum seekers and recognized refugees that have been 
granted asylum. ‘Refugee’ might be a term used widely outside the asylum 
centre among people which is why we think Horná Dolná Roma may use 
this term to denote the residency outside the asylum centre. Of course, 
this is an assumption that should be treated with caution as we did not get 
a chance to interview any respondents that actually had been in Canada. 
Either on azyl or on refudží they wait for the immigration clerks’ decision 
in their asylum procedure. As explained by our respondents it can take two 
days or it can take six months. What matters the most is how immigrants 
appear to the immigration clerks who scrutinize whether they behave, 
actively seek employment or whether they are trouble-makers whose only 
aim is to exploit Canada’s social system. Trouble-makers have no chance of 
staying as opposed to those who behave. 
“From what I heard, they take to you some kind of a court trial 
and they look at what you do. If you do good and only want 
a better life they let you stay. But if you make trouble they send 
you back.”(Ms. Alica )
“An immigration clerk decides based on your behavior whether 
you are a trouble-maker. People who make no trouble are 
allowed to stay. And of course, they can see your activity, if you 
look for a job, if you are trying hard enough.”(Mr. Milan)
Canadians are generally viewed as fair, judging only based on individual 
merits and making no differences between Roma and non-Roma. The main 
criterion is hard work and thus anyone who is willing to try hard enough 
can be successful in Canada. This is in stark contrast to Slovakia where 
Roma have no chance of living a dignified life even when they are educated. 
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The flats in which asylum seekers from Horná Dolná live in are 
located in blocks which they share with a number of people of various 
ethnic backgrounds. The area is described as very nice with a pool and a 
park in the centre, a camera system and a doorman. 
“They also go out, they are not scared. So far they had no 
problem with anybody.” (Ms. Alica)
The quotation implies one of the major reasons for leaving Slovakia – 
fear. In Slovakia they feel like second-class citizens pushed to the outskirts 
of society:
“Why do they treat us, Roma, like this? Like outcasts? We went 
to school with ‘whites’.”(Ms. Júlia)
In Canada they feel safe and respected. Anyone can get a job if one 
wants to; children go to school and get assistance from social workers who 
come to pick them up in their homes; they receive food aid and clothes 
from charity if needed. Health care is for free as long as one is properly 
registered; children born in the country acquire Canadian citizenship 
automatically after one year of life with their parents being entitled to 
apply too. It seems that this rose-tinted picture is too good to be true. 
And as one of the respondents acknowledged, much information is actually 
misinformation. He later implied that situation on the job front is not as 
ideal as it would seem – work is usually very hard and does not pay well. 
Nevertheless, migration to Canada is seen as a positive experience anyway. 
“I salute the young ones who left. Many thanks. Because they 
make the effort to leave. Here, there is nothing.” (Ms. Júlia)
Return as a Failure vs. Return as a Success
Returns from Canada are expected after achieving one’s goals – saving 
enough money to build or finish a house and have a decent life. The 
respondents based this assumption also on the examples of Bystrany and 
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Žehra where Roma working abroad, mainly in the UK, used their savings 
to solve their housing situation. A difficult housing situation is also one 
of the major reasons for migration as due to financial hardship families 
are forced to share houses. Interestingly, they do not expect to cross the 
Romani ‘colony’s’ borders even when buying a property as “they [the non-
Roma] wouldn’t sell us anything here [outside the colony]”. 
“Here, among the Gadje, it is impossible. Maybe in a block 
of flats through a real estate agency you could buy a place but 
hardly because you have to get neighbors’ consent whether the 
Roma can move in.” (Mr. Milan)
The distance between the Roma and non-Roma in Horná Dolná is so 
large that Roma do not expect to be accepted by the non-Roma population 
even if they acquire socio-economic status comparable with the majority. In 
terms of Roma and non-Roma relations Slovakia comes low in comparison 
with most countries including the Czech Republic. 
“I did live in the Czech Republic, too. But you wouldn’t see 
such racism and such problems as you do here. If I wanted a flat 
anywhere I could buy it or rent it.”(Ms. Alica)
Returns are also associated with the fact that they see migration as 
something they could be punished for. They fear that as a result of them 
leaving, the authorities, i.e. labor office and Social Insurance Company 
would not register them back and they would therefore lose entitlement to 
any state social support. Public officials at Social Benefits Offices and Labor 
Offices often treat their Roma clients with disrespect using their position of 
almost unlimited power (Grill, 2012) which deepens Roma distrust in the 
state apparatus. Once again they emphasize they did nothing wrong and 
followed all rules related to migration:
“But I think if he de-registered from the labor office and from 
everywhere they have to register him back when he returns, 
right? Not only Roma left but many Gadje, they even left before 
us.”(Ms. Alica)
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As if saying that nobody would dare to not register Gadje returnees, 
the informant strives to convince herself they must have the same right to be 
re-registered. The need for approval and confirmation that indeed they have 
done nothing wrong and have the right to leave if they want to is tangible 
throughout the whole interview. Migration for Roma is thus even more 
daring experience than it is for non-Roma. While non-Roma are praised 
for leaving and celebrated as courageous, Roma are automatically suspected 
of exploiting foreign social systems thus tarnishing Slovakia’s good name 
abroad. Adding this stigma to all the other hardships of migration, Roma 
risk even more.
Some people from outside Horná Dolná (from Levoča) returned 
already but this is regarded as early returning and a failure. One of the 
returnees was sent back from the airport in Vienna due to her “saying 
something wrong”. Another family was sent back from Canada because they 
were not willing to work hard and lead a decent life:
“One family returned but that’s because their father ‘worked’ 
only with his hands, you know what I mean? (…) They didn’t 
catch him stealing but he simply figured out that unless he 
works there he can’t make it. And he didn’t want to work so 
they returned.”(Mr. Milan)
Planned return is therefore seen as a part of the migration process. On 
the other hand, returning early without achieving one’s goals is judged an 
individual failure, showing unwillingness to work hard. 
Conclusion
In the present paper we have drawn a rough picture of migration of 
some Horná Dolná Roma to Canada. The decision to claim asylum in 
Canada has been shown to be a result of rational consideration as asylum 
provides a certain element of security in the initial phases of migration. 
Unlike regular migration to the EU countries, it allows whole families 
to travel together which is important in the Romani community. Several 
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main reasons for migration have been identified. On the one hand, poor 
chances of impoverished Roma to enter the labor market and advance 
their socio-economic standing lock them in the vicious circle of poverty 
and dependence. However, it is not only dependence on state welfare but 
also on the majority’s good will as poor Roma have virtually no power 
to advocate their needs and interests. Abysmal poverty and continuously 
growing inter-ethnic tension crush many Roma’s hopes for a better life for 
either themselves or their children. Migration to the western countries, 
perceived as advanced and tolerant, is seen as perhaps the only way to escape 
the ‘Gypsy ’ that the majority in Slovak society ascribes to them. Abroad, 
in countries used to cultural diversity, many Roma hope to pass unseen 
without being labeled as ‘Gypsies’. As is often the case, the Horná Dolná 
Roma also internalize the stigma ascribed to the Roma although they wish to 
dissociate themselves from ‘maladjusted Gypsies’ and repeatedly emphasize 
their good intentions and behavior. The interviews thus revealed relatively 
strict social division within both the Horná Dolná Roma community 
and larger population of Roma. The respondents strove to convey and 
maintain a positive self-image by emphasizing that Horná Dolná Roma are 
law-abiding (loyal) citizens as if assuming suspicion on our side. When it 
comes to migration the respondents needed reassurance their relatives did 
nothing wrong when they left the country as if trying to refute all expected 
allegations in advance. Presumption of guilt was eminently present in all 
our respondents’ narratives whether it related to their lives in Slovakia or 
their migration. It was also confirmed by their unwillingness to speak to 
anyone (researchers or journalists) who is interested in them migrating to 
Canada. Fear of accusations and of potential worsening of their image was 
among the main barriers in communication with the Horná Dolná Roma 
during the fieldwork. Migration and Canada as the receiving country is 
then often presented as an idealistic dream in which all problems are solved. 
However, it was sometimes implied that this rose-tinted picture is rather 
unrealistic and much information is in fact misinterpreted and embellished. 
It is plausible that deeper field research would have revealed a more accurate 
picture of Roma migration to Canada with its negative as well as positive 
aspects.
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Migration to Canada is a relatively new phenomenon among the 
Roma and there have been only few returnees so far who. Nonetheless, 
they are perceived by the rest of the community as failures. Although 
return is a part of the migration plan for most Horná Dolná Roma early 
returnees coming back home with no savings, some of them even indebted, 
are seen as unsuccessful. Interestingly, the blame is usually not ascribed to 
any external factors, such as competitive conditions in the Canadian labor 
market or refusal of Canadian authorities to accept Roma from Slovakia. 
Those returning early are perceived as failing to work hard enough to 
earn Canada’s acceptance. From these migrants our respondents strove to 
dissociate themselves. They looked down on them. Even though migration 
is presented as a means of upward mobility, Horná Dolná Roma do not 
expect to cross borders of their ‘colony’. Their socio-economic advancement 
will be confined within their local community as they do not anticipate 
change in the majority’s attitudes to them. Inter-ethnic relations are 
perceived as given even though the Roma are not content with them.
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B E I N G  A  H U N G A R I A N  I N  H U N G A R Y ” : 
T H E  ‘ N E W  WAV E ’  O F  R O M A  M I G R AT I O N
 Judit Durst
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“Step aside and wait for further investigation!” the black Immigration Officer 
instructed my Roma friends, a well-dressed married couple, as we exit the 
airplane terminal, having landed at Toronto International Airport. I could 
easily have slipped by, being ‘fortunate enough’ to have a white complexion 
- unlike my Roma companions with dark completions, but, instead, I stop 
and ask him what is the issue with my friends, why they were stopped. 
The black officer, once an immigrant himself, didn’t seem to show much 
sympathy towards these Roma travelers, and casts a bewildered eye on me: 
“Why are you interested? Do they belong to you?” After a lengthy explanation 
in which I tried to get him understand that we are together, that we came 
as tourists to visit our Gypsy friends from Hungary, and we would only 
stay for a fortnight (as can easily be checked on our return tickets), I also 
incidentally revealed that I am a sociologist. He then immediately felt 
inclined to bombard me with a plethora of questions: 
“If you are an expert, they must be your co-workers. So, tell me, 
why are so many [Gypsies] coming these weeks? Sometimes fifty 
[Roma] in one single plane. They all come from the same place, 
Miskolc, as your friends are from (he could tell by looking at 
the passport data). Why are they coming in crowds? I’m telling 
204
J U D I T  D U R S T
you, because they want to exploit this country’s generous welfare 
system. You’re telling me this is not the case? Then what? They 
came to work? We [Canadian citizens] don’t have work, 
either! What do they want? They should go home and sort their 
problems out at home.” 
This account is from a May 2012 trip to Canada in which I went to 
Toronto to do some brief, pilot fieldwork on the Hungarian Roma community 
that had migrated to this Canadian metropolis in recent years. This fieldwork 
on migration was a natural continuation of my previous ethnographic work 
on poverty in Borsod, one of the most economically backward regions of 
Hungary, where one third of the Roma population in Hungary live (Kemény 
and Janky, 2004). In the last two to three years, ‘Canada’ had been one of 
the main topics of local public discourse among the poor and not-so-poor 
Roma, as well as among the poor, not too highly educated, unemployed non-
Roma106 - and not only in my (previous research subject) village of Lapos,107 
where ninety-five percent of the local population was Gypsy, but everywhere 
else in the region, especially in Miskolc, the capital of Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén 
county.  ‘Canada’ was synonymous with the ‘Land of Opportunity’, a ‘Good 
Business’ that was worth investing in; it is a ‘Garden of Eden’, where there 
is no starvation, indeed, you can eat as much as you want. Canada was the 
chance to escape from the harsh reality of one’s daily life of destitution. 
106 Academic literature on Hungary’s largest minority group interchangeably uses the 
designating term: Gypsy or Roma. Although I’m fully aware that the term Gypsy might 
sound derogatory to ‘politically correct’ readers, the people I encounter during my fieldwork 
most often refer to themselves as Gypsy in everyday conversation. Every morning, when 
we woke up, my host family’s little child greeted us jokingly: “Good morning, Gypsies!” 
Therefore, in this text, I alternately use the term Roma/Gypsy, always keeping their own 
denotations when citing them. The Gypsies use the term ‘Hungarian’ to refer to non-Gypsy. 
In a comparative perspective, it is striking that, in Hungary in recent years, one of the most 
important distinction-making characteristics used to assert one’s social status is one’s ethnic 
belonging. (cf. Feischmidt, 2011). On the level of public discourse, the society seems to 
be split into two (not interchangeable) categories: the Roma and the non-Roma, or Gypsy 
and non-Gypsy, population. This might be the case in other Eastern European countries 
(such as Slovakia), but not in more multi-ethnic societies like Romania (Pulay, informal 
communication). 
107 All over the text, I use fictitious names - both for places and for people - in order to retain 
my informants’ anonymity.  
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At that time, it seemed to me that almost all the Gypsies I talked to 
wanted to try to move to this transatlantic, multi-ethnic country, famous 
for its welcoming, friendly, anti-racist, all-encompassing society, with a 
generous welfare system. The only ones who hesitated were those who 
had too much to leave behind: an asset like a valuable (self-owned) home, 
secure prospects for their personal business initiatives, and/or a good local 
schooling situation for their children – basically, those who held a well-
respected status in their local communities. As one of my friends in this 
circle put it: 
As you have witnessed, we have also been hesitating for a long 
time whether to go [to Canada] or not. Once, we even got 
two [plane] tickets [to Toronto], we had relatives there who’d 
have put us up in the initial period. However, we decided not 
to go. If I tell the truth, I didn’t go because I didn’t want to 
be a refugee. After being ‘somebody’ at home, I didn’t want 
to put my children in a situation where they would see their 
father as a refugee.” 
This statement leads straight to the main inquiry of my pilot study, 
both in Toronto and then, later on, amongst the return migrants in Borsod 
County, Hungary. Namely, what factors have triggered Roma migration to 
Canada in the past few years (since 2008), once the visa requirement was 
lifted? Can it be considered a ‘new wave of migration’ as far as the pattern 
and volume are concerned? Why is the destination country Canada, rather 
than any other European country? What facilitated the mass migration trend 
amongst these poor people with seemingly limited resources, who appear – 
not only superficially, but also according to the research literature – to be 
one of the groups with the least capacity to practically choose migration as 
a livelihood strategy, as many do not even possess enough material goods to 
even invest in the first step of the move: buying their air tickets.
From my ethnographic experiences, I assumed that this latest 
transatlantic movement to Canada could be labeled as a ‘new wave’ or new 
pattern of migration (Cf. Vidra and Virág, 2012): being ‘new’ not only due 
to its sheer volume, but also in terms of its characteristics. The previous 
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wave of migration, between 1998-2001, was described by researchers as ‘not 
considerable’ in its numbers and simply as a strategy of some more affluent 
Roma groups, who were either Vlah Gypsies from the capital (Budapest) with 
considerable entrepreneurial skill or highly qualified musicians, or young 
intellectuals (Kováts, 2002) – that is, people with greater migration potential. 
However, the ‘new wave’ seemed to consist of a mass movement of a variety 
of groups defined as having low migration potential: poor, low-educated, 
lower class Roma, as well as non-Roma. The (many) non-Roma refugees I 
personally met, or heard of, in Toronto, that claimed to be Roma for the sake 
of receiving refugee status, raised a second question for me:  Does this new 
wave of migration have a ethno-cultural feature or it is better understood as 
an economic strategy of the poor, independent of their ethnicity? 
This leads to yet another important question: Once started, what 
perpetuates the migration process in the case of the Hungarian Roma 
moving to Canada? Although it is obvious from the research literature 
that the migration network and the so-called ‘migration industry’ are the 
facilitators that sustain the process (Massey at al., 1993; da Haas, 2010; 
Vidra, 2012), in reality, how do these networks and industries operate in 
the case of the Hungarian Roma migrants? 
Although ‘network’ has been one of the key words in the research 
literature on migration, the network theory approach does not explain why 
everyone does not take advantage of the opportunity to move (Black at al., 
2006). That is, why do some people move whilst others belonging to the 
same network do not move? What are the motivations behind not moving 
for those who do not choose migration as a ‘viable livelihood strategy’ 
(Van Hear-Nyberg-Sorensen, 2003)? 
And last, but not least, if migration is a self-perpetuating social 
process, as the research literature suggests, why does it, on some occasions, 
simply cease – for example, as recently happened in this particular case of 
Hungarian Roma migration to Canada? 
In order to answer these questions and to be able to understand 
the whole process of migration in regards to some Roma groups from 
Hungary to Canada, I not only carried out short-term, pilot fieldwork in 
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Toronto but also conducted a survey amongst both those in Toronto and 
those who have already returned home to Hungary.108 
“We are all economic refugees”: Comparing previous waves with the 
‘new’ wave of Roma migration to Canada109
A previous migrant’s account
Economic theories of migration (micro or macro, neoclassical, or the new 
economics approach) are the most developed to explain the social process of 
migration. Their common central assumption is that international migration 
is about redistribution of labor.  Consequently, migrants are largely equated 
with workers and economic theories are used to explain everything in terms 
of labor migration, namely, as the international movement of economically-
active individuals (Massey at al., 1993).
108 All in all, my Roma co-worker and I spent six weeks in Toronto, living in one of ‘the 
buildings’ in the metropolis where many Hungarian Roma families live. We gained access 
to this observance point through acquaintances of ours, a Roma family with children who 
moved there 10 months ago, arriving from a middle sized settlement in Borsod County. I, 
myself, spent only two weeks there. However, my co-worker returned later, for an additional 
month, to carry on with the fieldwork. Although I was unable to be present, I looked upon 
this second round as a methodological experiment for me. Apart from providing me with 
a write up of his research (fieldwork) diary, we Skyped each other regularly and discussed 
observed events. As a result, the insight gained from his work has organically joined my 
own and I will not only base my arguments on my own observations and experiences 
there in Toronto, but also on his accounts, which can additionally be understood as 
‘through a Roma’s lenses’. I also carried out a migration history survey amongst both those 
migrants who were living in Toronto and those who had already returned home. On top 
of their migration histories and (future) migration potential, the questionnaire asked the 
migrants about their social, economic, and demographic characteristics. We interviewed 
130 migrants in Toronto. The sample size of the Borsod survey is around 800. The return 
migrants’ sample was collected using a snowball method and the respondents are mainly 
from Miskolc and the surrounding settlements. Although this return migration research 
and its associated data analysis is not yet completed, I will use some of its preliminary 
findings here to support some of my arguments.
109 These two categories serve only to distinguish the timely dimension of a person’s migration 
process. I call ‘previous’ (or ‘early’) migrants those who left Hungary for Canada before 
December 2001, when Canada introduced visa requirement towards Hungarian citizens. 
Respectively, I call ‘new migrants’ those who immigrated to Canada from 2008 onwards 
to the present, in the so-called ‘new wave’ of mass migration of the poor, after the visa 
requirements were lifted. 
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At first sight, this explanation seems to be more valid in the case 
of the ‘previous’ or ‘early’ rather than the ‘new’ migration wave of the 
Hungarian Roma – for those who went to Canada in between 1998-2001. 
According to our interviews with some earlier migrants from Borsod, 
these were people of younger age, economically active, with around eleven 
years of schooling; skilled workers, mainly having vocational training in 
the construction industry, who found it difficult to earn enough money in 
Hungary to support their families. The main purpose of their migration 
was to find a better paying job outside Hungary. Most of them moved to 
Canada on their own: to reduce the risk of migration, many employed the 
help of their transnational migrants network (i.e. a brother, other relatives, 
or friends living in Canada already) (Hajnal, 2002). They would reunite 
with their families in Canada only after some months or sometimes even a 
year after having settled and having become established on the Canadian 
labor market. For example, here is Jani’s story: Jani can be considered a 
typical ‘previous’ Roma migrant from Avas, one of Miskolc’s residential 
areas mostly populated by Roma and also the place from where many Roma 
(and non-Roma) migrated. 
Jani moved to Hamilton, a small settlement not far from Toronto in 
the spring of 2001. He went on his own, leaving a wife and two small 
children at home in Miskolc, to follow his brother who had already begun 
working there. He bought his air ticket from his savings. 
“It was different in those days. In those days, only the normal 
ones went; not like now when one and all are going, even 
those illiterate, know-nothing Gypsies. At that time, there was 
no scrap metal collecting. Nobody thought of collecting scrap 
iron.110 In those days we went there to work. And, if you worked 
there, you had everything. You just took up the same rhythm of 
life as they [the Canadians] lived. But if you don’t work, it’s a 
different story. Then you need to do something, something like 
110 In recent years, almost all ‘new migrant’ Roma go regularly to collect scrap metal from the 
streets of Toronto. His is their additional income earning activity, complementing their 
main income source, the state welfare. 
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collecting scrap metal. But with this view of life you won’t fit 
in anywhere. You don’t work, you live on welfare, and you cost 
money to the state. Meanwhile if I work, I pay tax, I live a 
normal life, and the State earns money through me, by letting 
me lead a normal life, letting me work. It is good for the state 
and good for me, too.” 
Jani’s opinion of the ‘new’ migrants’ economic practices in Canada 
can be read as a highly judgmental critique of his fellow Roma. Firstly, 
he uses the same generalizations (the social practice of judging this 
‘newcomer’ group by ‘lumping them together’; a practice which is often 
the critique of Hungarians’ (non-Roma) behavior towards the Roma – 
treating them as one selfsame homogenous group. Secondly, he assumes 
that the ‘newcomers’ didn’t “come here to work.” As I will demonstrate 
it later, this is not the case and the ‘new’ migrants’ move to Canada can 
clearly be analyzed as labor migration – if we understand the meaning 
of work (or labor) in a broader sense, as the Roma themselves do. Jani’s 
(unconscious) drive to negatively judge the ‘newcomer’ migrant Roma can 
be better understood from the below citation. It may also be analyzed 
using Elias’ analytical framework ‘the Established and the Outsiders’ 
figuration (Elias, 1994) – we only need to replace the word ‘established’ 
with ‘previous migrant’ and the ‘outsiders’ with ‘newcomer’ migrants. As 
Elias put it, “an established group tends to attribute to its outsider group 
as a whole the ‘bad’ characteristics of that group’s ‘worst’ section. (…) 
In contrast, the self-image of the established group tends to be modeled 
on its exemplary, most norm-setting section, on the minority of its ‘best’ 
members” (ibid, p. 5). 
Jani’s statements clearly show his fear:  the newcomers are threatening 
his ‘established’ position as a Roma migrant. Due to their ‘bad behavior’, 
they are leveling down, discrediting, and ruining the reputation of the 
whole Roma migrant community. 
Let’s return to Jani’s own account: After seven months of living on 
welfare and working under the grid, Jani managed to find a ‘proper’, that 
is, formal, or reported job in the construction industry.
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“These new Roma (migrants) have spoiled it all. Nowadays, 
the Canadians do not even wish to speak to Hungarians…
however, Hungarians were welcome in Canada in those days. 
We had a good reputation (as hard workers); they knew that 
you could work even twenty hours a day if it’s needed, you don’t 
shout back as the Canadian, the Indian, or the Sri Lankans 
do. In the beginning, I worked in a salad factory. Boring, you 
don’t need to know anything; you’re just cutting peppers and 
all kinds of vegetables. But considering that you don’t speak the 
language, don’t know the city; it was an okay job that enables 
you to survive. ‘Cos you can’t really make a living off of welfare. 
Then I moved to Toronto and worked for a cleaning company. 
It was an unreported job, too, and nobody spoke any English. 
Here, I was taught the language by a (Hungarian-speaking) 
Czech entrepreneur whom I worked for. Once you have learnt 
the language, you can speak and the world begins opening up to 
you. Whilst I earned $8.00 or $9.00 in the cleaning company, 
just like I got at the construction industry, all of the sudden I 
started to earn $18.00 per hour. And it was a legal, reported 
job with a proper insurance number, and so on. I quit getting 
welfare. Since then, I’ve had a good life. My children went to 
school, I worked with nice people and I wasn’t exploited or 
deceived anymore.”
Jani considers himself an economic refugee.
“You can claim refugee status if your life is in danger…We 
who leave (Hungary) are economic refugees. ‘Cos we flee from 
poverty. Sure there is racism in it for, as many of us said, you 
don’t get a job (in Hungary) because your skin color is black. 
There is racism, for sure. But whether one’s life is in danger, I 
can’t tell that…If somebody comes to Canada from Somalia, 
that is okay. I had a Somalian mate; he couldn’t leave his 
village for three days, for if he would have left his home, he 
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would have been shot dead. He is a refugee. But I, whose life 
is not in danger, am only an economic refugee, who only flees 
from poverty. On the other hand, you need the refugee status 
since it gives you the right to stay in the country, to get health 
care, etc. Otherwise, you would be an illegal migrant and they 
would throw you out immediately.”
Although the Immigration Board rejected Jani’s refugee claim 
(he reflects that he knows he ‘made a mistake’) after almost three years 
of having stayed in Canada,111 to date, he continues to migrate. He has 
worked in the UK in a bread shop, in Ireland on a farm, and just recently 
in the Netherlands for three years in the construction industry. Prior to the 
interview, he had just returned home with his family to Miskolc to discover 
that there are no jobs for Roma people throughout the entire region. 
Therefore, he is planning his next move – this time to Belgium, where 
not only does he have a relative but also knows from experience that it’s 
easy to find regular menial labor. Jani is one of many Roma from Miskolc 
who can be classified according to academic literature as a ‘chain migrant’. 
However, they can also be described as ‘forced migrants’ who migrate out 
of a ‘necessity for livelihood’ as many of have emphasized, just like Jani.
“I wouldn’t go anywhere if they would give me a job paying 
300,000 (Hungarian forints, equivalent to CAN $ 1,200) a 
month. Why would I go? Then I could have a normal life, 
my kids would go to school, we’d have our friends around, I 
could regularly see my parents if I want. This (migration) is 
a livelihood necessity. That’s why I said we are all economic 
refugees.” 
111 When asked, Jani admitted that he didn’t turn up at his hearing: “At that time, I was 
thinking with a child’s mind. I didn’t take the whole legal procedure seriously. I was young.” 
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The ‘new migrants’ stories
As I stated above, the migration process experienced by those Roma who left 
Hungary in the previous wave between 1998-2001, like Jani, seem at first 
sight to be more grounded in an understanding of the framework of labor 
migration than the new wave. However, contrary to all appearances, we will 
soon see that the ‘new wave’ of refugee migration can also be interpreted as 
partly labor migration – if we consider ‘labor’ or ‘work’ in terms of how the 
Roma migrant themselves consider it to be. 
What is misleading in regards to the new wave of movement is that, 
on the surface, it seems as if this particular group’s (namely, the Hungarian 
unemployed Roma [and non-Roma] lower class people) international 
migration would be fed by the differences not in the level of wages 
between the sending and the receiving countries but by the disparity 
between the two countries’ social welfare systems. Applying the logic of 
the economic model of labor migration, we should refer to this pattern as 
‘welfare migration’. However, choosing this alternative, but, nevertheless, 
economic explanation of the current (but temporarily coming to an end) 
migration process of the Roma and non-Roma people from Hungary to 
Canada, would be over simplistic and concealing. Instead, we will try here 
to demonstrate that this transnational movement should rather be seen as 
a multiplex, multi-layered social process. Admittedly, my research is still 
rudimentary in its development; however the foundations of this argument 
are able to be made. According to this process, not only economic factors 
(making a better living) but also the political climate (a rise in hate crimes 
and anti-Gypsy campaigns waged by the vigilant far right movement and 
the Hungarian Guard), social factors (ethnic discrimination, among others, 
specifically, on the labor market) and psychological motivations (e.g. post-
traumatic stress) all play a part in triggering the transatlantic movement 
of those Roma who profess they wanted to get away from the socially and 
economically destitute situation in their home country. 
The desire of both Roma and non-Roma from the Central Eastern 
European region to migrate has been significantly growing in recent years 
and is well demonstrated by survey results on the subject of the Hungarian 
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residential population’s migration potential. Recent surveys show the 
“highest ever migration potential” measured in the country in recent 
decades (Sik, 2012). From 2004 to 2011, Hungary’s migration potential 
doubled, not only in the Hungarian national sample, but also in the Roma 
subsample, too. A survey that came out in 2011 shows that 17% of the 
country’s population had planned to migrate at the time of the interview. 
Within the Roma subsample, this proportion was even higher: every fifth 
Roma respondent (20%) planned to move (Bernath, 2012, personnel 
communication). Although this number is still lower than it is in other 
European countries, it is a trend that is significantly on the rise. 
The survey also indicated that among those who plan to migrate, 
students and the unemployed are overrepresented. As far as the target 
countries are concerned, Hungarians’ top target destinations are Germany, 
Austria, and the UK, in respective order (Bernáth, 2012). However, the 
preliminary results of our own survey, conducted during the summer and 
autumn of 2012, indicates that the pattern is different for the Roma: the 
vast majority of the respondents said Canada was their target country and 
when asked about their next possible migration plan, many of them named 
the UK and some Germany.  
Almost all researchers state how difficult it is to get reliable statistical 
data on migrants who leave the country. We only know their numbers 
from the receiving country’s immigration statistics.112 However, data from 
the Canadian Council for Refugees seems to support our ethnographic 
findings. According to its statistics, there was a vast increase in the number 
of Hungarian refugee claimants arriving in Canada in the past few years. 
While there were only ten Hungarian citizens who claimed refugee 
status in Canada in 1994, this number has steadily increased after 1998 
(982 people claimed asylum that year). In 1999, 1,579 people arrived in 
Canada as refugees. By 2000, this total was 1,936 (Kovats, 2002).  After a 
temporary break, due to Canada’s introduction of visa requirements for the 
112 Another problem is that there is no official data on the number of ‘unreported’ or ‘irregular’ 
migrants, those who moved in search of informal or unreported job or to work in the 
informal economy (Portes, 2010), unless they claimed refugee status.
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Hungarian citizens, the Hungarian Refugee Claimants’ numbers started to 
grow rapidly again from 2008 onwards. In 2011, a total of 4,423 ‘Roma’ 
left Hungary to claim refugee status in Canada: this is almost double the 
statistics (2,300) from 2010. 
There is a long-standing debate amongst researchers about the 
characteristics or patterns of Roma migration to Canada, whether these 
can be regarded as labor migration or asylum seeking (cited by Vidra, 
2012). According to the official status of these migrants, it is technically 
refugee migration (cf. Kovats, 2002). Of the 800 migrants (from Hungary 
to Canada) that we interviewed to date, there was not a single respondent 
who had not migrated there as a refugee or, further, who did not claim to 
be a refugee. 
The question to naturally arise from this line of inquiry is: Why 
does (almost) every Roma (and some non-Roma!) people want to make 
their move as a refugee? And why have these people chosen Canada as 
their migration destination? Our survey provides some insight into these 
questions; however, we have to treat our (preliminary) findings carefully, 
as they are not a representative sample of the whole Hungarian Roma 
population that has migrated to Canada.  
First of all, migration to Canada has definitely been facilitated by 
a ‘transnational migration network’ already in existence (Hajnal, 2002). 
According to our survey, almost all of the respondents said that they had 
family, friends, or acquaintances in Canada who helped them through the 
first critical period following their arrival and who also assisted them in 
finding (informal) work.   
Secondly, over half of our sample additionally stated that the 
receiving country’s social and economic structure (cf. Massey, 1987) and 
its immigration policy made their migration possible. A common and 
formulaic answer to the question “why did you choose Canada to migrate 
to?” was the following: “Because Canada gave us refugee status” or “I 
wouldn’t have had the talent to go to another country and support my 
family there: to feed them and shelter them until I find job there. Canada 
backed the Roma, supporting them with food and accommodation.”
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Our survey also provides us with some idea about the pattern of this 
‘new wave of migration,’ in terms of mapping the social and demographic 
characteristics of this migrant group from Borsod County.
According to both our (preliminary) results and interviews conducted 
with both those who remain in Toronto and those who have already 
returned home (to Borsod County), it seems that there is indeed a new 
pattern to the Roma migration to Canada that has occurred in the last 
two to three years. Whereas only the more affluent and some lower-middle 
class Roma managed to migrate before 2008, in the last two to three years, 
the uneducated, lower-class are now also choosing migration as a viable 
livelihood strategy in an attempt to escape the hopeless economic and social 
situation they face in their home country. This new wave has additionally 
been further assisted by previous waves. As one of our respondents put it: 
“the middle-class families helped their poor relatives to move to Canada.” 
However, not everybody who migrated had ‘well-to-do’ relatives. 
Those unlucky ones who didn’t acquire this social capital, but still 
desperately wanted to escape the destitute economic situation at home 
(long-term unemployment, accumulated debts including unpaid utility 
bills, etc.), had two choices. Many of them sold all their assets (if they had 
any): cars, furniture, even their flats. Some accepted the “help” of informal 
moneylenders (one of the agents in the ‘migration industry’ that makes it 
possible even for the poorest to migrate). We will soon see (in the case study 
below) how the whole migration process plays out for the two groups. 
Amongst the sample of 130 ‘new migrants’ (those who migrated in 
the last two to three years) we surveyed in Toronto, the educational level 
is notably low. Almost 60% (mostly those from Miskolc) had one to three 
years of vocational training. The other 40% (mostly Roma from rural 
areas) had only finished primary school (eight years of primary school). 
Their low educational status (and a lack of command of the English 
language) makes it difficult to get jobs, even unreported ones. One Roma 
man aptly explained their labor market situation in Canada by saying that, 
“we are uneducated, therefore, we can’t take up any job but dosser work” (in 
Hungarian, ‘csicska munka’). 
216
J U D I T  D U R S T
Although, for a layperson, it may seem counterintuitive that Roma 
migrants might complain about their inability to speak English, which 
hinders them from finding a decent job in Canada, there is one obvious 
explanation for why they do not manage to gain command of the language. 
Even at first glance, the preliminary findings of our surveys on current and 
the already-returned migrants were, in fact, surprising to me: out of the 
130 respondents in Toronto and 800 returned migrants in Borsod, only ten 
(!) attended the free English language classes whilst in Toronto. As well as 
a being a service provided to refugees, it is a precondition for immigrants 
receiving state benefits to attend the compulsory English language classes 
(three times a week, for three hours in the morning, free of charge). As 
those surveyed put it, with a bit of “cleverness,” one could find a way to 
escape from this “unnecessary” duty.113 When I asked the respondents why 
they didn’t want to study English for free, almost all of them reasoned 
equivocally: they did not have time for this. The men were busy with 
collecting scrap metals and garbage, meanwhile the women needed time to 
cook and to do other household chores. 
One way of interpreting the migrants’ aversion to attending the allegedly 
compulsory language classes is that it is part of their overall economic and 
social practice: they came here to work, not to go to school. Schooling 
would only take time away from their work, from garbage rummaging, 
scrap metal collecting, and/or from other casual, informal types of work. 
So, the background behind many in this group’s poor English language 
skills itself can also support our thesis, namely, that Roma migration to 
Canada may be interpreted as labor migration (Vidra, 2012).  
At the same time, there is another easily distinguishable, highly 
educated group of Hungarian Roma people in Toronto, whom one 
can meet at the Roma Community Centre, a highly active volunteer 
organization dedicated to supporting and celebrating Romani culture 
113 A well-established Hungarian Roma migrant, for instance, might make an agreement with 
a Canadian English teacher to issue a fake attendance certificate for the fee of, say, CAD 
200. No wonder some Roma migrants have come to the conclusion that “one can arrange 
everything with a bit of cleverness.” As many also said, “even in Canada, people can be 
corrupted.”  
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as well as defending the rights of Roma refugees in Canada. While this 
group’s members are highly educated, and well meaning, it does not seem 
to have much interaction with the uneducated Roma from Borsod.
What is common to all the Hungarian Roma migrant groups in 
Canada, independent of their various social statuses and educational levels, 
is that – when it comes to the Canadian political discourse – they are all 
lumped together as ‘bogus refugees’. This loaded title is used freely, despite 
the fact that most Hungarian Roma refugees, educated or uneducated, have 
fled from ethnic discrimination in their home country, experienced on the 
labor market, in the schools, and in the health care system.
Although almost all Hungarian Roma migrants consider themselves 
‘real refugees’ on the basis of their everyday discrimination and stigmatization 
in their home country, it is worth investigating on what basis a refugee 
claim may be considered ‘justified’ according to the law. 
The rough definition of a ‘Convention refugee’ is a “person in need of 
protection.” This protection can be necessary for many reasons, including 
protection against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment (Article 1 of Immigration and Refugee Protection Act).114
All the way up to December 2011, when the new immigration law was 
introduced, refugee claimants (in our case, the Hungarian Roma person or 
family) had approximately one year from arrival to prove that he or she is a 
Convention Refugee and/or that their sending country poses a “risk to life 
or a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment and/or a danger of 
torture, all within the meaning of sections 96 and 97(1) of the Immigration 
and Refugee Protection Act” (IRPA). 
If we take this text literally, we might conclude that many Roma 
migrants in Canada cannot be regarded as ‘conventional refugees’. However, 
if we listen to the stories told by those Roma who are able to articulate their 
feelings about what it means to be a Gypsy in present day Hungary, we 
114 As presented in the official letter from the authorities addressed to my host family in 
Toronto. During my stay, they were summoned to appear at a scheduling conference to fix 
a date for their refugee claim hearing. This is the kind of letter that all Roma migrants dread 
getting. For, in most cases, it means that - in a maximum of three to six months - the family 
will be sent back home. 
218
J U D I T  D U R S T
might stop for a minute to consider what the terminology defined in the 
article above ought to cover. 
Some refugees decided to flee from Hungary for political reasons. 
Some migrated to escape the ill natured, anti-gypsy social milieu which 
has caused some of their children to suffer from psychological troubles, 
including post-traumatic stress disorder related to past anti-Gypsy attacks 
against them. One woman had this story to tell:
“A Canadian can’t grasp it, that’s fine, there might not be a 
life threatening situation, however, there are sometimes, but 
there are generations who have to grow up with the recognition 
that you are second rate, inferior, you don’t count as a human 
being...For goodness sake, I bleached my skin, almost my entire 
life, to whiten it. I always bleached my hair and never dared to 
wear as colorful a flower-patterned blazer as I’m wearing now. 
For, I thought it “ looks Gypsy” (in Hungarian:“cigányos”). 
Now, here in Toronto, I started to grow my hair long, even 
putting in black hair extensions and wearing what I want to 
wear. For the first time ever in my life I feel free. I don’t know 
what’s gonna happen to us, I fear. I do not want to go home. If 
I need to, I’ d rather get married [in Canada]”. 
Even those less-educated Roma migrants who couldn’t articulate 
their experiences as ‘Gypsies’ quite as eloquently as the above-cited degree-
holding Roma woman have expressed similar reasons for emigrating. When 
asked about their ‘story’ (the reasons why they fled from Hungary which 
they must present at their refugee claim hearing), all our informants and 
survey respondents stated the same factors: poverty, unemployment, and 
racism (or, as many described it, a “hatred” for the Roma). They almost 
all had a personal account of various everyday humiliations faced based 
on their ‘visible’ Roma characteristics or origins (i.e. their dark skin color). 
Many reported racial discrimination on the part of a potential employer. 
The most prevalent story was the accounts of being turned down for a job 
because they were Roma; the job would go to a Hungarian: 
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“They told me on the phone that I could go for the job interview 
in an hour. By the time I arrived, they just had a glance at me 
and said the job is filled. It was enough for them to see my dark 
skin.” 
Another frequent account is of bullying or abuse of Roma children 
at school or in kindergarten on the basis of their ethnicity. More than one 
woman told me a story akin to the following: 
“I had an incident with my little son [which demonstrates this 
abuse]: many years ago, the nursery teacher scrubbed his little 
elbows and his knees, until they were almost bleeding, because 
she thought they were dirty.” Another experience Roma parents 
commonly recall is that their children were excluded in the 
nursery by the Hungarian kids who do not want to play with 
the ‘black’ ones. 
Also, in almost all accounts, refugees mention some threatening 
incidents in which they had an encounter with a far-right vigilante group 
called the Hungarian Guard (Magyar Gárda), a paramilitary organization 
in Hungary, which is very active in Borsod County, especially in Miskolc, 
where the majority of the Roma migrants come from.115 Many recalled 
frightening memories of the period when the serial murders against Roma 
families took place (2008-2009). Those who came from rural Gypsy colonies, 
usually located on the outskirts of the settlement, reported ‘post-traumatic 
stress disorder’ in their children, conditions, for instance, induced merely 
by hearing a motorcycle approaching the Gypsy colony after twilight.116 
115 The Hungarian Guard (Magyar Garda) is a semi-illegal paramilitary organization with 
clear ties to of the third biggest Hungarian political party, the far-right Jobbik Party. The 
Guard has several thousand self-appointed members who undertake, from time to time, law 
enforcement in their community (or other people’s communities) without legal authority. 
Their reasoning is that if the legal authorities can’t handle the “Gypsy problem” (sometimes 
they formulate it as the “Gypsy crime”), then they will sort it out for the sake of the 
(Hungarian) community members.
116 A common attack method, usually committed by young men on motorcycles, is to firebomb 
Roma families’ homes on the outskirts of the Gypsy colonies. 
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The Roma migrants’ conviction that “nothing good can be expected 
by going home” was reinforced, for example, after they heard about the 
latest anti-Gypsy demonstration led by the Guard in Miskolc.117 Their 
transnational migration network, which has been functioning brilliantly 
and effectively thanks to newly available Internet tools, allows them access 
to updated information about what is happening at home with families, 
friends, and neighbors.118 The Roma migrants hear from relatives at home 
about the not-so-public slogans of the Guard in Miskolc, private (but 
public) statements like: “All Gypsies should be turned into soap” or “One 
should make Gypsy stew119 out of them” (instead of letting them come 
home from Canada and resettle).
However, this transatlantic migration seems to be a temporary social 
process. Our preliminary results show that the average duration of a stay 
in Canada for our respondents was fourteen months. Most of the Roma 
families were forced to come home after their refugee claims were rejected. 
Many decided to return to Hungary of their own free will after their 
friends or families were refused residency. Some came home even before 
their hearing process would have taken place due to homesickness, a serious 
illness, an urgent need to care for elderly parents, or just because they “had 
enough.” 
However, the majority of them were forced to return home once the 
Immigration and Refugee Board rejected their claims for refugee status. 
117 On 17th October, 2012.
118 My host Roma family told me many times while I was with them in Toronto that they 
couldn’t have moved so far from their home and families if they could not have managed to 
communicate with them every day via the internet. Whilst I was there, they started every 
single morning to switch on the computer, which every family in Toronto possesses. After 
greeting their families at home in Hungary, they exchanged the latest news about everyday 
life in Toronto and back at home. Occasionally, they even asked grandparents to look after 
their small children via the Skype camera while they popped out for a quick shopping trip. 
The very next day after I had left Toronto, and went to carry on the research in a Gypsy 
settlement near Miskolc, almost everybody there knew from their relatives in Toronto that I 
was “okay,” and that I would not cause any trouble to them if they spoke to me about their 
migration experiences.
119 A play on words using the name of a (delicious) Hungarian dish of fried pork cutlets. The 
recipe has nothing to do with Gypsies, in fact.
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The recent change in the Canadian Immigration Policy is a good example 
of the theory that migration is as much about state policies as it is about 
the mobility of people (Black et al., 2006). The mass migration of poor 
Hungarians, Roma or non-Roma (all declaring themselves Roma in front 
of the Canadian authorities), and the saturation effect it caused, resulted 
in a declaration by the Canadian Immigration Minister, Jason Kenney, 
that the Roma from Eastern Europe are “bogus refugees” and a national 
security threat. Kenney promoted the introduction of Bill C31, intended to 
protect the country against the mass migration of these “bogus refugees” 
from Eastern Europe who he contended “were economic migrants coming 
to take advantage of the generous provision of the Canadian welfare 
system” (Levine-Rasky, 2012). The new Law entitled “Protecting Canada’s 
Immigration System Act” sorts refugees into ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ 
groups as Canadian sociologist Levine-Rasky put it. The new law was to 
designate some countries as ‘safe’ – to which refugees may be returned – in 
contrast to those that are not. On the list of the Designated Countries of 
Origin (DCO), Hungary (alongside with the Czech Republic and Slovakia) 
appears as a safe country. Accordingly, since the enforcement of the new Act 
in December 2012, refugees from Hungary are taken as ‘irregular arrivals’ 
and are not entitled to any provision from the state. 
Although this latest ‘new phase’ in the Canadian migration story 
once again seems to come to an end for the Hungarian Roma with the 
introduction of a new regulation by the Canadian government, the 
(politically) disturbed migration trend seems to have already found its way 
to other destinations (Cf. Kováts, 2002).120 With a knot in their stomachs, 
many of the Roma refugees in Toronto are now awaiting their official 
removal letter from the Refugee Board and are already planning to move 
forward. Some are planning to use their migration network to go to the 
UK in search of (unskilled) works. Some will come home temporarily, just 
to save enough money for the next journey, and will travel on either to 
120 The political interruption of the social process of migration between the two countries is 
historically nothing new. A previous example took place in December 2001 when Canada 
introduced the visa requirement for all Hungarian citizens entering the country.
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Germany or to Malta. Malta is a seemingly new target country, where a few 
Roma have already got their foot in the door of the (informal) service sector, 
facilitating more relatives and friends to follow in their footsteps. And no 
wonder: the ‘push factors’ that are the incentives for Roma to migrate out 
of Hungary (e.g. poverty, unemployment, and racism) are still prevalent, 
if not worse than before. Many of those who plan to continue to migrate 
stated almost unanimously that, these days, Hungary “is not a country 
where people like Gypsies.” At the same time, due to the overwhelmingly 
good experiences of Canadian Roma migrants, the ‘culture of migration’ 
(Massey, 1993) – that is, the “culture where migration is considered to be 
the only way to improve one’s standard of living” (Hearing at al., 2004) 
– is widely diffused nowadays amongst poor Hungarian Roma from 
economically disadvantaged regions in Hungary.121
The life of migrants in Toronto
I would now like to consider the migration stories of two Roma families, 
both which can be regarded as ‘ideal types’ of the migration process from 
Hungary to Canada: whilst the first one exemplifies a (so far) ‘success story’; 
the other one is a prototypical example of unsuccessful or ‘failed migrants’ 
(cf. Vidra, 2012).
We look first at the ‘success’ story: Turdy (alias Zolika) moved with 
his family (wife and two young children) from a middle-sized settlement 
in Borsod County to Toronto in the beginning of 2011. Turdy and his wife 
are in their early thirties. They belong to the Roma lower-middle class. 
They have completed primary school (eight years of formal education), one 
or two years of vocational training, and went on to work for many years in 
menial labor. Even though they had worked hard doing exhausting, semi-
skilled physical jobs, they were not able to earn enough money in the past 
121 It is so widely diffused that the Canadian Embassy in Hungary recently initiated a four-
week billboard campaign in Miskolc discouraging Roma from seeking asylum in Canada, 
highlighting the changes to the refugee system.  The posters say that unjustified refugee 
claimants will be deported and sent back home much more rapidly than before.   (HVG-
online, 20130118/itthon).
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few years to be able to support their family or even pay the utility bills 
necessary for keeping their house up, now in a state of disrepair. 
After a few years, Turdy reached a stage in his and his family’s life 
where he was fed up with their destitute economic situation. At the same 
time, both he and his wife’s parents died, freeing them of the obligations 
related to strong family ties (Granovetter, 1987). Freedom, though gained 
within sad circumstances, still facilitated their free movement.122
“Just think of it: I work day and night, me and my wife, too. 
[One day] I had a craving for canned Sardines. And my wife 
says to me, ‘do not buy them, Turdy,’ for every penny has its place 
(in the household budget). Then I sat in my car and thought 
about it: you work hard and you can’t even buy a 300 forint 
(CAN 1.2) can of sardines. And you have, every single month, 
an outstanding (utility) bill. And these bills are just piling up. 
Right then and there, I just decided to try [to move to] Canada. 
I didn’t see other way out [of the poverty]. It was just after my 
father, and Kate’s (his wife) parents died, too. You ask us ‘why 
[we came] Canada [and not somewhere else]?’ I came here because 
they (his migrant friends already in Toronto) said: ‘Canada is 
good money.’ They said, ‘you could save up a hundred thousand 
(forints, around $400) in a month from your welfare [check].’ 
And I needed one million forints ($4,000) to get my house done 
[renovated, back in Hungary]. So, I tried and came here.”
Turdy’s motivation for migration was clearly economically motivated: 
his goal was to get his family out of poverty. He hoped to not only to have 
a better livelihood temporarily, in their new home in Canada, but also to 
save enough money so that they could one day return to Hungary. In fact, 
practically none of the Roma migrants I met in Toronto planned to leave 
their home country, Hungary, forever. They saw migration as a temporary 
122 Also see Portes (2010) on the downsides of social capital. As Portes states, one of the negative 
consequences of social capital (in terms of one’s strong social ties with kin) is that it restricts 
individual freedom.
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economic strategy worth investing into in order to get out of poverty (cf. 
Stark, 1991): A poverty both caused and exasperated not only by unequal 
access to social, economic, and political resources (unequal opportunities 
in education and employment) but also by mainstream anti-Gypsyism in 
Hungarian society.
Turdy also had clear political motivations for migrating, too: to escape 
the widespread, everyday experience of ethnic discrimination against 
Gypsies in Hungary. Not just Turdy, but also almost everyone I spoke to 
mentioned, when I asked about leaving Hungary, that “it is not good to be 
Gypsy in Hungary.” 
After brooding over his hopeless, destitute economic and social 
situation at home, Turdy decided to invest in the process of migration. He 
sold the family car, used up all his wife’s severance pay, and even borrowed 
some money from close family members to buy airplane tickets for his 
family of four: he, his wife, and their two children. 
His migration network strongly facilitated this transatlantic move. 
Migrant friends and family provided information about life in Canada 
and gave the useful tips and tricks as to how to make ‘quick money’. 
Additionally, his network actually provided accommodation for him and 
his family in the first period after his arrival to Canada.  The ‘transnational 
migration network’ (Hajnal, 2002; see also Lewitt, 2001; Portes, 2010) is 
the strongest facilitator of Roma migration: not only by disseminating the 
‘culture of migration’, but also by reducing the cost of migration. 
Let us listen to Turdy’s own account:
“You come here [to Toronto] and you don’t have any money 
on you. And you need money for everything. Your first three 
months go by, as you save up every penny and you just manage 
to eat. I swear to you, that is how it is. We came out here, 
another family, a friend of ours put us up, but not for free. 
Nothing here is free! Our first welfare [benefits] went to this 
family who gave us shelter. While we were living with them, we 
didn’t have a penny. We gave our welfare to them for putting 
us up. When we came here, it was winter; the days were so cold 
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that you couldn’t even go out on the street, ‘cos you didn’t have 
(proper) clothes for it. I managed to buy my first (winter) hat 
after the second month - for five dollars.” 
One of the central features of this migration network is the principle 
of reciprocity regarding all social practices or business conducted amongst 
its members. This network – a source of social capital for those who belong 
to it – can be seen as a web of mutual obligations according to a code 
of norms, with reciprocity at the center: A web of “social chits” in which 
its members provide different kinds of ‘help’ (access to scarce resources) 
to other members in need with the expectation that these favors will be 
fully repaid sometime in the future (Portes, 2010). The writer Paulo Coelho 
(2005) coined the phrase “favor bank” in one of his novels: a system, he 
says, that governs most of our lives. In what way, you ask? We can say, 
rather significantly, since those who have not accumulated any ‘social chits’, 
any obligation or favors to be returned from the other members of this 
transnational migration network, are resource less during the process of 
migration. Either they will not be able to migrate, despite their desire to do 
so, or they might be the ‘losers’ in the migration process, an ‘unsuccessful 
migrant’, as we will soon observe in our second, ‘ideal typical’ migration 
story about Esther, a mother of four from a Gypsy colony near Miskolc. 
Another main cost-reducing factor for poor, lower-educated Hungarian 
migrants in Canada is the affluence and openness of the Canadian society. 
Many Canadian families dump their abundant superfluity in the bins 
back home – goods that will no longer be needed in their new households. 
On the streets of richer neighborhoods in Toronto, one can find almost 
everything what one needs to start a new life: second hand furniture, 
cutlery, old and (even sometimes) new clothes. Occasionally, one can even 
find treasure boxes filled with antique jewelry and watches. These consumer 
goods or products are in such good condition that not only poorer Roma 
(and non-Roma) but also better-off, educated, upper-middle class new 
Roma immigrants will use them to start their new life in Canada – with 
almost no initial costs, one can begin again. 
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During one of our many conversations in Toronto, Turdy once said 
to me:  
“Here, you become a millionaire in no time. In three months 
you can start a completely new life. Back at home, a whole life 
is not enough to start up a new life. I’m telling you, you come 
here [to Toronto] and you have nothing: no fork, no knife, no 
spoon, no carpet, nothing. In three months, you have a flat and 
everything. You have a full life. ‘Cos it’s a full life for me (in 
Hungarian, “ fullosan élek”). Here, all my clothes come from 
the garbage. I have trousers, t-shirts, and shoes for the kids – 
everything from the garbage. Here the rubbish bin (garbage 
can) is like the “Chinese market” at home. Indeed, it is even 
better here - you find designer clothes in the garbage, not only 
those ‘made in China’ [poor quality garments].” 
‘A full life’ or a ‘millionaire’s life’ (in Hungarian: “fullos élet”) for 
the Hungarian Gypsies from Borsod County means when the basic needs, 
plus a bit more, are met: one has everything that he/she wishes for his or 
her family: enough food, clothes to wear, a furnished flat, a television, and 
even a second hand car. For migrant Gypsies, having these things means 
satisfaction with their lives. 
Migration and the informal economy
What factors enable somebody to become a successful, or fortunate, migrant 
in Canada? It is common knowledge in the Hungarian (Gypsy and non-
Gypsy) migrant communities that one cannot make a living from receiving 
welfare exclusively – not even in Canada. Therefore, the key to success is 
to make some ‘quick money’ on top of the welfare allowance. There are 
many ways of achieving this end: all you need is ‘cleverness’ or ‘craftiness’, 
as many informants put it. In this respect, the only difference between the 
Gypsy and non-Gypsy migrants is that, while the Gypsies will celebrate 
their ‘cunningness’ or ‘craftiness’ (i.e. the art of navigating the informal 
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economy, which needs both skill and a special personal quality (Pulay, 2012)) 
aloud, non-Gypsies seem to keep quiet about it (cf. Stewart, 1993). The latter 
also conduct their ‘small informal businesses’ and employ their own ‘small 
cleverness’ to acquire quick money, but, unlike their Gypsy comrades, they 
do not speak about it publicly. The scale of these crafty ‘businesses’, as they call 
them, is wide: ranging from the most innocent informal economic activity 
like scrap metal collection, to more fraudulent activities like acquiring extra 
state benefits on top of their welfare allowances (i.e. state supported ‘dietary 
allowances’) or even illegal enterprises like credit fraud.
I would like to clarify at this point that I interpret the economic practice 
of ‘cunning’ or ‘crafty’ business amongst Hungarian welfare-dependent 
migrants in the theoretical framework of informal economy. According to 
the official definition, as defined by the International Labor Organization 
(ILO), informal economic activities are those practices that generate 
income but fail to be registered by the relevant authorities and, thus, avoid 
taxes (Kim, 2005). In the case of our refugee migrants, collecting scrap 
metal is such an activity, since it is a kind of unregistered self-employment. 
Economic anthropologist Keith Hart, who coined the term ‘informal 
economy’ and applied it basically to self-employed, informal workers (in 
contradiction to wage-earning employment) in African urban settings, has 
emphasized the dynamics and diversity of these activities (Hart, 1973). 
At the same time, economic sociologists stress that there is a universal 
character to informal economy, noting its ‘cushioning affect’ in advanced 
countries in relation to the marginal segments of societies – a sector 
that would otherwise have meager access or be completely deprived of 
subsistence. Therefore, societies would be politically less peaceful without 
informal economy’s income generating opportunities (Portes, 2010). Portes 
also points out that combining welfare with off-the-books temporary work 
has become a ‘way of life’ for many marginalized groups all over the world 
(cf. MacDonald, 1994). The Hungarian migrant (Gypsy and non-Gypsy) 
welfare claimants are just one of many examples of this practice. While, it 
is not my intention here to detail how these ‘crafty businesses’ are practiced, 
I would like to emphasize that, according to the Gypsies I lived together 
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with in Toronto (non-Gypsies refused to discuss their informal economic 
practices with me), the ‘crafty businesses’ they are engaged in are, by 
definition, victimless. Indeed, in their minds, such a business can only be 
called ‘clever’ or ‘crafty’ if it provides them with quick money but does not 
hurt anybody. One informant defined it like this:
“What do I call cleverness?! When everybody makes his own 
business, makes money of it, but still can be restful in his sleep.” 
When we say practices that do not hurt ‘anybody’, in this context 
we mean does not hurt ‘any individual person’ who has a ‘face’. As these 
‘businessmen’ see it, the state (any state), is a faceless entity (Hajnal, 2002; 
Horvath, 2001), therefore, it is not vicious to rip it off. A good example here 
is the case of the ‘diet money’. In Canada, people with special dietary needs 
are entitled to an extra social provision called ‘diet money’. The maximum 
allowance per person per month is $250 – almost half of one’s monthly 
welfare allowance. To acquire diet money, one need only find a mediator, 
a key agent in the migration industry. The mediator is usually a more 
established Gypsy migrant, who will take the client to a Canadian doctor 
who provides him with the necessary medical certificate of ‘having special 
dietary need’. It costs approximately $100, out of which the Canadian 
doctor gets fifty dollars. It is a good business for everybody, except the state. 
Some people may feel that the way of life described above is nothing 
to brag about and might wonder why low-educated Roma would actually 
celebrate their ‘cleverness’ or ‘cunningness’ so openly and proudly. Why, 
for instance, would they celebrate having to make a living on the informal 
economy? This ‘cleverness’ is indeed something they are proud of. For low-
educated people, as the vast majority of the new Roma migrants in Canada 
are, finding a regular, stable job on the formal labor market with which 
they can support a family is almost impossible. If they are lucky, they can be 
offered unregistered work, but this is usually unstable and badly paid. Still, 
some Roma migrants in Toronto were employed (still unreported) in jobs. 
Frequently, the businesses are owned by well-established Canadian citizens 
of Hungarian decent who were once migrants themselves. However, the 
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jobs are always in menial labor; for instance, packing at factories or working 
in construction. Due to their unreported nature, these jobs are neither safe 
nor long lasting: they never last over three or four months. Additionally, it 
is common for workers to get less money than they were promised for the 
work. It is no wonder that they prefer more ‘calculable’ economic activities 
that promise ‘quick money’. In the survey that we carried out in Toronto 
amongst Hungarian migrants, everybody who had arrived in the last two 
to three years had the same answer to the question about their means of 
livelihood: “We get welfare benefits and, on top of that, the men collect scrap 
metal.” They told us that one can earn $700 (HUF 160,000) a month if 
one is “clever” or “good at” it. In this case, cleverness means that he has the 
skills to differentiate valuable scrap metal from cheaper varieties and is able 
to sell it to the scrap yard. A good scrapper has a good knowledge of public 
spaces and knows where one can find quantities of good quality scrap metal 
on the city streets. One also has to be industrious enough to be able to find 
enough scrap metal per day, given the growing competition as an increasing 
number of migrants arrive on the scene. 
Migrants consider their scrap iron collecting and garbage rummaging 
activities “work” and accordingly construct their identity as (informal) 
migrant workers around this work. Their economic and social practices 
are very similar to other informal workers. For example, one can draw 
parallels with Brazilian catadores, who collect and sell recyclable materials 
at garbage dumps in Rio de Janeiro (Miller, 2009). In the context of the 
officially unemployed, welfare dependent Hungarian migrants in Canada, 
I would concur with Miller and Perelman (2007) that we should “integrate 
poverty studies and the anthropology of work” (Millar, 2009: 26) as well 
as conceptualizing informal labor as a form of work, rather than framing 
the activities of the poor and officially unemployed as survival strategies of 
those members of society on the margin. Within such a context, we can 
indeed consider the refugee migration process that is experienced by the 
Hungarian Roma (and non-Roma) a form of labor migration. 
As demonstrated above, migrating to Canada is only a good strategy if 
someone can make use of the opportunities provided by the refugee provision 
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system, as well as the formal and informal economy, ‘cleverly’. ‘Cleverness’ 
or cunning means finding economic opportunities that produce ‘quick 
money’. Although this quick money is accrued mainly through borderline 
informal (in that they are unreported) economic activities (collecting scrap 
metal or returning recycling bottles to supermarkets), sometimes they cross 
the line of illegal businesses. A common example of this is credit fraud. 
In Canada a refugee is a solvent, creditable person. They even get 
their welfare allowance by credit card. Low-educated migrants who have 
never before experienced the advantages and disadvantages of an advanced 
economy’s financial culture have quickly learnt through their migrant friends 
that “in Canada, credit is the essence. Refugees become millionaires from credit.” 
For example, according to some, it is one sort of ‘cleverness’ to buy 
a valuable mobile phone with a monthly contract using their credit card, 
even if they have little money at the moment of their purchase. Resale of the 
phone to another person will yield quick money and be economic success 
for many. The fact that they have to pay installments at a high interest rate 
is a matter for the future – a future where they may not even be in Canada. 
The problem for these ‘businesses’ with the quick money made from 
illegal activities within the informal economy is that it is restricted to that 
short period of time until the formal economic institutions (banks, mobile 
phone companies, etc.) find out that they are being ‘ripped off’.123 This 
realization may take some time, but it definitely comes sooner or later. 
Although formerly it could be said it was worth the risk: as one of the 
previous Roma migrants put it, “this country is not clever yet, there’s still 
time to be craftier” (Hajnal, 2002). These days, Canadian institutions have 
wised up to these practices. As hundreds of new migrants, rather than just 
a few, try their luck with these strategies, it becomes increasingly obvious 
what and how they are doing it and institutions will catch up with and put 
an end to  it. Nowadays, due to the saturation effect, there are not many 
banks that would give a credit card to a new Hungarian refugee. 
123 According to contemporary definitions, illegal economy “encompasses the production and 
distribution of legally prohibited goods and services” (Portes, 2010: 133). This includes 
activities such as credit fraud. 
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This saturation effect has also led to the creation of the “making of the 
Hungarian refugee” as a problem in Canada. Contrary to the situation in 
Western Europe, where researchers have aptly described the ethnicization of 
a migrant group: e.g. the formation of the phenomenon of “making of the 
Roma/Gypsies” from all the Slovakian migrants in the UK (Grill, 2012), we 
can witness in Canada the “nationalization” of all refugees from Hungary. 
Paradoxically, those who have been stigmatized at home on the basis of 
their ethnicity, now have to struggle with the stigma of their nationality. 
A Roma migrant woman happily wrote about it on Facebook shortly after 
her arrival a year ago. She said that, for the first time ever in her life, she 
feels free: “my skin color is not my scarlet letter (the basis for being stigmatized) 
anymore.” The catch 22, however, is that she now has to suffer from bearing 
the label of being a Hungarian refugee. In response, she decided to change 
her identity strategy by actually using her - now beneficial - skin color: “I’ d 
rather [tell people I am] Italian or Greek, than admit to being a Hungarian.” 
In this context, it is also understandable why those more affluent 
Roma musicians from Hungary who migrated some time ago and are now 
Canadian citizens are reluctant to speak Hungarian in public spaces. They 
do not interact with Roma who have recently migrated (except if they are 
‘decent families’) and do not live in the same building as them. In fact, 
even the more established, middle-lower class Roma migrants look down 
upon those of their poor, lower-class, uneducated brethren who have most 
recently migrated.
Once again, we can observe here the same logic inherent in all the 
Established-Outsiders relationships that we analyzed earlier. We see how the 
established migrants stigmatize the newcomer migrants, labeling them as 
“know-nothings”, “untalented”, “different way-of-thinking” people. All the 
while, the newcomers represent a threat to them, too: they will downgrade 
the whole Hungarian migrant community’s image in the mainstream 
society’s eyes – especially for the Gypsy community, an already stigmatized 
group. Therefore, the Established feels it necessary to constantly make 
distinctions and differentiate between their own group and the others, 
marking them as inferior and with less human worth (Elias, 1994). 
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Turdy’s opinion about his fellow Gypsy migrants in Toronto 
demonstrates this logic well:
“The problem is that these newcomer Gypsies have ruined our 
good reputation…I’ve been thinking about it a lot…I bet the 
only solution could be if someone, a well-educated Gadjo124, 
would select the normal [Gypsies]. Those like me…or Caspar125 
– the ones who want to break out of poverty, of stigmatization. 
One should select the normal Gypsies according to cleverness, 
education, and attitude. Then I would separate them from the 
worse Gypsies. You know, those whom you can decide at the 
first sight that [they] can’t think of anything else but roguish 
[criminal behavior]. I would lock up these worse ones and let 
them live in their own, separated environment. And then we 
can see what the Hungarians think of the Gypsies?! [I would 
say to the Hungarians] ‘You judge them, but don’t judge me!’ 
Only in this way I could stick to myself. Otherwise, the whole 
situation is hopeless.”
The established Roma migrants blame the newcomers for causing their 
situation to deteriorate in regards to every aspect of life in Canada. It is not 
only that they are no longer able to get credit: almost all other money making 
opportunities will eventually cease due to this latest mass migration of the 
new Roma migrants. Even collecting scrap metal has become harder since 
summer 2012. This was the point at which Canadian authorities themselves 
became ‘craftier’: they borrowed Hungarian-speaking policemen from 
Hungary to get the Roma out of the practice of scrap metal collecting. 
A scrapper shared his experience with this change in affairs:
 “Nowadays, there is a Hungarian policeman in every police car. 
The Hungarian policeman says to you (in your own language), 
‘My Brother, what are you doing here, collecting scrap metal?!’  
124 A non-Gypsy
125 My co-worker, who asked me to call him ‘Caspar Iron’ (in Hungarian ‘Vasas Gazsi’) in this 
text to retain his anonymity. 
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One of these kinds stopped my brother the other day. My brother 
answered that ‘I’m only picking up rubbish from the street, 
why, is it not allowed?!’ Then the policeman told him it was 
not. My brother didn’t understand why not: ‘I’m not cheating, 
not stealing, not robbing anyone, so, what’s wrong with it - to 
pick up metal from the street?!’ The policeman explained to him 
that you can’t collect metal when you are on welfare. You should 
pay tax after collecting metal, even at home (in Hungary). Full 
stop. He even asked for his welfare identification number and 
arranged to get his welfare money withdrawn for three months. 
And he was a Hungarian policeman. Yet, I can’t be bothered; 
I’m still going to collect [scrap metal].” 
When a newcomer’s migration is unsuccessful
According to established migrants, another problem with new migrants, 
apart from the saturation effect they create in terms of the Canadian 
informal economic market, is that there are many uneducated Gypsies 
amongst them who do not even have the ‘talent’ of ‘Gypsy cunningness’ 
and who can only make money through illegal activities. Many established 
migrants mentioned to me that, after many years of maintaining a friendly 
relationship with the Hungarian Roma ‘metal collectors’, nowadays, the 
Toronto scrap yard even has a little sign posted up on the board saying (in 
Hungarian) “we don’t buy stolen tracks.126”
Many examples of our second ideal prototype, the ‘unsuccessful 
migrant’, can be found within this group of newcomers. Some of them sold 
126 During my stay in Toronto, I sometimes visited the scrap yard with my Roma friends. 
Every time, they were welcome by the friendly greeting: “Szoszi Mo?” (in Romani: “How 
are you doing?”). When I asked the yard’s workers about their experiences with the Roma, 
considering their derogatory note (about stolen tracks), mentioned above, they said, “in 
every nation there are good and bad people, one can’t generalize.” However, my Roma 
friends emphasized that, from time to time, although Canadian people have been helpful 
with them so far, recently, they have started to eye Hungarians suspiciously because of the 
‘knowing-nothing’ newcomers.
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all their assets just to buy the plane tickets while others managed to move 
to Toronto with the ‘help’ of informal moneylenders. There are some illegal 
(but definitely professional) ‘migration agents’ and some are Hungarian 
businessmen, whose business practices are catered to address the needs 
of the uneducated poor. They not only lend money (with an interest rate 
ranging from twenty-five to a hundred percent) to them, but also arrange to 
buy their plane tickets and provide them with (bus) transport from Miskolc 
to the airport – either the one in Budapest or in Vienna. These agents have 
their own people in Canada, who welcome the migrants upon their arrival 
in Toronto and begin collecting their monthly welfare allowance (in some 
cases they simply confiscate the bank card through which all their welfare 
money is transferred). 
Another important agent in the migration industry that specializes in 
services for the uneducated poor, and who usually does not speak a word of 
English, is the ‘interpreter’. Interpreters are usually established Hungarian 
migrants, who claimed and gained their refugee status many years ago and 
have since become Canadian citizens.  Some of them realized that they 
can make a good livelihood out of this business: the price of a piece of 
advice or a brief visit to a local Canadian doctor or other administrative 
office goes for between $20-50 (or, as the Hungarian Roma always convert 
into Hungarian forints, HUF 5,000-12,500).127 However, there is also a 
subgroup of interpreters (especially amongst the older generation of the 
Hungarian migrants who became Canadian citizens a long time ago) who 
have taken it on as their ‘mission’ to help defenseless, low-educated Roma 
migrants (Vidra, personal communication). 
The disadvantage of having an interpreter’s help became obvious 
during my fieldwork. For the low-educated Roma, lacking cultural capital 
(formal education and a working knowledge of English), their interpreter 
becomes their ‘Lord’, the one whose local knowledge and organizational 
127 The migrant Roma, who mostly have no more than eight years of schooling on average, 
prove to be brilliant mental mathematicians. Their everyday practice of converting all the 
Canadian prices into Hungarian forints suggests that, although living abroad, they are still 
very ‘Hungarian’ and their main aspiration is to save up enough money to facilitate a better 
life when they return to Hungary. 
235
T H E  ‘ N E W  W A V E ’  O F  R O M A  M I G R A T I O N
skills determine their ‘life and death’. They can become so dependent and 
become so accustomed to being ripped off by their interpreter that, after 
some time, they cannot even recognize it anymore. The incident described 
below demonstrates this situation quite well.
One day, my Gypsy host family and I went off on a trip to the Niagara 
Falls, a sixty-kilometer drive from Toronto. Finding our way from the 
city to the motorway proved to be tricky, so, we thought we had got lost. 
Turdy’s automatic reaction was to instruct his wife: “Let’s call Ani128, right 
now, and ask her how to get to the motorway.” This short phone call would 
have cost him twenty dollars, but it would cost Ani, their otherwise helpful 
interpreter, only two minutes of her time.129 
This incident is only a tiny illustration of how defenseless migrants can 
be without speaking the language of their host country and how they have 
to live at the mercy of their interpreters. This defenselessness applies to many 
aspects of everyday life in Toronto: from the visit to the welfare office, where a 
good translator can easily arrange some extra provisions for the Roma refugee, 
to seeing a doctor, arranging one’s driving license or the most important event 
in a migrant Gypsy’s life, the legal hearing. Here, even a mistranslated word 
can change the outcome of the judgment of his/her refugee claim. 
For the majority of Roma migrants, Canada is – or was – a good 
experience: Canada means a “ full life”, a “Canaan, regarding food”. (That 
is to say, as many of them put it, “you can eat as much as you want here, 
unlike at home.”) For other migrants, moving to Canada proved to be a bad 
idea, an unsuccessful turn of events, given the outcome of their migration 
experience. Although, according to our survey, this ‘unsuccessful’ group 
makes up approximately no more than 10% of all migrants, their experience 
is not without a cautionary message.130 
128 Their interpreter
129 After a few minutes, my Gypsy co-worker and I managed to convince Turdy that, rather 
than calling Ani, we could just stop and check the route on the map that we bought on our 
arrival. Finally, we found our way to the falls and saved twenty dollars for the day.
130 We asked the following question in our survey: “Do you consider your move to Canada 
a good or a bad experience; do you have a good or a bad memory of Canada?” I consider 
migrants ‘unsuccessful’ if they said that Canada was a bad experience for them. 
236
J U D I T  D U R S T
Esther’s case is a good illustration of the ‘unsuccessful’ migration in 
this group. Esther left Petersland in February 2010 with her husband and 
four children. She left the settlement in Hungary with twenty other Gypsy 
families.
“The whole plane was full of us Gypsies. The previous flight was 
all Gypsies, too. We went on the same bus from Petersland to the 
airport in Budapest, but we were not allowed to speak to each 
other: not on the bus, nor on the plane, either. All us Gypsies told 
the same story when they arrived to Toronto; that we fled from 
the Guard. It was silly and they didn’t swallow it. You want the 
honest truth? We all went because we were penniless.” 
According to Esther, they were ‘coaxed’ to migrate, persuaded to 
make the move by relatives and neighbors from the settlement who had 
just came back from Canada, saying that it was ‘Canaan’ and, of course, by 
moneylenders who lent them the money for their plane tickets. 
Esther’s biggest hope was to “make some money” out there in Toronto 
and to “have a better life.” Instead, she ended up living in a big block of 
flats, the West Lodge, where almost all the Gypsies from Petersland lived at 
that time. Some of them were luckier than Esther. Esther’s rented flat was 
full of bed bugs. One of her adolescent sons’ legs was so badly bitten that 
he needed several months of medical treatment for the bed bugs after their 
return to Miskolc. However, the main reason Esther decided to go home 
was the drug issue. Her boys, both in their late teens, had such easy access 
to marijuana and other drugs and hung around with such dangerous gangs 
that Esther started to fear for their lives. They did not go to school. As the 
boys themselves said: “We were afraid of the niggers there.” 
So, after five months, Esther decided that it was better to move the 
family back home, although, to date, she has yet to pay back her debt (with 
significant interest) to the local (informal) moneylender. 
What Canada means to Esther, looking back after one year after 
returning home, is very different from the experiences had by more 
successful migrants:
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“It was not a good experience for me. It’s better for me to be 
at home. What comes to my mind regarding Canada? That 
building, the stink, drugs. The people there are out of their 
minds; they go there to rip each other off. We didn’t bother 
with anybody though; my husband went to do ‘garbage’ 
[rummaging] and I was at home with the children and didn’t 
really go anywhere. I planned to stay there for one year, however, 
I couldn’t bear to be locked up and [I had] all the worries about 
the boys. They were so spaced out; they could get drugs so cheap. 
At home, at least they have to work to be able to buy it. But out 
there, everything came so easy for them. It got dangerous, so I 
decided to take them home.” 
The above Roma Canadian migration story can also be read as a 
metaphor of how the habitus of the poor Gypsy survives residential changes, 
whether a transnational movement or just an intra-country migration. Due 
to a lack of (even weak) ties within the receiving country’s community, 
Roma migrants coming from Petersland, a rural settlement near Miskolc 
with a significant local Roma population, they continue to live in Toronto 
almost identically to how they did in their Gypsy community back home. 
They created an ethnic enclave in the heart of the metropolis by once again 
ending up in residentially clustered neighborhoods. This area was once a 
flourishing neighborhood in Toronto (at least, according to the established 
migrants) but has now, in the last two years, been turned into ethnic 
enclaves of the Hungarian Gypsies. West Lodge, the infamous block of 
flats where Esther and her family once lived, accommodates almost five 
hundred Roma families. Everyone lives off of social welfare. It gained its 
reputation as “infamous” by the media, the established migrants, and by 
the police who all dubbed it a “dangerous place.” Before I went there myself 
in order to visit some Roma migrant families whom I got to know through 
an interpreter friend of mine in Toronto, even my host family, Turdy, and 
his friends warned me: “You should not go there, that is a dangerous place, 
a ghetto, they will kill you there.” This reaction struck me as ironic since it 
is a typical stigmatization of many urban slums, some Gypsy villages in 
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Hungary, and all over the world. Yet, admittedly, it is a stigmatization that 
gains power partly from the reality that, among the dwellers of these slums, 
drug addicts also live here.
Nowadays, the majority of the tenants come from the same rural 
settlement in Hungary: Petersland. This is partly because Canadian 
landlords are not willing to rent out flats to Hungarian refugees anymore 
– only in West Lodge. On the other hand, people from Petersland, who do 
not speak English, do not feel safe anywhere except amongst each other. 
This is how the ‘red belt’ of Toronto came to be created in the past few 
years. 
In West Lodge, one can observe pastimes from rural life in Petersland’s 
Gypsy colony. Youngsters on drugs crowd the entrance lobby queuing up 
for (and obstructing others from) the elevator.  Crying babies in buggies 
cram the upper corridors. Women offer tit-bits of their
cooking to their next-door neighbors; the time of day, mid-afternoon 
or ten o’clock at night, does not seem to matter. The vibrant life of the 
Hungarian rural Gypsy colony has been recreated. Non-Gypsy neighbors 
(mostly Asian or Canadian welfare recipients) complain to the local 
authorities about the “unbearable amount of noise” coming from their new 
Gypsy neighbors’ apartments. They say they also find the ‘rural’ Gypsy 
colony lifestyle intimidating.131 However, there is a mutual fear of the 
‘other’ within the West Lodge neighborhood; non-Roma, Canadians feel 
unsafe with their Roma neighbors, but also the Roma themselves are scared 
of the ‘others’ that live amongst them (‘niggers’,132 drug addicts, etc.)
131 It is a commonly observed conflict in Europe, too, within neighborhoods comprising of 
Roma and non-Roma migrants. One of the reasons for the conflict is, as Grill put it, that 
“the Roma sense and use of public space does not fit in easily with local practices.”  For the 
Hungarian Roma migrant coming from a rural Gypsy colony, spending leisure time in the 
lobby or in the public corridor of the block of flats, even at late hours, is “simply part of 
their daily habitual sociability, but it is also a practice that makes them highly distinctive” 
and even an “unwelcome, intimidating sight” in the eyes of their non-Roma neighbors. 
(Grill, 2012: 46). 
132 Migrant Gypsies call the Afro-Americans ‘nigger’ (in Hungarian: ‘Feka’), and they are scared 
of them since they believe many of them are involved in drug traffic. 
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Class-related or ethnicity-related migration?
This new migration pattern to Canada seems to be more class-related than 
ethno-culturally defined. That is, it is not at all specific to the Roma. In 
fact, we met many Hungarian (non-Roma) migrants in Toronto who come 
from Miskolc, or other cities, and who are only claiming to be Roma to be 
entitled to the refugee status. ‘Switching ethnicity’ is a beneficial economic 
strategy for migrants coming from Hungary to Canada.  One of the entries 
in my Roma co-workers fieldwork diary goes like this:
“I met with an interesting thing today: Hungarian people from 
Hungary who are not Roma. I asked them how come they are 
here. They didn’t want to answer. Then one of them said: ‘It is 
better to be a Gypsy in Canada than a Hungarian in Hungary. 
But if they force me to go home, I’ ll be Hungarian again; I will 
not want to hear from the Gypsies then.’ I think it is disgusting, 
tasteless. I’m sending my word to the members of Jobbik [a right 
wing political party with ties to the Magyar Garda], that they 
should filter out these people who declare themselves Gypsy in 
Canada and then upon returning home, join the Hungarian 
Guard. I have to laugh.” 
These two-faced Hungarian migrants typically did not want to answer 
our survey questions, or even talked to us, even briefly. They seemed to have 
something to hide. 
However, of the Hungarian non-Roma refugees, originating from all 
over Hungary, we have met some who had frequent interaction with the 
Roma migrant community. Not only did their Hungarian children play 
happily with their Roma migrant friends, living in the same block of flats 
in Toronto, but also there were examples of ‘mixed marriages’ among young 
Hungarian men and Gypsy women – a social relationship that is far from 
commonplace in Hungary these days. 
I have chosen to include the story of one Hungarian young man 
from this latter group. Although this migrant group deserves much more 
thorough research in the future, based on the ethnographic experience I 
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gained both in Toronto and Miskolc, I believe his story to be in some way 
a kind of typical narrative for this group. 
Robi is in his mid-thirties. He used to live in one of Miskolc’ better 
housing estates, the third block of Avas. Since it is an ethnically mixed 
part of the city, he had not only Hungarian but also Roma friends, too. 
Regarding his family circumstances and social status, his life didn’t differ 
too much from the Roma living in Avas. However, his life got off to an 
unfortunate start as his father died when he was six years old and his mother 
then went on to have nine children from three different fathers. 
Regarding his social status, he was in the same position as many of his 
Gypsy friends in the city: he had eleven years of schooling with vocational 
training in the construction industry. He never worked as wage laborer. He 
enjoyed autonomy and worked as a self-employed peddler. He recently became 
unemployed, as his business fell apart. He moved to Toronto two years ago 
with his sister, after his cousin coaxed them to leave Hungary; first migrating 
to the UK and then, when that did not prove to work out, to Canada. 
When I asked him about his ethnic affiliation, he tried to avoid the 
answer jokingly: “I don’t know. You should ask my mum.” However, his 
Roma girlfriend did not leave room for doubt about his ethnicity: 
“Why do you always have to joke?! Just look at him, how white 
he is. There is no one who would say you could be a Gypsy. 
You know how it is: one recognizes it immediately who is 
Gypsy. Not only his family members but also all his friends are 
Hungarian,” she asserted.
After a while it became quite obvious that Robi was only reluctant to 
admit in front of me that he used the opportunity to identify himself as 
Roma in Canada merely for the sake of the refugee status. 
Later on, in the course of our long conversation, it became clear that 
he considers himself a non-Roma Hungarian: somebody who has a higher 
social status than his Roma girlfriend and her other Gypsy friends. This sense 
of status is confirmed by a Hungarian ethnic identity that is not stigmatized 
and by his Hungarian friends, who all have a higher social status.
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However, it is important to reiterate that, despite the fact we have 
focused here on a description of the new wave of migration as a mass 
outmigration of lower-class, poor, low-educated Roma (and non-Roma) 
families, there is no exclusive homogeneous stream of migrants coming 
to Toronto. Some highly educated, relatively well-off Roma intellectuals 
have also recently moved to Canada. A few of them have even publicly 
demonstrated their well-grounded reasons for leaving their anti-Gypsy 
home country behind. 
What awaits Gypsies when they return home from “doing Canada”? 
(in Hungarian: Kanadázó cigányok)
We mentioned previously how greatly Roma migrants fear receiving their 
asylum refusal letter. They have good reasons, too. The account below 
foreshadows the kind of social milieu that welcomes many a migrant Gypsy 
back in their hometown, after returning to Miskolc. 
One evening, a van carrying an extended Roma family and their 
friends back to Toronto from Niagara Falls, was knocked off the motorway 
by a lorry. The lorry did a hit and run, leaving behind the broken van. As 
a result of this accident, an eleven-year old boy died, three adults were put 
into intensive care at the local hospital and almost all of the passengers had 
more or less serious injuries. The family had only wanted to see Niagara 
Falls, a ‘must see’ for almost all Gypsy migrants in Toronto, on their last 
day in Canada before they were forced to return home to Hungary. 
Friends and acquaintances in Hungary heard about the tragic event 
just hours after it took place via Facebook and by speaking to the family via 
Internet video calls. What was shocking, was that, even under these tragic 
circumstances, people from the extreme right (members of the Miskolc 
Hungarian Guard) felt no shame in posting comments on Facebook, 
directed towards their Gypsy acquaintances (more accurately, their enemies) 
from the same settlement,  stating that  “it’s a shame that only one of you 
died”, and “should all the fucking Gypsies have passed away in the accident, it 
would have been better for everybody.”
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This story, although extreme in its callousness, is indicative of the 
ill-natured social context in which Gypsies and non-Gypsies are forced to 
endure in Miskolc and of the general political climate, together with its 
far right local government, that dominates the surrounding settlements. 
Regardless of their ethnic affiliation, the ruthless remarks of these 
individuals lacked all human feeling and sympathy for the victims of this 
road accident. However, if you ask a Gypsy from this area, they would tell 
you this is the crux of daily life in this region.
Another striking example of this disheartening social milieu is from 
another settlement near Miskolc. In this case, the local municipal leadership 
called an exclusive meeting behind closed doors to discuss the ‘issue’ of the 
returning Roma migrants to the township. According to one of our local 
informants, the crucial dilemma was whether to welcome back the Roma 
who have already returned (or were soon to return) from Canada or to try 
to displace/relocate them somewhere outside the border of the settlement. 
In the eyes of the local leadership and their followers, excommunicating 
them would be the best opportunity to get rid of the “undeserving poor” 
who have anyway “betrayed the Hungarians,” and ruined “our country’s 
good reputation abroad.” The returnees were also seen as having created an 
unbearable social burden upon their return, which the local government 
was not prepared to deal with. As one of the local clerks put it, “ it is proved 
that they [the Gypsies] are not welcome anywhere in the world, so why should 
we need to welcome them [back home] to our settlement?!”
Concluding remarks
While many elements of our research and analysis are still rudimentary in 
terms of their development, I hope that I was able highlight here some of 
most important features and patterns that we identified in this latest Roma 
migration wave to Canada.
For us, the most striking discovery is that this wave appears to feature 
a new pattern of Roma outmigration from Hungary (cf. Vidra-Virág, 
2012). Up until two years ago, only those who possessed either some social 
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and cultural capital (secondary education or some entrepreneur skill) or 
economic resources (savings or property) could choose a transnational 
migration strategy. Yet in the past two to three years, Gypsies (and non-
Gypsies) from the lower strata population have also managed to migrate, 
especially – or mainly – from the most economically and socially backward 
region of Hungary, Borsod County, known for its vivid anti-Gypsy, racist 
far right movement. Migrants decided to move not only for economic 
reasons, but also to flee from a social environment engulfed in hatred 
against them, a place where being a (visible, that is, black) Gypsy means 
being the lowest-of-the-low on the social strata and where one can expect 
to be treated like an inferior, undeserving being; unworthy of assistance 
or taxpayer’s money, unfit for the decent, upright mainstream society, the 
rightful subject for multifaceted discrimination on the labor market, in 
education, and in healthcare.
We have also been able to demonstrate how the prevalence of 
‘professionalized’ informal emigration brokers (primarily moneylenders) 
has recently facilitated migration even for uneducated, lower-class Roma 
groups with no resources. Out of all the migrants in Toronto, this group 
is the most defenseless. Not speaking a word of English, they can only 
manage their migrant life at the mercy of their Hungarian interpreters. With 
few exceptions, these two agents of the migration industry, the informal 
travel brokers (money lenders) and the interpreters, can make a good deal 
of money off the ignorance and neediness of poor, desperate people. The 
poor and illiterate, serve as a good basis for one’s profit-making economic 
activities – a maxim that holds true not only in terms of Hungary, but also 
for Canada and everywhere else for that matter (cf. Yasar, 2008).
It is also important to note that, although the culture of migration 
has spread out widely from the better-off, middle class Roma to the lower-
class Gypsies, this minority’s very lowest class has still missed even this 
opportunity. While this is partly because their social networks do not 
contain migrant members, it is also partly due to their larger family sizes 
(meanwhile the migrants have around three, they have five or six children 
on average) (Durst, 2007) and they simply are not able to afford to take 
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even the first step in the migration process: collecting the money to travel. 
Another reason they have also stayed behind is due to the strength of their 
family ties (and obligations). For those with many children and a large 
extended family, the greatest possible resource to insure their survival, 
the possibility of migrating (including even moving from their village) is 
unimaginable (Durst, 2011). 
Another important element of the Roma’s recent migration story is 
the relationship between poverty and development. The positive benefits of 
migration for the poor, the important role played by migrant remittances 
in poor people’s livelihoods (cf. De Haan, 2000 - as cited by Black at al., 
2006), is clear in the case of Hungarian Roma migrants. The vast majority 
of our migrant respondents (both returned and current) reported that they 
had managed to save up money whilst having been in Canada. Many sent 
back remittances regularly, almost every month or every other month, to 
their parents to pay for the rent of their council flats or to start renovation 
or refurbishment of their houses (having left them in the care of their 
parents or other close relatives at home). In the case of the young adults, 
some sent money back to pay a mortgage on their first home or for saving 
up to buy a new house when they return. However, family networks and 
resources were not just mobilized for the starting point of a migration 
journey – either when money was collected at home or sent from Canada 
to finance a migration trip for lower class migrants or when the established 
migrant family members send air tickets from Canada to their poorer 
family members at home. These networks come into play on their return, 
too. Those from Miskolc who did not have a place to stay when they were 
forced to leave Canada moved into the homes of their parents or siblings 
until they managed to find their own accommodation. 
However, unlike other returned migrant groups (cf. Portes, 2010; 
Lewitt, 2001), remittances sent back home by the Roma from Canada do 
not facilitate the social mobility of the returnees and their families. These 
remittances are not spent on their children’s education, on better healthcare, 
or starting up a new small enterprise but on everyday subsistence. They are 
used for renovating houses, settling outstanding utility bills, and, in many 
cases, for covering daily subsistence in a future period when the returnees 
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will be left without any social benefits or state support. For they all know, 
based on the experiences of friends and relatives who have already moved 
back to Hungary, that they will not be eligible for unemployment benefits 
and/or social welfare for at least one year after returning home. 
Last but not least, I would like to draw attention to the multiple policy 
implications of this latest Hungarian Roma migration story. With its new 
Immigration Act, Canada has indicated that the Eastern European Roma’s 
economic and social problems should be sorted out in their home country. 
Another one of my intentions in the context of this piece is to draw 
attention to the increasing emigration flow that is currently taking place, 
which the media has dubbed the ‘new exodus’ from Hungary. This 
departure from Hungary pertains to both Roma and non-Roma people and 
demonstrates that the social process currently taking place can and should 
be understood against the backdrop of the rapidly deteriorating economic 
and political situation in this country. Further, the rise and empowered 
presence of vigilant far right political movements, with their anti-Gypsy 
and anti-Semitic hate campaigns against minority groups – their chosen 
scapegoats during this time of worsening economic circumstances – is not 
to be taken lightly. This is another, worrying, dangerous social process 
taking place in Europe today that is putting people’s lives at risk.
The majority of the Roma migrants in Canada are in a sense economic 
refugees – even according to their own accounts – who have to face 
discrimination of all kinds in their everyday lives from birth to death. As 
we have observed, many of them have chosen migration as a short-term 
economic strategy. Many would have stayed in Hungary, should they have 
been able to find regular employment there. They have invested in the 
process of migration in the hope of saving up some money and being able 
lift themselves out of poverty when ultimately returning home. 
All in all, one of the core messages from this latest mass Roma 
migration is that: as long as the state and the local governments do not 
promote economic development, creating more job opportunities for 
unskilled laborers – a workforce in which the Roma are overrepresented 
(Kollo, 2000) – the culture of migration will be the only viable livelihood 
strategy for many able bodied, working age people.  
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Nonetheless, I add a thought here – with a bit of sarcasm – that some 
Hungarian, anti-Gypsy, Nationalist ‘wishful thinkers’ probably would not 
mind if this is exactly how the situation evolves, that Roma mass migration 
to the West continues, since Gypsies represent, in their eyes, the most 
troublesome, malfunctioning, unmanageable social problem the country 
has, or will ever have, to face. They might wistfully think that this would 
be the easiest way to rid Hungary of the Gypsies and solve the Hungarian 
“Gypsy question” once and for all. 
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